The whole world shook : shifts in ethnic, national and heroic identities in children's fiction about 9/11

Like many other cataclysmic events September 11, a day now popularly believed to have 'changed the world', has become a topic taken up by children's writers. This thesis, titled The Whole World Shook: Ethnic, National and Heroic Identities in Children's Fiction About 9/11, examines how cultural identities are constructed within fictional texts for young people written about the attacks on the Twin Towers. It identifies three significant identity categories encoded in 9/11 books for children: ethnic identities, national identities, and heroic identities. The thesis argues that the identities formed within the selected children's texts are in flux, privileging performances of identities that are contingent on post-9/11 politics. This study is located within the field of children's literature criticism, which supports the understanding that children's books, like all texts, play a role in the production of identities. Children's literature is highly significant both in its pedagogical intent (to instruct and induct children into cultural practices and beliefs) and in its obscurity (in making the complex simple enough for children, and from sometimes intentionally shying away from difficult things). This literary criticism informed the study that the texts, if they were to be written at all, would be complex, varied and most likely as ambiguous and contradictory as the responses to the attacks on New York themselves. The theoretical framework for this thesis draws on a range of critical theories including literary theory, cultural studies, studies of performativity and postmodernism. This critical framework informs the approach by providing ways for: (i) understanding how political and ideological work is performed in children's literature; (ii) interrogating the constructed nature of cultural identities; (iii) developing a nuanced methodology for carrying out a close textual analysis. The textual analysis examines a representative sample of children's texts about 9/11, including picture books, young adult fiction, and a selection of DC Comics. Each chapter focuses on a different though related identity category. Chapter Four examines the performance of ethnic identities and race politics within a sample of picture books and young adult fiction; Chapter Five analyses the construction of collective, national identities in another set of texts; and Chapter Six does analytic work on a third set of texts, demonstrating the strategic performance of particular kinds of heroic identities. I argue that performances of cultural identities constructed in these texts draw on familiar versions of identities as well as contribute to new ones. These textual constructions can be seen as offering some certainties in increasingly uncertain times. The study finds, in its sample of books a co-mingling of xenophobia and tolerance; a binaried competition between good and evil and global harmony and national insularity; and a lauding of both the commonplace hero and the super-human. Being a recent corpus of texts about 9/11, these texts provide information on the kinds of 'selves' that appear to be privileged in the West since 2001. The thesis concludes that the shifting identities evident in texts that are being produced for children about 9/11 offer implicit and explicit accounts of what constitute good citizenship, loyalty to nation and community, and desirable attributes in a Western post-9/11 context. This thesis makes an original contribution to the field of children's literature by providing a focussed and sustained analysis of how texts for children about 9/11 contribute to formations of identity in these complex times of cultural unease and global unrest.

Correcting flaws in Mitchell’s analysis of EPBC

Efficient error-Propagating Block Chaining (EPBC) is a block cipher mode intended to simultaneously provide both confidentiality and integrity protection for messages. Mitchell’s analysis pointed out a weakness in the EPBC integrity mechanism that can be used in a forgery attack. This paper identifies and corrects a flaw in Mitchell’s analysis of EPBC, and presents other attacks on the EPBC integrity mechanism.

Cryptanalysis of SIMON Variants with Connections

SIMON is a family of 10 lightweight block ciphers published by Beaulieu et al. from the United States National Security Agency (NSA). A cipher in this family with K -bit key and N -bit block is called SIMON N/K . We present several linear characteristics for reduced-round SIMON32/64 that can be used for a key-recovery attack and extend them further to attack other variants of SIMON. Moreover, we provide results of key recovery analysis using several impossible differential characteristics starting from 14 out of 32 rounds for SIMON32/64 to 22 out of 72 rounds for SIMON128/256. In some cases the presented observations do not directly yield an attack, but provide a basis for further analysis for the specific SIMON variant. Finally, we exploit a connection between linear and differential characteristics for SIMON to construct linear characteristics for different variants of reduced-round SIMON. Our attacks extend to all variants of SIMON covering more rounds compared to any known results using linear cryptanalysis. We present a key recovery attack against SIMON128/256 which covers 35 out of 72 rounds with data complexity 2123 . We have implemented our attacks for small scale variants of SIMON and our experiments confirm the theoretical bias presented in this work.

On the Security of Two RFID Mutual Authentication Protocols

In this paper, the security of two recent RFID mutual authentication protocols are investigated. The first protocol is a scheme proposed by Huang et al. [7] and the second one by Huang, Lin and Li [6]. We show that these two protocols have several weaknesses. In Huang et al.’s scheme, an adversary can determine the 32-bit secret password with a probability of 2−2 , and in Huang-Lin-Li scheme, a passive adversary can recognize a target tag with a success probability of 1−2−4 and an active adversary can determine all 32 bits of Access password with success probability of 2−4 . The computational complexity of these attacks is negligible.

Security Analysis of Randomize-Hash-then-Sign Digital Signatures

At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106. In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

EPC: a provably secure permutation based compression function

The security of permutation-based hash functions in the ideal permutation model has been studied when the input-length of compression function is larger than the input-length of the permutation function. In this paper, we consider permutation based compression functions that have input lengths shorter than that of the permutation. Under this assumption, we propose a permutation based compression function and prove its security with respect to collision and (second) preimage attacks in the ideal permutation model. The proposed compression function can be seen as a generalization of the compression function of MD6 hash function.

