The electoral dynamics of human development

This paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980-2013. The incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account. A GMM estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development. Majority governments also influence it, but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects. The electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non-OECD countries, in countries with less frequent elections, with lower levels of income and human development, in presidential and non-plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes. They have also become more intense in this millennium.

A elite política parlamentar portuguesa: caracterização, cristalização e circulação (2005-2011)

Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciência Política

Cerambycidae (Coleoptera) da Colômbia: I. Eburiini (Cerambycinae)

New records added to the Colombian fauna: Susuacanga unicolor (Bates, 1870), Opades costipennis (Buquet, 1844), Eburodacrys havanensis Chevrolat, 1862, E. granipennis Gounelle, 1909, E. moruna Martins, 1997, E. nemorivaga Gounelle, 1909, E. pilicornis Fisher, 1944. New species described: Pantomallus martinezi, from Cundinamarca and Meta and Beraba inermis, from Cundinamarca.

Cerambycidae (Coleoptera) da Colômbia: II. Ibidionini (Cerambycinae)

Colombian records are given for Hexoplon albipenne Bates, 1872; H. venus Thomson, 1864; Gnomidolon rubricolor Bates, 1870; Tropidion brunneiceps (Thomson, 1865); Thoracibidion buquetii (Thomson, 1867); T. io (Thomson, 1867); Rhysium bivulneratum (Thomson, 1867); R. guttiferum (Thomson, 1867); Compsibidion maronicum (Thomson, 1867); C. varipenne Martins, 1969; ?Compsa flavofasciata (Thomson, 1867); Neocompsa squalida (Thomson, 1867); Heterachthes signaticollis (Thomson, 1865). New species described: Gnomidolon bellus,from Tolima and Neocompsa longipilis,from Santander.

Cerambycidae (Coleoptera) da Colômbia. III: Cerambycinae com olhos finamente granulados

New species described: Chrysoprasis pilosa from Huila. New records for Colombian Cerambycidae fauna: Tillomorphini, Euderces posticus (Pascoe, 1866); Heteropsini, Alloesia chlorophana Chevrolat, 1862; Monnecles apollinarii (Gounelle, 1913); Trachyderini, Ancylocerina, Ceralocyna variegata Monné & Napp, 1999; Trachyderini, Trachyderina, Crioprosopus cacicus Bates, 1885; Ancylosternus m. morio (Fabricius, 1787); Ozodera callidioides Dupont, 1840; Trachyderes hermani Huedepohl, 1985.

Cerambycidae (Coleoptera) da Colômbia. V. Lamiinae com unhas tarsais divergentes

New species described from Colombia: Amphicnaeia interrupta sp. nov., from Cauca; Adetus tayronus sp. nov., from Magdalena; A. aberrans sp. nov., from Santander; Parmenonta albosticta sp. nov., from Cundinamarca; Jamesia bella sp. nov., from Cauca. New records for nine species of Colombian Lamiinae (Apomecynini, Agapanthiini, Onciderini) are given.

Cerambycidae (Coleoptera) da Colômbia. VI. Lamiinae com unhas tarsais divaricadas ou bífidas

New taxa described from Colombia: Desmiphora (D.) tristis sp. nov. from Cundinamarca; Blabia longipennis sp. nov. from Nariño; Anhanga gen. nov., type species A. diabolica sp. nov. from Valle del Cauca; Exalphus vicinus sp. nov. from Santander; Necalphus maranduba sp. nov. from Amazonas; Paradesmus gen. nov., type species, P. iuba sp. nov. from Atlántico. New combination proposed: Padesmus brunneus (Aurivillius, 1923) from Adesmus. New records for nineteen species (Acanthoderini, Acanthocinini, Aerenicini, Desmiphorini, Hemilophini, Polyrhaphidini) of Colombian fauna are given.

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be ?nanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. In particular, in most of the cases we consider we ?nd that rightist parties have an advantage to win in countries where the relevant issue in election is illegal immigration. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly