Department of Management Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report

Iowa Homeland Security & Emergency Management Division Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report

Iowa Department of Management Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1998

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1998

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1999

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1999

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2000

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2000

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2001

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2001

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2002

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2002

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2003

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2003

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2004

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2004

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2005

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2005

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2007

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2007

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Timing of seasonal sales

We present a model of timing of seasonal sales where stores chooseseveral designs at the beginning of the season without knowingwich one, if any, will be fashionable. Fashionable designs have achance to fetch high prices in fashion markets while non-fashionableones must be sold in a discount market. In the beginning of theseason, stores charge high prices in the hope of capturing theirfashion market. As the end of the season approaches with goods stillon the shelves, stores adjust downward their expectations that theyare carrying a fashionable design, and may have sales to capture thediscount market. Having a greater number of designs induces a storeto put one of them on sales earlier to test the market. Moreover,price competition in the discount market induces stores to startsales earlier because of a greater perceived first-mover advantage incapturing the discount market. More competition, perhaps due todecreases in the cost of product innovation, makes sales occur evenearlier. These results are consistent with the observation that thetrend toward earlier sales since mid-1970's coincides with increasingproduct varieties in fashion good markets and increasing storecompetition.