791 resultados para second immigrant generation, political integration, political participation
Resumo:
Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt anhand von Einzelfällen, welche Probleme und Folgen eine Ausweisung und/oder Abschiebung von kriminell gewordenen Angehörigen der sogenannten zweiten Generation türkischer Staatsangehöriger im Hinblick auf deren Eingliederung in die türkische Gesellschaft mit sich bringt.rnDem Bereich der Ausweisung und/oder Abschiebung – beides Formen von Zwangsmigration – ausländischer Staatsangehöriger in ihr Herkunftsland wurde bislang im weiten Feld der Integrationsforschung kaum Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Nicht anders verhält es sich in der politischen und öffentlichen Diskussion, wenn es um die „Entfernung“ kriminell gewordener Ausländer, die mitunter in Deutschland geboren und aufgewachsen sind oder sich bereits viele Jahre in der Bundesrepublik aufhalten, aus dem Bundesgebiet geht. Bei dieser Diskussion wird zwar die Bestrafung kriminell gewordener Ausländer mittels Ausweisung und/oder Abschiebung vorschnell befürwortet, besonders in solch spektakulären Fällen, wie in dem des Jugendlichen Muhlis Arı, genannt „Mehmet“ oder in dem des als „Münchner U-Bahn Schläger“ bekannt gewordenen Serkan. Die weitreichenden Folgen für den Einzelnen werden in der Regel jedoch nicht tiefergehend betrachtet.rnDeshalb steht im Zentrum dieser Arbeit die Frage, wie sich die Eingliederung von in Deutschland geborenen und hier aufgewachsenen Nachkommen der „Gastarbeiter“-Generation sowie später nachgeholter Kinder im Anschluss an eine Ausweisung und/oder Abschiebung in die türkische Gesellschaft gestaltet. Die theoretische Grundlage der Untersuchung bilden vier theoretische Konzepte zu Integration, Fremdheit und Marginalität. Dabei handelt es sich um die „Integrationstheorie“ von Hartmut Esser, das Konzept des „bleibenden Fremden“ von Georg Simmel, das des „einwandernden Fremden“ von Alfred Schütz sowie um das Konzept des „marginal man“ von Robert E. Park. Auf Basis dieser vier theoretischen Konzepte und der Auswertung des erhobenen empirischen Datenmaterials wird deutlich, dass hohe soziale Barrieren auf Seiten der Mitglieder der türkischen Aufnahmegesellschaft, mangelnde integrationsförderliche Opportunitäten, aber auch eine geringe Motivation auf Seiten der Betroffenen zur Aufnahme integrationsförderlicher Handlungen eine Integration verhindern. Die von Ausweisung und/oder Abschiebung Betroffenen sind letztlich dazu gezwungen, dauerhaft ein Leben am Rande der Gesellschaft in der Marginalität zu führen.rn
Resumo:
The Bedouin of South Sinai have been significantly affected by the politics of external powers for a long time. However, never had the interest of external powers in Sinai been so strong as since the Israeli-Egyptian wars in the second half of the 20th century when Bedouin interests started to collide with Egypt’s plans for a development of luxury tourism in South Sinai. rnrnThe tourism boom that has started in the 1980s has brought economic and infrastructure development to the Bedouin and tourism has become the most important source of income for the Bedouin. However, while the absolute increase of tourists to Sinai has trickled down to the Bedouin to some extent, the participation of Bedouin in the overall tourism development is under-proportionate. Moreover, the Bedouin have become increasingly dependent on monetary income and consequently from tourism as the only significant source of income while at the same time they have lost much of their land as well as their self-determination.rnrnIn this context, the Bedouin livelihoods have become very vulnerable due to repeated depressions in the tourism industry as well as marginalization. Major marginalization processes the Bedouin are facing are the loss of land, barriers to market entry, especially increasingly strict rules and regulations in the tourism industry, as well as discrimination by the authorities. Social differentiation and Bedouin preferences are identified as further factors in Bedouin marginalization.rnrnThe strategies Bedouin have developed in response to all these problems are coping strategies, which try to deal with the present problem at the individual level. Basically no strategies have been developed at the collective level that would aim to actively shape the Bedouin’s present and future. Collective action has been hampered by a variety of factors, such as the speed of the developments, the distribution of power or the decay of tribal structures.rnWhile some Bedouin might be able to continue their tourism activities, a large number of informal jobs will not be feasible anymore. The majority of the previously mostly self-employed Bedouin will probably be forced to work as day-laborers who will have lost much of their pride, dignity, sovereignty and freedom. Moreover, with a return to subsistence being impossible for the majority of the Bedouin, it is likely that an increasing number of marginalized Bedouin will turn to illegal income generating activities such as smuggling or drug cultivation. This in turn will lead to further repression and discrimination and could escalate in a serious violent conflict between the Bedouin and the government.rnrnDevelopment plans and projects should address the general lack of civil rights, local participation and protection of minorities in Egypt and promote Bedouin community development and the consideration of Bedouin interests in tourism development.rnrnWether the political upheavals and the resignation of president Mubarak at the beginning of 2011 will have a positive effect on the situation of the Bedouin remains to be seen.rn
Resumo:
This article examines the relations between the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Western economic system during the first two decades of national planning in Turkey (1960–1980). It traces how the SPO, established with the guidance and full endorsement of international economic institutions came to vehemently oppose Turkish participation in one of their pillars: the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union. It argues that the shift in the SPO's world-view was founded upon two distinct understandings of the Turkish nation and its development, situates these understandings within the intellectual history of Turkey's past ambivalence towards the West, and, in doing so, provides a historical case-study of the ideological clash between modernisation and dependency theories of development.
