Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Fairness under uncertainty with indivisibilities

I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.

Una estimación del coste marginal en bienestar del sistema impositivo en España

Actual tax systems do not follow the normative recommendations of yhe theory of optimal taxation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the informational difficulties of knowing or estimating all relevant elasticities and parameters. Secondly, the political complexities that would arise if a new tax implementation would depart too much from current systems that are perceived as somewhat egalitarians. Hence an ex-novo overhaul of the tax system might just be non-viable. In contrast, a small marginal tax reform could be politically more palatable to accept and economically more simple to implement. The goal of this paper is to evaluate, as a step previous to any tax reform, the marginal welfare cost of the current tax system in Spain. We do this by using a computational general equilibrium model calibrated to a point-in-time micro database. The simulations results show that the Spanish tax system gives rise to a considerable marginal excess burden. Its order of magnitude is of about 0.50 money units for each additional money unit collected through taxes.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Classical horizontal inequity and reranking: an integrated approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers in a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Long-run Inflation-Unemployment Dynamics: The Spanish Phillips Curve and Economic Policy

This paper takes a new look at the long-run dynamics of inflation and unemployment in response to permanent changes in the growth rate of the money supply. We examine the Phillips curve from the perspective of what we call "frictional growth", i.e. the interaction between money growth and nominal frictions. After presenting theoretical models of this phenomenon, we construct an empirical model of the Spanish economy and, in this context, we evaluate the long-run inflation-unemployment trade for Spain and examine how recent policy changes have afected it.

La Treuhand alemanya: una experiència per a la fidúcia catalana

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Universitat de Freiburg, Alemanya, al desembre del 2006. S’ ha aprofundit en la Treuhand alemanya, tot analitzant les relacions de caràcter fiduciari que aquesta contempla, els seus tipus i efectes. La matèria tenia especial interés donada la reempresa al 2006 de la redacció d'un esborrany d'avantprojecte de llei de patrimonis fiduciaris per part del Govern de Catalunya.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

Rosca participation in Benin: a commitment issue

In the light of first-hand data from a Beninese urban household survey in Cotonou, we investigate several motives aiming to explain participation in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. We provide anecdotal pieces of evidence, descriptive statistics, FIML regressions and matching estimates which tend to indicate that most individuals use their participation in a rosca as a device to commit themselves to save money and to deal with self-control problems.

Diabetes care in Switzerland: good, but perfectible: a population-based cross-sectional survey.

BACKGROUND: While Switzerland invests a lot of money in its healthcare system, little is known about the quality of care delivered. The objective of this study was to assess the quality of care provided to patients with diabetes in the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland. METHODS: Cross-sectional study of 406 non-institutionalized adults with type 1 or 2 diabetes. Patients' characteristics, diabetes and process of care indicators were collected using a self-administered questionnaire. Process indicators (past 12 months) included HbA1C check among HbA1C-aware patients, eye assessment by ophtalmologist, microalbuminuria check, feet examination, lipid test, blood pressure and weight measurement, influenza immunization, physical activity recommendations, and dietary recommendations. Item-by-item (each process of care indicator: percentage of patients having received it), composite (mean percentage of recommended care: sum of received processes of care / sum of possible recommended care), and all-or-none (percentage of patients receiving all specified recommended care) measures were computed. RESULTS: Mean age was 64.4 years; 59% were men. Type 1 and type 2 diabetes were reported by 18.2% and 68.5% of patients, respectively, but diabetes type remained undetermined for almost 20% of patients. Patients were treated with oral anti-diabetic drugs (50%), insulin (23%) or both (27%). Of 219 HbA1C-aware patients, 98% reported ≥ one HbA1C check during the last year. Also, ≥94% reported ≥ one blood pressure measurement, ≥ one weight measurement or lipid test, and 68%, 64% and 56% had feet examination, microalbuminuria check and eye assessment, respectively. Influenza immunization was reported by 62% of the patients.The percentage of patients receiving all processes of care ranged between 14.2%-16.9%, and 46.6%-50.7%, when considering ten and four indicators, respectively. Ambulatory care utilization showed little use of multidisciplinary care, and low levels of participation in diabetes-education classes. CONCLUSIONS: While routine processes-of-care were performed annually in most patients, diabetes-specific risk screenings, influenza immunization, physical activity and dietary recommendations were less often reported; this was also the case for multidisciplinary care and participation in education classes. There is room for diabetes care improvement in Switzerland. These results should help define priorities and further develop country-specific chronic disease management initiatives for diabetes.

Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments Versus the Inequality of Rewards

Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries, or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, inequality affects incentives to compete and hence has a direct effect on equilibrium choices and hence material outcomes. We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endowments (e.g. ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can obtain as rewards (e.g. prestigious positions, money). We show that these two types of inequality have opposing effects on equilibrium behavior and wellbeing. Greater inequality of rewards tends to hurt most people — both the middle class and the poor, — who are forced into greater effort. In contrast, greater inequality of endowments tends to benefit the middle class. Thus, which type of inequality is considered hugely affects the correctness of our intuitions about the implications of inequality.

Hawtreyan “Credit Deadlock” or Keynesian “Liquidity Trap”? Lessons for Japan from the Great Depression

This paper outlines the ideas of Ralph Hawtrey and Lauchlin Currie on the need for monetised fiscal deficit spending in 1930s USA to combat the deep depression into which the economy had been allowed to sink. In such exceptional circumstances of “credit deadlock” in which banks were afraid to lend and households and business afraid to borrow, the deadlock could best be broken through the spending of new money into circulation via large fiscal deficits. This complementarity of fiscal and monetary policy was shown to be essential, and as such indicates the potential power of monetary policy – in contrast to the Keynesian “liquidity trap” view that it is powerless This lesson was not learned by the Japanese authorities in their response to the asset price collapse of 1991-92, resulting in a lost decade as ballooning fiscal deficits were neutralised throughout the 1990s by unhelpfully tight monetary policy with the Bank of Japan refusing to monetise the deficits.

Trade in bilateral oligopoly with endogenous market formation

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

Volatility of Housing

The aim of the project is to develop a theoretical framework where homelessness arises due to various economic and social factors that vary over time. The ultimate goal is i) to understand whether homelessness spells, entrances and exits could be predicted and if so what information is necessary; and ii) to design and evaluate a homelessness prevention programme in a changing and uncertain environment. Examples of the questions we want to answer are: Should it be made easier for people to borrow money so that they can get out of homelessness, or will such borrowing allow people to over-consume today and so fall into homelessness tomorrow? Should precautionary savings be encouraged so that people have cushions to withstand future shocks, or will savings just delay entry into homelessness? What interventions will affect the probability of becoming homeless and how will they affect behaviour? How will interventions affect incentives to save and to consume before homelessness prevention programmes kick in?