Opportunities and challenges in the area of employment, social affairs, skills and labour mobility. EPC Commentary, 30 September 2014

On 1 October 2014, Marianne Thyssen, Commissioner-designate for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, will face a European Parliament (EP) hearing. On this occasion, Thyssen will have to perform a delicate balancing act consisting of on the one hand, taking into consideration the significant budget constraints that a number of Member States are still facing and following the still prevailing political line of fiscal consolidation and sound public finances, and on the other hand, of demonstrating her strong commitment for Social Europe. In the context of the upcoming hearing, this commentary aims to outline the features, opportunities and challenges of the new portfolio related to employment and social affairs in view to providing an input into the political debate.

Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war. OSW Commentary No. 148, 08.10.2014

Ukraine’s financial results over the past few months prove that the economic crisis which has been ongoing since mid 2012 has exacerbated. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Gross Domestic Product for the first six months of 2014 shrank by 3%. In the second quarter, it fell by 4.6%1 and may further be reduced by as much as 8–10% over the year as a whole. After the first six months of this year, the balance of payments deficit reached US$4.3 billion. After deflation last year, prices grew by 12%, and the hryvnia dropped to a historic low. Although a surplus was seen in Ukrainian foreign trade in goods and services, reaching over US$3 billion at the end of June, its trade volume is shrinking. The main reason behind this deteriorating situation is the actions taken by Russia. Moscow has been fomenting the conflict in Donbas since April, has consistently imposed embargoes on imports of more and more Ukrainian goods and cut gas supplies to Ukraine in June. This has forced the government to focus on the current management of state finances and to carry out budget sequestration twice this year. The government has also used this as an excuse not to implement necessary systemic reforms. The increasing share of military expenditure, the shrinking exports (-5% in the first six months), including in particular to Russia, which until recently was Ukraine’s key trade partner, and the rapid fall in industrial production and investments have all made the situation even worse. All that saves Ukraine from an economic collapse is the loan from the International Monetary Fund and higher taxes, which allows the government to maintain budget liquidity. However, if the conflict in Donbas lasts longer and if Russia continues its economic blackmail, including withholding gas supplies, the economic crisis may prove to be long-lasting.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

The Cost of Servicing Greece’s Debt: A Sisyphean task? CEPS Commentary, 4 February 2015

Following the victory of Syriza in the Greek elections on January 25th, policy-makers, economists and concerned EU citizens are scrambling to understand the causes, modalities and consequences of a possible Greek default in order to anticipate and prepare for what is likely to unfold in the coming weeks and months. The debate on the sustainability of Greek public finances has often been characterised by a lack of clarity and even a certain degree of confusion. This brief note focuses first on the cost that Greece faces in servicing its debt and then asks whether this is a manageable or a Sisyphean task. It concludes by reflecting on the political implications of the new government’s announced intentions and whether these are being taken into account in the current debate over debt restructuring.

The case for a European unemployment benefit scheme. CEPS Commentary, 19 May 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, Ilaria Maselli and Miroslav Beblavý argue that the European economic governance system needs to be equipped with a supranational automatic stabiliser that would kick-in automatically in the event of an economic downturn, to avoid unduly burdening national public finances. In their view, the option of creating an unemployment benefit system for the euro area should be given serious consideration. The possible variations of such a system and their implications will be the subject of in-depth study at CEPS over the coming year.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.

What role for social investment in the new economic governance of the Eurozone? EPC Policy Brief, 10 November 2015

The EU, and the Eurozone in particular, has been going through a period of prolonged economic difficulty. While there are some signs of recovery, growth rates remain too low, only returning to the already modest growth rates of the pre-crisis period. This not only affects the creation of jobs, but also, through lower tax revenues and stagnant GDP levels, the consolidation of public finances.

Measuring Dependency Ratios using National Transfer Accounts. CEPS Working Document No. 420/April 2016

It is now widely recognised that the socio-economic changes that ageing societies will bring about are poorly captured by the traditional demographic dependency ratios (DDRs), such as the old-age dependency ratio that relates the number of people aged 65+ to the working-age population. Future older generations will have increasingly better health and are likely to work longer. By combining population projections and National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data for seven European countries, we project the quantitative impact of ageing on public finances until 2040 and compare it to projected DDRs. We then simulate the public finance impact of changes in three key indicators related to the policy responses to population ageing: net immigration, healthy ageing and longer working lives. We do this by linking age-specific public health transfers and labour market participation rates to changes in mortality. Four main findings emerge: first, the simple old-age dependency ratio overestimates the future public finance challenges faced by the countries studied – significantly so for some countries, e.g. Austria, Finland and Hungary. Second, healthy ageing has a modest effect (on public finances) except in the case of Sweden, where it is substantial. Third, the long-run effect of immigration is well captured by the simple DDR measure if immigrants are similar to the native population. Finally, increasing the length of working lives is central to addressing the public finance challenge of ageing. Extending the length of working lives by three to four years over the next 25 years – equivalent to the increase in life expectancy – severely limits the impact of ageing on public transfers.

Essays on the Effects of Corporate Taxation

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en macroéconomie et finances publiques. Elle développe des modèles d'Equilibre Général Dynamique et Stochastique pour analyser les implications macroéconomiques des politiques d'imposition des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Le premier chapitre analyse les mécanismes de transmission à l'économie, des effets d'un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Dans une économie constituée d'un gouvernement, d'une firme représentative et d'un ménage représentatif, j'élabore un théorème de l'équivalence ricardienne avec l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Plus particulièrement, j'établis que si les marchés financiers sont parfaits, un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises qui ne change pas la valeur présente de l'impôt total auquel l'entreprise est assujettie sur toute sa durée de vie n'a aucun effet réel sur l'économie si l'état utilise un impôt forfaitaire. Ensuite, en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits, je montre qu'une une baisse temporaire de l'impôt forfaitaire sur le profit des entreprises stimule l'investissement parce qu'il réduit temporairement le coût marginal de l'investissement. Enfin, mes résultats indiquent que si l'impôt est proportionnel au profit des entreprises, l'anticipation de taxes élevées dans le futur réduit le rendement espéré de l'investissement et atténue la stimulation de l'investissement engendrée par la réduction d'impôt. Le deuxième chapitre est écrit en collaboration avec Rui Castro. Dans cet article, nous avons quantifié les effets sur les décisions individuelles d'investis-sement et de production des entreprises ainsi que sur les agrégats macroéconomiques, d'une baisse temporaire de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Dans un modèle où les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs de productivité idiosyncratiques, nous avons d'abord établi que le rationnement de crédit affecte plus les petites (jeunes) entreprises que les grandes entreprises. Pour des entreprises de même taille, les entreprises les plus productives sont celles qui souffrent le plus du manque de liquidité résultant des imperfections du marché financier. Ensuite, nous montré que pour une baisse de 1 dollar du revenu de l'impôt, l'investissement et la production augmentent respectivement de 26 et 3,5 centimes. L'effet cumulatif indique une augmentation de l'investissement et de la production agrégés respectivement de 4,6 et 7,2 centimes. Au niveau individuel, nos résultats indiquent que la politique stimule l'investissement des petites entreprises, initialement en manque de liquidité, alors qu'elle réduit l'investissement des grandes entreprises, initialement non contraintes. Le troisième chapitre est consacré à l'analyse des effets de la réforme de l'imposition des revenus d'entreprise proposée par le Trésor américain en 1992. La proposition de réforme recommande l'élimination des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital et l'imposition d'une seule taxe sur le revenu des entreprises. Pour ce faire, j'ai eu recours à un modèle dynamique stochastique d'équilibre général avec marchés financiers imparfaits dans lequel les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs idiosyncratiques de productivité. Les résultats indiquent que l'abolition des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital réduisent les distorsions dans les choix d'investissement des entreprises, stimule l'investissement et entraîne une meilleure allocation du capital. Mais pour être financièrement soutenable, la réforme nécessite un relèvement du taux de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises de 34\% à 42\%. Cette hausse du taux d'imposition décourage l'accumulation du capital. En somme, la réforme engendre une baisse de l'accumulation du capital et de la production respectivement de 8\% et 1\%. Néanmoins, elle améliore l'allocation du capital de 20\%, engendrant des gains de productivité de 1.41\% et une modeste augmentation du bien être des consommateurs.

Reinach-Nord (BL, Suisse): Une ferme gauloise à l'aube de l'époque romaine

Situé dans la vallée de la Birse, Reinach appartient à l'arrière-pays de Bâle et est localisé dans la plaine du Rhin supérieur. Cette zone jouant un rôle important pendant la Guerre des Gaules ainsi que durant le Ier siècle apr. J.-C., on doit envisager de forts bouleversements du peuplement de cette région au changement d'ère. Grâce à des conditions favorables, les structures de La Tène finale au lieu-dit "Mausacker" sont très bien conservées et permettent de restituer une ferme laténienne avec deux phases différentes. Au même endroit se situe une villa gallo-romaine, mieux connue par ses enclos funéraires que par les structures résidentielles. Des études pluridisciplinaires financées par le Fonds national suisse (FNS) sont en cours pour les vestiges laténiens et gallo-romains de Reinach-Nord.

Enquête sur la question monétaire ...

At head of half-title: Ministères des finances et de l'agriculture et du commerce.

Commercial tariffs and regulations of the several states of Europe and America : together sith the commercial treaties between England and foreign countries /

Report on Mexico made to the British Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, containing treaties of commerce and navigation between Great Britain and Mexico, customs' tariff, commercial regulations, monies, weights, measures, and reports on trade, navigation, manufactures, finances, mining, Indian population, etc. The majority of this work relates to California, New Mexico, Oregon Territory and Russian America.

Estimated income and expenditure.

Description based on 1912 issue.