Resumo:
In this critical analysis of sociological studies of the political subsystem in Yugoslavia since the fall of communism Mr. Ilic examined the work of the majority of leading researchers of politics in the country between 1990 and 1996. Where the question of continuity was important, he also looked at previous research by the writers in question. His aim was to demonstrate the overall extent of existing research and at the same time to identify its limits and the social conditions which defined it. Particular areas examined included the problems of defining basic concepts and selecting the theoretically most relevant indicators; the sources of data including the types of authentic materials exploited; problems of research work (contacts, field control, etc.); problems of analysisl and finally the problems arising from different relations with the people who commission the research. In the first stage of the research, looking at methods of defining key terms, special attention was paid to the analysis of the most frequently used terms such as democracy, totalitarianism, the political left and right, and populism. Numerous weaknesses were noted in the analytic application of these terms. In studies of the possibilities of creating a democratic political system in Serbia and its possible forms (democracy of the majority or consensual democracy), the profound social division of Serbian society was neglected. The left-right distinction tends to be identified with the government-opposition relation, in the way of practical politics. The idea of populism was used to pass responsibility for the policy of war from the manipulator to the manipulated, while the concept of totalitarianism is used in a rather old-fashioned way, with echoes of the cold war. In general, the terminology used in the majority of recent research on the political subsystem in Yugoslavia is characterised by a special ideological style and by practical political material, rather than by developed theoretical effort. The second section of analysis considered the wider theoretical background of the research and focused on studies of the processes of transformation and transition in Yugoslav society, particularly the work of Mladen Lazic and Silvano Bolcic, who he sees as representing the most important and influential contemporary Yugoslav sociologists. Here Mr. Ilic showed that the meaning of empirical data is closely connected with the stratification schemes towards which they are oriented, so that the same data can have different meanings in shown through different schemes. He went on to show the observed theoretical frames in the context of wider ideological understanding of the authors' ideas and research. Here the emphasis was on the formalistic character of such notions as command economy and command work which were used in analysing the functioning and the collapse of communist society, although Mr. Ilic passed favourable judgement on the Lazic's critique of political over-determination in its various attempts to explain the disintegration of the communist political (sub)system. The next stage of the analysis was devoted to the problem of empirical identification of the observed phenomena. Here again the notions of the political left and right were of key importance. He sees two specific problems in using these notion in talking about Yugoslavia, the first being that the process of transition in the FR Yugoslavia has hardly begun. The communist government has in effect remained in power continuously since 1945, despite the introduction of a multi-party system in 1990. The process of privatisation of public property was interrupted at a very early stage and the results of this are evident on the structural level in the continuous weakening of the social status of the middle class and on the political level because the social structure and dominant form of property direct the majority of votes towards to communists in power. This has been combined with strong chauvinist confusion associated with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and these ideas were incorporated by all the relevant Yugoslav political parties, making it more difficult to differentiate between them empirically. In this context he quotes the situation of the stream of political scientists who emerged in the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. During the time of the one-party regime, this faculty functioned as ideological support for official communist policy and its teachers were unable to develop views which differed from the official line, but rather treated all contrasting ideas in the same way, neglecting their differences. Following the introduction of a multi-party system, these authors changed their idea of a public enemy, but still retained an undifferentiated and theoretically undeveloped approach to the issue of the identification of political ideas. The fourth section of the work looked at problems of explanation in studying the political subsystem and the attempts at an adequate causal explanation of the triumph of Slobodan Milosevic's communists at four subsequent elections was identified as the key methodological problem. The main problem Mr. Ilic isolated here was the neglect of structural factors in explaining the voters' choice. He then went on to look at the way empirical evidence is collected and studied, pointing out many mistakes in planning and determining the samples used in surveys as well as in the scientifically incorrect use of results. He found these weaknesses particularly noticeable in the works of representatives of the so-called nationalistic orientation in Yugoslav sociology of politics, and he pointed out the practical political abuses which these methodological weaknesses made possible. He also identified similar types of mistakes in research by Serbian political parties made on the basis of party documentation and using methods of content analysis. He found various none-sided applications of survey data and looked at attempts to apply other sources of data (statistics, official party documents, various research results). Mr. Ilic concluded that there are two main sets of characteristics in modern Yugoslav sociological studies of political subsystems. There are a considerable number of surveys with ambitious aspirations to explain political phenomena, but at the same time there is a clear lack of a developed sociological theory of political (sub)systems. He feels that, in the absence of such theory, most researcher are over-ready to accept the theoretical solutions found for interpretation of political phenomena in other countries. He sees a need for a stronger methodological bases for future research, either 1) in complementary usage of different sources and ways of collecting data, or 2) in including more of a historical dimension in different attempts to explain the political subsystem in Yugoslavia.
