The Impact of Senate File 169 on Meth Abuse in Iowa A Report to the Legislature by Drug Policy, January 17, 2006

This report is respectfully submitted in satisfaction of the following Senate File 169 requirement, as approved by the 2005 Iowa Legislature: “The Drug Policy Coordinator shall report, in a joint meeting, to the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on Public Safety of the House of Representatives in January 2006 and in January 2007, the effects of this Act on methamphetamine abuse and related criminal activity.” (*Please note that all data contained in this document are preliminary, based on the most recent information available to the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy.)

Governor's Office of Drug Control Policy Five-Year Strategic Plan July 1, 2003-June 30, 2008

The Office of the Drug Policy Coordinator is established in Chapter 80E of the Code of Iowa. The Coordinator directs the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy; coordinates and monitors all statewide counter-drug efforts, substance abuse treatment grants and programs, and substance abuse prevention and education programs; and engages in other related activities involving the Departments of public safety, corrections, education, public health, and human services. The coordinator assists in the development of local and community strategies to fight substance abuse, including local law enforcement, education, and treatment activities. The Drug Policy Coordinator serves as chairperson to the Drug Policy Advisory Council. The council includes the directors of the departments of corrections, education, public health, public safety, human services, division of criminal and juvenile justice planning, and human rights. The Council also consists of a prosecuting attorney, substance abuse treatment specialist, substance abuse prevention specialist, substance abuse treatment program director, judge, and one representative each from the Iowa Association of Chiefs of Police and Peace Officers, the Iowa State Police Association, and the Iowa State Sheriff’s and Deputies’ Association. Council members are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. The council makes policy recommendations related to substance abuse education, prevention, and treatment, and drug enforcement. The Council and the Coordinator oversee the development and implementation of a comprehensive State of Iowa Drug Control Strategy. The Office of Drug Control Policy administers federal grant programs to improve the criminal justice system by supporting drug enforcement, substance abuse prevention and offender treatment programs across the state. The ODCP prepares and submits the Iowa Drug and Violent Crime Control Strategy to the U.S. Department of Justice, with recommendations from the Drug Policy Advisory Council. The ODCP also provides program and fiscal technical assistance to state and local agencies, as well as program evaluation and grants management.

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Agency Performance Reporting, 2011

The Agency Performance Report for the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy is published in accordance with the Accountable Government Act. The information provided within this report is to aid in decision-making and to illustrate accountability to stakeholders and citizens. The report is indicative of the agency’s progress in meeting performance targets and achieving goals consistent with the enterprise strategic plan, the agency strategic plan and agency performance plan.

Office of Drug Control Policy Agency Performance Plan, 2012

Agency Performance Plan

Insight into oversight : how information commissioners contribute to the achievement of access-to-information policy objectives

This thesis examines how oversight bodies, as part of an ATI policy, contribute to the achievement of the policy's objectives. The aim of the thesis is to see how oversight bodies and the work they do affects the implementation of their respective ATI policies and thereby contributes to the objectives of those policies using a comparative case study approach. The thesis investigates how federal/central government level information commissioners in four jurisdictions - Germany, India, Scotland, and Switzerland - enforce their respective ATI policies, which tasks they carry out in addition to their enforcement duties, the challenges they face in their work and the ways they overcome these. Qualitative data were gathered from primary and secondary documents as well as in 37 semi-structured interviews with staff of the commissioners' offices, administrative officials whose job entails complying with ATI, people who have made ATI requests and appealed to their respective oversight body, and external experts who have studied ATI implementation in their particular jurisdiction. The thesis finds that while the aspect of an oversight body's formal independence that has the greatest impact on its work is resource control and that although the powers granted by law set the framework for ensuring that the administration is properly complying with the policy, the commissioner's leadership style - a component of informal independence - has more influence than formal attributes of independence in setting out how resources are obtained and used as well as how staff set priorities and utilize the powers they are granted by law. The conclusion, therefore, is that an ATI oversight body's ability to contribute to the achievement of the policy's objectives is a function of three main factors: a. commissioner's leadership style; b. adequacy of resources and degree of control the organization has over them; c. powers and the exercise of discretion in using them. In effect, the thesis argues that it is difficult to pinpoint the value of the formal powers set out for the oversight body in the ATI law, and that their decisions on whether and how to use them are more important than the presumed strength of the powers. It also claims that the choices made by the commissioners and their staff regarding priorities and use of powers are determined to a large extent by the adequacy of resources and the degree of control the organization has over those resources. In turn, how the head of the organization leads and manages the oversight body is crucial to both the adequacy of the organization's resources and the decisions made about the use of powers. Together, these three factors have a significant impact on the body's effectiveness in contributing to ATI objectives.

Audit report on the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy for the year ended June 30, 2011

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Iowa Civil Rights Commission History of Policy, 2000-2007

A Chronological Listing of Important Statements of Support by ICRC 2000-2007

A two-level analysis of the determinants of direct democratic choices in European, immigration and foreign policy in Switzerland

This article employs a unique data set - covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration/asylum policy held between 1992 and 2006 in Switzerland - in order to examine the conditional impact of context upon utilitarian, cultural, political and cognitive determinants of individual attitudes toward international openness. Our results reveal clear patterns of cross-level interactions between individual determinants and the project-related context of the vote. Thus, although party cues and political competence have a strong impact on individuals' support for international openness, this impact is substantially mediated by the type of coalition that is operating within the party elite. Similarly, subjective utilitarian and cultural considerations influence the voters' decision in interaction with the content of the proposal submitted to the voters as well as with the framing of the voting campaign.

The Political Economy of Active Labor-Market Policy

Active labor-market policies (ALMPs) have developed significantly over the past two decades across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with substantial cross-national differences in terms of both extent and overall orientation. The objective of this article is to account for cross-national variation in this policy field. It starts by reviewing existing scholarship concerning political, institutional, and ideational determinants of ALMPs. It then argues that ALMP is too broad a category to be used without further specification, and it develops a typology of four different types of ALMPs: incentive reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment. These are discussed and examined through ALMP expenditure profiles in selected countries. The article uses this typology to analyze ALMP trajectories in six Western European countries and shows that the role of this instrument changes dramatically over time. It concludes that there is little regularity in the political determinants of ALMPs. In contrast, it finds strong institutional and ideational effects, nested in the interaction between the changing economic context and existing labor-market policies.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

Trade policy and regional inequalities

This paper aims to analyse the effects of trade policies in the pattern of regional inequalities within a country. Inspired firstly, by the debate concerning the role of protectionist policies in the settlement of a pattern of striking regional inequalities in the Spanish industrialisation process and secondly, by current evidence of an increase in these inequalities following the entry of Spain in the EU (1986), we set a model that shows that trade liberalisation increases regional inequalities.