On hash functions using checksums

We analyse the security of iterated hash functions that compute an input dependent checksum which is processed as part of the hash computation. We show that a large class of such schemes, including those using non-linear or even one-way checksum functions, is not secure against the second preimage attack of Kelsey and Schneier, the herding attack of Kelsey and Kohno and the multicollision attack of Joux. Our attacks also apply to a large class of cascaded hash functions. Our second preimage attacks on the cascaded hash functions improve the results of Joux presented at Crypto’04. We also apply our attacks to the MD2 and GOST hash functions. Our second preimage attacks on the MD2 and GOST hash functions improve the previous best known short-cut second preimage attacks on these hash functions by factors of at least 226 and 254, respectively. Our herding and multicollision attacks on the hash functions based on generic checksum functions (e.g., one-way) are a special case of the attacks on the cascaded iterated hash functions previously analysed by Dunkelman and Preneel and are not better than their attacks. On hash functions with easily invertible checksums, our multicollision and herding attacks (if the hash value is short as in MD2) are more efficient than those of Dunkelman and Preneel.

On the Collision and Preimage Resistance of Certain Two-Call Hash Functions

In this paper we present concrete collision and preimage attacks on a large class of compression function constructions making two calls to the underlying ideal primitives. The complexity of the collision attack is above the theoretical lower bound for constructions of this type, but below the birthday complexity; the complexity of the preimage attack, however, is equal to the theoretical lower bound. We also present undesirable properties of some of Stam’s compression functions proposed at CRYPTO ’08. We show that when one of the n-bit to n-bit components of the proposed 2n-bit to n-bit compression function is replaced by a fixed-key cipher in the Davies-Meyer mode, the complexity of finding a preimage would be 2 n/3. We also show that the complexity of finding a collision in a variant of the 3n-bits to 2n-bits scheme with its output truncated to 3n/2 bits is 2 n/2. The complexity of our preimage attack on this hash function is about 2 n . Finally, we present a collision attack on a variant of the proposed m + s-bit to s-bit scheme, truncated to s − 1 bits, with a complexity of O(1). However, none of our results compromise Stam’s security claims.

Side Channel Analysis of Some Hash Based MACs: A Response to SHA-3 Requirements

The forthcoming NIST’s Advanced Hash Standard (AHS) competition to select SHA-3 hash function requires that each candidate hash function submission must have at least one construction to support FIPS 198 HMAC application. As part of its evaluation, NIST is aiming to select either a candidate hash function which is more resistant to known side channel attacks (SCA) when plugged into HMAC, or that has an alternative MAC mode which is more resistant to known SCA than the other submitted alternatives. In response to this, we perform differential power analysis (DPA) on the possible smart card implementations of some of the recently proposed MAC alternatives to NMAC (a fully analyzed variant of HMAC) and HMAC algorithms and NMAC/HMAC versions of some recently proposed hash and compression function modes. We show that the recently proposed BNMAC and KMDP MAC schemes are even weaker than NMAC/HMAC against the DPA attacks, whereas multi-lane NMAC, EMD MAC and the keyed wide-pipe hash have similar security to NMAC against the DPA attacks. Our DPA attacks do not work on the NMAC setting of MDC-2, Grindahl and MAME compression functions.

Security Analysis of salt||password Hashes

Protection of passwords used to authenticate computer systems and networks is one of the most important application of cryptographic hash functions. Due to the application of precomputed memory look up attacks such as birthday and dictionary attacks on the hash values of passwords to find passwords, it is usually recommended to apply hash function to the combination of both the salt and password, denoted salt||password, to prevent these attacks. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of salt||password hashing application. We show that when hash functions based on the compression functions with easily found fixed points are used to compute the salt||password hashes, these hashes are susceptible to precomputed offline birthday attacks. For example, this attack is applicable to the salt||password hashes computed using the standard hash functions such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 that are based on the popular Davies-Meyer compression function. This attack exposes a subtle property of this application that although the provision of salt prevents an attacker from finding passwords, salts prefixed to the passwords do not prevent an attacker from doing a precomputed birthday attack to forge an unknown password. In this forgery attack, we demonstrate the possibility of building multiple passwords for an unknown password for the same hash value and salt. Interestingly, password||salt (i.e. salts suffixed to the passwords) hashes computed using Davies-Meyer hash functions are not susceptible to this attack, showing the first security gap between the prefix-salt and suffix-salt methods of hashing passwords.

Grøstl – a SHA-3 candidate

Grøstl is a SHA-3 candidate proposal. Grøstl is an iterated hash function with a compression function built from two fixed, large, distinct permutations. The design of Grøstl is transparent and based on principles very different from those used in the SHA-family. The two permutations are constructed using the wide trail design strategy, which makes it possible to give strong statements about the resistance of Grøstl against large classes of cryptanalytic attacks. Moreover, if these permutations are assumed to be ideal, there is a proof for the security of the hash function. Grøstl is a byte-oriented SP-network which borrows components from the AES. The S-box used is identical to the one used in the block cipher AES and the diffusion layers are constructed in a similar manner to those of the AES. As a consequence there is a very strong confusion and diffusion in Grøstl. Grøstl is a so-called wide-pipe construction where the size of the internal state is significantly larger than the size of the output. This has the effect that all known, generic attacks on the hash function are made much more difficult. Grøstl has good performance on a wide range of platforms and counter-measures against side-channel attacks are well-understood from similar work on the AES.