Department of Cultural Affairs Performance Plan, FY2012

Agency Performance Plan, Department of Cultural Affairs

L'équité d'accès aux ressources en eau : fin ou moyen d'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'irrigation ? : la gestion des ressources en eau dans l'état du Gujarat (Inde) dans la perpective de la political ecology

La thèse présentée ici est le résultat d'une étroite collaboration avec une ONG indienne, AKRSP(I), intervenant dans le développement de l'irrigation au Gujarat depuis plus de 25 ans. Un SIG prototype a été mis en oeuvre et nous permet de proposer ime analyse spatiale et quantitative de l'action de cette ONG ainsi qu'une réflexion plus générale sur les leviers de mise en valeur et de gestion des ressources en eau à des fins agricoles. On peut souligner trois principaux enseignements: Les perspectives d'application des SIG au sein des ONG sont manifestes. Les exigences des bailleurs de fonds peuvent néanmoins faire obstacle à leur développement car, indi-rectement, ils favorisent la mise en oeuvre de SI voués à la justification plutôt qu'à la planification et au suivi des programmes d'actions. Ce résultat soulève la question de la pertinence de l'encadrement, des critères d'évaluation et de la conditionnalité de l'aide publique au développement. Les ONG ont un fort potentiel pour participer à la mise en valeur des ressources en eau en Inde et aider à relever le défi agro-démographique indien, en particulier dans les zones marginales où les services étatiques sont en retrait. Les stratégies d'action basées principalement sur l'application des instruments économiques et techniques doivent cependant être modifiées. Nous montrons qu'elles favorisent une inégalité d'accès aux ressources qui débouche sur une efficacité limitée des pratiques d'irrigation, sur un plan agro-technique. Ces résultats soulignent la nécessité de poursuivre une réflexion critique des discours et solutions dominants en matière de gestion des ressources en eau. Deux pistes d'amélioration sont avancées: 1. considérer l'équité d'accès comme un moyen d'optimiser la gestion de la ressource (limiter le volume d'eau par agriculteur pour encourager les choix de cultures irriguées peu consommatrices et l'adoption des technologies d'économie d'eau), 2. prêter attention à l'ordre dans lequel les différents instruments de gestion disponibles sont employés afin de les articuler dans un séquençage temporel pertinent. La Political Ecology apparait comme un cadre conceptuel très pertinent pour engager cette réflexion critique. Elle permet d'intégrer différentes échelles d'asymétries de pouvoirs à la compréhension des situations et des blocages observables localement : inégalités de capabilités et forces socio-politiques à l'échelle locale, politiques agro-industrielles (coton) et jeux d'alliances politiques des castes à l'échelle nationale, discours et conflits idéologiques ou orientations stratégiques des bailleurs de fonds à l'échelle internationale... Notre recherche empirique contribue modestement au développement de cette Political Ecology de la mise en valeur et de la gestion des ressources en eau. - The present research is based on a close collaboration with an indian NGO, AKRSP(I), which is active in the development of irrigation facilities in Gujarat for the past 25 years. We built a GIS prototype providing quantitative and spatial datas to analyse the NGO intervention and propose a general reflection about water resources development and management issues. Three main findings may be emphasized : The potential of GIS within the workings of an NGO is obvious, as an information ma-nagement tool as much as for developing analytical capacity. However, financial backers expectations may not favour a relevant development of this technology. Indirectly, they promote Information Systems built to justify rather than to plan or monitor action pro¬grammes. This raises the question of stricter framework, conditionality criters and stan¬dardised assessment indicators surrounding official development assistance. There is strong potential that NGOs can assist with the improvement of water resources in India. They can help in overcoming Indian demographic-related agricultural challenges, especially in marginal rural areas neglected by state services. However, intervention strategies mainly based on technical and economic management tools has to be adapted. We found that they lead to inequitable access and distribution of water resources what induces a low efficiency of irrigation practices from an agro-technical point of view. These results underline the need to go further in criticizing dominant ideas and guidelines regarding water resources management. We suggest two other options : 1. to consider equitable access has a tool to improve the effective use of water for agricul¬tural purposes (limiting the volume of water available per farmer would encourage them to adopt low water consumption crops and water saving technics), 2. to consider more carefully the order of use of the various management tools available and to structure them in a relevant sequence. Here, Political Ecology seems to be a relevant conceptual framework to enter into such a critical reflection, integrating different levels and scales of political asymmetries at the core of environmental issues. Indeed, the understanding of regional water situations and social stumbling blocks needs not only to consider local capabilities and socio-political inequities, but also agro-industrial policy (e.i. cotton) and caste political alliances at a national scale, as well as ideological and narrative struggles or strategical orientations of financial backers at an international level. Our empirical research modestly contributes to the development of such a Political Ecology of water resources development and management.

Do political factors matter in explaining under- and overweight outcomes in developing countries?

We construct a rich dataset covering 47 developing countries over the years 1990-2007, combining several micro and macro level data sources to explore the link between political factors and body mass index (BMI). We implement a heteroskedastic generalized ordered logit model allowing for different covariate effects across the BMI distribution and accounting for the unequal BMI dispersion by geographical area. We find that systems with democratic qualities are more likely to reduce under-weight, but increase overweight/obesity, whereas effective political competition does entail double-benefits in the form of reducing both under-weight and obesity. Our results are robust to the introduction of country fixed effects.

Cobertura y desamparo: garantías jurídicas de los españoles en el Perú (1870-1945) = Coverage and helplessness: legal guarantees of the spanish in Peru (1870-1945)

The archives of the Prefecture of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide a perspective from which to reconstruct the broad range of legal circumstances in which Spanish residents in various regions of the country find themselves immersed (assets of relatives who have died without wills or family in Peru, political conflicts, legal problems -whether criminal or civil as a result of business activities- or the requested intervention ofconsular authorities when decisions considered detrimental to their compatriots are made by prefects and sub-prefects). The legal framework protecting Spanish nationals in Peru is analysed to understand the mechanisms of immigration in the country and the mechanisms that led them to keep their Spanish nationality, even after establishing wide-reaching family and business interests

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs, Strategic Plan FY2011-2015

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Veterans Home, goals and mission.

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs, November-December 2008

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs Newsletter

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs, August-September 2008

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs Newsletter

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs, September-October 2009

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs Newsletter

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs, November-December 2009

Iowa Department of Veterans Affairs Newsletter