Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.

Flank or front : an assessment of military-political developments in the High North

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.

The political role of the State in Cambridge theories of growth and distribution

In this paper we extend Kaldor’s Neo-Pasinetti theorem to the scope of budgetary interventions based on political orientations. First, we take into account a system of taxes and expenditures. Second, we introduce different reaction functions for public spending showing the political role of the State in Cambridge theory of distribution. It turns out that the validity of Kaldorian results depends on the political orientation adopted by government, which diminishes the range of application of the Neo-Pasinetti theorem.

A nova disciplina de sistemas econômicos comparados: uma proposta

The new discipline of comparative economic systems: a proposition. This article offers elements for a reorientation of the subject matter of the discipline " Comparative Economic Systems" with the impact of the fall of the Berlin’s wall. Thus, we argue that in the context of the modern democratic society the political choice between society models occurs in a narrower set of options. Thus the study of pure forms of socialism is of historical interest, but he is not relevant to this discipline since it must prioritize the debate around the choice of compatible alternative models within the rule of law. So the article offers a new program for this discipline, able to describe and to understand the diversity of systems between countries that had opted for mixing market economy.

O efeito da intenção de reeleição sobre gastos em saúde: uma análise com base no modelo de reputação política

The effect of reelection intention on public health expenditures: An analysis based on reputation models. The political model of reputational-building argues that if the incumbent politician aspires to be reassigned, he/she must act in the voters' interest to obtain their approval and consequently their votes. Considering that voters are sensitive to public health expenditures, we check how reputational incentives shift municipal spending patterns in electoral years. The empirical tests for 3.004 Brazilian municipalities show an increase of health expenditures in those cities in which incumbents are trying to maintain their jobs. In addition, we find an increment in health expenditures where mayors forfeit their chance of being reelected to the benefit of a party mate.

As convenções de desenvolvimento no governo Lula: um ensaio de economia política

Development conventions in Lula's mandates: an essay on political economy. This article analyses the different development proposals put forward during the two Lula Presidential mandates. It is argued that such proposals are structured as "development conventions", which involve different priorities and different solutions to the problem of structural transformation. Their analytical frame is also different as are the interest groups which uphold them. Therefore their epistemology must be placed in the political economy context. It is argued that, notwithstanding the weight gained by a "developmental" convention over the second mandate, a "stability" convention is still hegemonic and commands macroeconomic policies.

Political Legitimacy and Ethnocultural Justice. Essays on Public Reason, Democratic Citizenship, and the Rights of Cultural Minorities

In this thesis, I argue that there are public cultural reasons that can underpin public justifications of minority rights of indigenous and national minorities in a constitutionaldemocracy. I do so by tackling diverse issues facing a liberal theory of multiculturalism. In the first essay, I criticize Will Kymlicka’s comprehensive liberal theory of minority rights and propose a political liberal alternative. The main problem of Will Kymlicka’s theory is that it builds on the contestable liberal value of individual autonomy and thus fails to take diversity seriously. In the second essay, I elaborate on the Rawlsian political liberalism assumed here by criticizing Chandran Kukathas’s version of political liberalism as overly accommodating to diversity. In the third essay, I discuss questions of method that arise for a political liberal approach to the moral-political foundations of multiculturalism, and propose a certain understanding of the political liberal enterprise and its crucial standard of reasonableness. In the fourth essay, I dwell on the political liberal ethic of citizenship and propose a strongly inclusionist interpretation of the duty of civility. In the fifth and last essay, I introduce a certain understanding of ethnocultural justice and propose a view on certain cultural reasons as public cultural reasons. Cultural reasons are public when they are based on necessarily established cultural marks of a democratic polity, as specified by the cultural establishment view; and when they are crucial for the societal cultural bases of self-respect of citizens. The arguments in this thesis support, and help to spell out, moral-political rights of indigenous and national minorities as formulated in international legal documents, such as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations 2007) or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966).

Quinze anos de rigidez monetária no Brasil pós-Plano Real: uma agenda de pesquisa

Fifteen years of monetary rigidity in Brazil after the Real Plan: a research agenda.The paper makes a review of literature and a research agenda on the anomaly of Brazilian monetary policy. Following a retrospect of the first 15 years after the Real Plan, there is a review of studies aiming to explain the high real interest rate. None of the summarized theses can completely explain the phenomenon. The main research opportunities are: deepening of empirical evidence of monetary policy efficacy loss; improvement in mensuration of its inefficacy; and improvement of alternative instruments to control inflation. The field of political economy is also fertile. One should assess the relevance of oligopolies as an explaining factor of persistence of high inflation.

Education and development projects in Brazil (1932-2004): political economy perspective

This paper discusses the long-run history of education policies in Brazil. It is suggested that the main reason for the educational backwardness was the existence of strong political interests over education. It is also defended that these interests can be empirically observed in the allocation of public resources between the different levels of education, with political choices favouring specific groups in society. It was not a matter of lack of investment in education, but of inadequate allocation of resources. This pattern of political-based policies created a strong negative path dependence of misallocation of resources in education in Brazil, particularly with significant underinvestment in secondary education.

Democracy over governance

Varieties of institutional economics are available to evaluate varieties of capitalism. These methodologies dig behind preferences and technology to arrive at the ground on which agents make choices. The individual is at the foundation of these edifices, neoclassical and otherwise. Consequently, the denouement of all these models is that the market knows best in the absence of effective counterfactuals. A natural corollary is that the task of the government is to set effective mechanisms in place in order to approach the best outcomes. In contrast, we propose a framework which contends with the modern economy as an aggregate that evolves in historical time. Problems like effective demand failures are endemic to capitalist economies. Therefore, systematic State intervention is essential to their functioning. In particular, political economy teaches us that intervention must be in the interest of wage earners. In contrast to the earlier model, the fabric of norms and conventions that facilitate the growth and development of economies must emerge from the consciousness and practices of the working class.

On high interest rates in Brazil

This article examines the question of why interest rates are so high in Brazil as compared to the international average. It looks at theoretical arguments based on excessive government deficits, structural lack of private savings, inflation bias, excessive investment demand and fear of floating. An informal look at the evidence does not strongly corroborate any of these arguments. Hence a wise central bank should consider "testing" the market to make sure it is not dealing with an extreme equilibrium configuration or a long standing disequilibrium.