Dual track sell-out: Signaling through IPO and Underpricing

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

Business plan for RestCard: The implementation of an innovative concept in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business Hostel: A new opportunity for the hostel industry

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Positioning of Ontario University Business Programs - Guelph-Humber

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Promoting Portuguese exports to Germany: A hand-on approach for the machinery and equipment sector

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The crisis and the firm: The case of h3

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Guincho surf center business plan viability: Case study

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Market analysis of a new business opportunity in mobile-casual gaming: Partnership between Nmusic and Rovio Entertainment Ltd

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Liquidity, business cycles and monetary policy: A simulation

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.

Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Strategy definition of a new business opportunity in mobile-casual gaming: Partnership between Nmusic and Rovio Entertainment Ltd.

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Higher education branding: Nova School of Business and Economics and Bocconi University

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics