Environmental features which limit organization and industry viability:a study of the footwear industry

This thesis proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of organizational environments. Three primary segments of the task environment - the transaction environment, the industrial environment and the ecotone are delineated. The interrelationships between the organization and these three environmental segments are examined. It is suggested that the task environment i) defines the nature of the task confronting the organization and the economic, political and social position of the organization within this network; ii) influences the way organizations and industries are organized; iii) prevents recognition of the need for adaptation and change; and iv) limits the alternatives available to the organization should changes in the environment render existing technology, behaviour and structures obsolete. The British Footwear Industry provides an example of how this framework might be used to investigate the problem of industry decline and organization viability. It is argued that the explanations usually put forth to explain organization failure and industrial decline have not taken into consideration the environmental factors which affect organization and industry viability. The shift from national markets to global markets has altered the composition of the task environment and has changed the nature of competition from firm versus firm to environment versus environment. Organizations do not compete in the market, their products do. These products are often produced by organizations embedded in environments which are significantly different from the one in which the focal organization and industry are embedded.

Follow-ups and interpreter-mediated discourse

The edited volume documents the proceedings of the ESF workshop "Follow-ups across discourse domains: a cross-cultural exploration of their forms and functions". It examines the forms and functions of the dialogue act of a follow-up, viz. accepting or challenging a prior communicative act, in political discourse across spoken and written dialogic genres. Specifically, it considers (1) the discourse domains of political interviews, editorials, op-eds and discussion forums, (2) their sequential organization as regards the status of initial (or 1st order) follow-up, a follow-up of a prior follow-up (2nd order follow-up), or nth-order follow-up, and (3) their discursive realization as regards degrees of indirectness and responsiveness which are conceptualized as a continuum along the lines of degrees of explicitness and degrees of responsiveness. The chapters come from the fields of linguistics, discourse analysis, socio-pragmatics, communication, political science and psychology, examining the heterogeneous field of political discourse and its manifestation in diverse discourse genres with respect to evasiveness, indirectness and redundancy in mediated political discourse, professional discourse, discourse identity and doing politics, to name but the most prominent questions.

Making sense of the ‘difficult’ past:transmission of political heritage and memory-work among young people across Europe

This article considers young people’s socialization into mnemonic communities in 14 European countries. It argues that such socialization is an intersubjective and selective process that, to a great degree, depends on the particular social environment that conditions the discourses on pasts available to young people. Drawing on memory studies, it recognizes memory as a valid alternative to the institutionalized past (history) but envisages the two as inextricably connected. Given this, it identifies several strategies adopted by young people in order to socialize understandings of the past. While these strategies vary, some reveal receptivity to populist and far right ideologies. Our study demonstrates how internalization of political heritage via mnemonic socialization within families is conditioned by both the national political agenda and socio-economic situation experienced across Europe.

A mérsékelt iszlamista mozgalmak szerepe az "arab tavaszt" követő politikai átmenetben (The Role of Moderate Islamist Movements in the Political Transition Following the Arab Spring)

Up to January 2011 authoritarian political regimes in the Middle East had widely been considered stable due to the armed forces, the underdeveloped political institutions, the economic embeddedness of the regimes, the neo-patrimonial structure of the Arab societies and, eventually the characteristics of Islam. Middle Eastern political systems are often considered to belong to a special sub-group of non-democratic regimes called “liberalized autocracies”. The 2011 events show that there is a new, as yet non-defined political structure emerging. Although there are different interpretations of the developments, there is a consensus on the determinant role of the Islamist organizations in the development of the new political structure. The results of the Egyptian and Tunisian parliamentary elections show that the secular political parties could not attract the public, while in Tunisia the long forbidden Hizb an-Nahda could form a government. In Egypt Hizb al-Hurriya established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 won almost half of the parliamentary mandates, and to a great surprise, the Salafi Hizb an-Nour also received 24.3% of the votes. On the basis of the above developments the thesis of the Islamist re-organization of the Middle East, i.e. of a new wave of Islamism was elaborated, according to which the main political winners of the revolts in the Arab countries are the Islamist organizations, which could step in and fill in the political vacuum. While some speak of an Islamist autumn or Islamist winter as the result of the Arab Spring, others prefer the term Islamic revolutions.