Resumo:
This project had a threefold aim and sought to provide answers to several different questions. Kossowska first focused on the relationship between Openness to Experience and ideological variables such as authoritarianism and conservatism. The main questions here were (1) whether there are differences between the Polish and Belgian samples studied with respect to the relationship between political ideology and Openness to Experience, and (2) whether this relationship applies to all facets of Openness to Experience. The study showed significant negative correlations between Openness and right-wing ideology in both adult samples, and that Fantasy and Actions were the most robust correlates of political ideology. A second problem examined concerned the relationship between ideology and cognitive functioning. The important questions here were about the conceptualisation and measurement of cognitive variables such as rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, or the need for closure, which determine individuals' attitudes to politics. The results confirmed the significance of the need for closure construct in both samples for understanding the process of formulating and holding political beliefs. The last aspect of the study was the differences in political beliefs between the Polish and Belgian samples in relation to the social, political and economic situation in the two countries. The most important question here was the changes in the political mentality of Poles during the period of system transition. Kossowska expected to find differences between Poles and Belgians with respect to the level of conservatism and authoritarianism, but in fact both samples showed comparable levels of right-wing political beliefs.
Resumo:
Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.
Resumo:
The project dealt with the political history of the Finnish-speaking minorities of the Russian northwest, mainly in the 20th century. The first part looks at the development of the national movement of the Ingrian Finns and other related ethnic groups (Izhoras, Votes) from the turn of the century to 1920, when Estonia and Finland signed peace treaties with Soviet Russia and the national rights of the Finnish minority in Russia were to some extent guaranteed. In the second section, on the history of the Ingrians during Soviet and post-Soviet times, areas covered include Ingrian national-cultural autonomy in the 1920s, the activities of Ingrian "ingri" organizations in Finland during the inter-war period, social and national repression and the end of autonomy in the 1930s, the dispersal of the Ingrians during the second world war, their first attempts to return home in the immediate post-war period, trends in the development of the social and cultural life of Ingrians during the last 40 years, and the prospects for their existence as an ethnic unity in the future. The research is based on documentary sources from 15 Russian archives, many of which have not previously been used.
Resumo:
This project is the third stage of a comparative research project, The New Baltic Barometer, which was carried out simultaneously with the "New Democracies Barometer" of the Paul Lazerfeld Society (Vienna) and The Russian Barometer. It studied the opinion and behaviour of the largest Baltic ethnic groups (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians). The main focus was on the attitudes of Baltic residents towards the changes in the economic and political system, attitudes towards political values, political trust, and attitudes to the Baltic countries joining the European Union. An analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the Baltic states made it possible to deduce the link between the country's economic development, and satisfaction with the political regime and attitudes towards democratic values. The study analysed the conditions for the democratisation of society, i.e. the development of culture and public opinion in the Baltic states. Attention was also paid to the development of a social network of individuals, showing the transition from informal networks to impersonal institutions. The group concluded that the participation of residents in formal organisations, NGOs in particular, considerably fosters political trust and also increases political efficacy. Participation in formal organisations also reduces the importance of esteem for an authoritarian leader.
Resumo:
An important issue in both Canadian and United States immigration history has been the control of immigration, which includes possible quotas, immigration laws as well as denying entry, and finally, the deportation of immigrants. This paper is based on information that is available on the deportations of 167 people, most of them young adult males. Many assume politics was a key motivation for deportation. However, Finnish Americans were rarely deported for political activities. The paper discusses a few interesting cases of political deportations both during the interwar years, and after the Second World War. The information is mostly based on the correspondence between the authorities in Finland and the United States and Canada, available at the Foreign Ministry Archives in Helsinki, Finland. Special attention is directed to the social and political background of those people and of special interest are the specific reasons, social or health problems, which seem to be the basis of most deportation decisions.
Resumo:
In this paper the author outlines the background to the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland which led to the current ‘Troubles’. In this discussion a range of key ideas are highlighted, including the nature of sectarianism and patterns of violence which have profoundly affected the society. The second part of the paper reviews a number of issues which face social workers when they try to deal with the effects of such violence as well as highlighting new challenges which have emerged as the society moves towards the resolution of conflict. It concludes with the argument that, wherever there is such conflict in the world, social workers need critically to understand the way in which political and social structures impinge upon their everyday practice.
Resumo:
How can we explain the decline in support for the European Union (EU) and the idea of European integration after the onset of the great recession in the fall of 2007? Did the economic crisis and the austerity policies that the EU imposed—in tandem with the IMF—on several member countries help cause this drop? While there is some evidence for this direct effect of EU policies, we find that the most significant determinant of trust and support for the EU remains the level of trust in national governments. Based on cue theory and using concepts of diffuse and specific support, we find that support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy, which Europeans know far better than the remote political system of the EU. This effect, however, is somewhat muted for those sophisticated Europeans that are more knowledgeable about the EU and are able to form opinions about it independently of the national contexts in which they live. We also find that the recent economic crisis has led to a discernible increase in the number of those who are disillusioned with politics both at the national and the supranational level. We analyze 133 national surveys from 27 EU countries by estimating a series of cross-classified multilevel logistic regression models.
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This article asks if voters' participation in federal elections is lower in the new Länder (East Germany) than in the old Länder (West Germany). It is assumed that voters in the new Länder are less convinced they can influence politics by voting. Using the perspective of cognitive psychology the article stresses differences in individual interpretations of the election context among citizens of both the new and old Länder. Furthermore, it is argued that the strength of the expected influence by voting depends on the structure and direction of individuals' beliefs in their competence and control as well as their belief in causality and self-efficacy. These beliefs may differ among voters in the new and old Länder. For empirical analysis, the article uses data from the German General Social Survey 1998.
Resumo:
This study critically analyzes and synthesizes community participation (CP) theory across disciplines, defining and beginning to map out the elements of CP according to a preliminary framework of structure, process, intermediate outcomes, and ultimate outcomes. The first study component sought to determine the impact of Sight N' Soul, a CP project utilizing neighborhood health workers (NHWs), on appointment missing in an indigent urban African-American population. It found that persons entering the vision care system through contact with an NEW were about a third less likely to miss an appointment than those persons entering the system through some other avenue. While theory in this area remains too poorly developed to hypothesize causal relationships between structure, process, and outcomes, a summary of the elements of Sight N' Soul's structure and process both developed the preliminary framework and serves as a first step to mapping these relationships. The second component of the study uncovered the elements of structure and process that may contribute to a sustained egalitarian partnership between community people and professionals, a CP program called Project HEAL. Elements of Project HEAL's structure and process included a shared belief in the program; spirituality; contribution, ownership, and reciprocation; a feeling of family; making it together; honesty, trust, and openness about conflict; the inevitability of uncertainty and change; and the guiding interactional principles of respect; love, care, and compassion; and personal responsibility. The third component analyzed the existing literature, identifying and addressing gaps and inconsistencies and highlighting areas needing more highly developed ethical analysis. Focal issues include the political, economic, and historical context of CP; the power of naming; the issue of purpose; the nature of community; the power to muster and allocate resources; and the need to move to a systems view of health and well-being, expanding our understanding of the universe of potential outcomes of CP, including iatrogenic outcomes. Intermediate outcomes might include change in community, program, and individual capacity, as well as improved health care delivery. Ultimate outcomes include increased positive interdependencies and opportunities for contribution; improved mental, physical, and spiritual health; increased social justice; and decreased exploitation. ^
Resumo:
This article reconceptualizes shared rule and uses novel data to measure it, thus addressing two shortcomings of federal literature. First, while most studies focus on self-rule, one question that is largely neglected is how lower-level governments can influence politics at a higher level in the absence of “second” chambers. The answer is through shared rule. A second shortcoming is that even when addressing this question, scholars concentrate on constitutional-administrative aspects of vertical intergovernmentalism, neglecting more informal, “political” dynamics. Comparing the twenty-six Swiss cantons allows drawing two lessons for federal studies: That shared rule is multifaceted and complex, and that to study informal territorial actors as well as direct political processes is indispensable to understand how power is actually distributed in federal political systems.