A hazai kis- és közepes vállalatok szociokulturális beállítódása a hofstede-dimenziók mentén = The socio-cultural attitudes of the Hungarianc small and medium enterprises along the Hofstede dimensions

A kis- és közepes vállalkozások (KKV-k) kutatása viszonylag új, és emiatt meglehetősen feltáratlan terület, bár a megjelenő tudományos cikkek és eredmények száma és minősége évről évre jól érzékelhetően nő (Collinson – Shaw, 2001). A KKV-kutatások igen fontos sajátossága továbbá, hogy kifejezetten interdiszciplináris terület, megközelíthető a menedzsment, az innovációkutatás, a marketing, a szervezetszociológia, de akár a pszichológia felől is. Több kutatás is felveti a szociokulturális háttér jelentőségének kérdését KKV-k esetében. A szerzők kutatásuk során kvantitatív felmérést végeztek 200 vállalkozó körében a Hofstedeskála (Hofmeister et al., 2008) felhasználásával, melynek eredményeként kiderült, hogy a KKV-vezetők beállítódása jelentősen különbözik mind a hazai nagyvállalati vezetőktől, mind az általános lakosságtól. Jelen tanulmányunkban bemutatjuk azokat a Hofstede-dimenziókat, amelyek mentén karakteres különbségek jelentkeztek a vállalkozók és a nagyvállalati vezetők, valamint a társadalom összessége között. Az eredmények alapján határozottan kirajzolódnak olyan „vállalkozói” gondolkodásmódbeli sajátosságok, mint a nagyobb versenyszellem, a közvetlenebb, kevésbé hierarchikus működési stílus, a rendkívül erős, rövid távú orientáció, valamint a kockázatvállalás rendhagyóan alacsony foka. _____ Although there has been an increasing academic attention towards small and medium-sized enterprises, it is still a novel research area with a number of unanswered questions. It is also an especially interdisciplinary field as it can be approached from various viewpoints such as management, innovation, marketing, organization sociology or even psychology. Different academic disciplines have studied the influence of socio-cultural factors and concluded that they are relevant aspects of entrepreneurial activity. This paper presents the results of the authors’ quantitative research which aimed at finding patterns in the software of the minds of SME managers where they applied Hofstede’s cultural scale (Hofmeister et al., 2008). Drawing upon data from 200 Hungarian SMEs, the results indicate they have different attitude and way of thinking compared to large company managers and to the general Hungarian population. This paper points out the relevant Hofstede dimensions where significant differences have been revealed. The main finding of the study is that managers of small and medium businesses have a special mindset which can be characterized with higher level competitiveness, more direct and less hierarchic operation, extremely high level of short term orientation and low level of risk taking

Defining failure in the nonprofit organization: The case of four human service agencies

Private nonprofit human service organizations provide a spectrum of services that aim to resolve societal problems. Their failure may leave needed and desired services unprovided or not provided sufficiently to meet public demand. However, the concept of organizational failure has not been examined for the nonprofit organization. This research addresses the deficiency in the literatures of organization failure and nonprofit organizations.^ An eight category typology, developed from a review of the current literature and findings from expert interviews, is initially presented to define nonprofit organization failure. A multiple case study design is used to test the typology in four nonprofit human service delivery agencies. The case analysis reduces the typology to five types salient to nonprofit organization failure: input failure, legitimacy failure, adaptive failure, management failure and leadership failure.^ The resulting five category typology is useful to both theory builders and nonprofit practitioners. For theory development, the interaction of the failure types extends the literature and lays a foundation for a theory of nonprofit organization failure that diffuses management and leadership across all of the failure types, highlights management and leadership failure as collective functions shared by paid staff and the volunteer board of directors, and emphasizes the importance of organization legitimacy.^ From a practical perspective, the typology provides a tool for diagnosing failure in the nonprofit organization. Using the management indicators developed for the typology, a checklist of the warning signals of potential failure, emphasizing the key types of management and leadership, offers nonprofit decision makers a priori examination of an organization's propensity for failure. ^

Savages into citizens: Families, political purge, and reconciliation in Cordoba, Argentina, 1820--1862

This dissertation explores the political exclusion and reintegration of families and individuals in Córdoba, Argentina during the early nineteenth-century. Part one is an examination of how Federals in Córdoba managed the process of political identification and purge. Federals set up ad hoc institutions that were responsible for targeting political subversives within provincial communities. From 1831 to 1852, Federals managed to target, or “classify,” over 400 individuals and families in various towns and villages as “savage Unitarians,” a political label that meant the certain loss of rights, property, exile, and worse. Federals also sought active participation among “citizens” from all levels of society. Thus, I argue that the process of correctly identifying a “savage Unitarian” in Córdoba was constantly subject to modification at the local level. I also reconstruct the stories of accused families as they struggled to survive the political purges. Many of the families were large landowners and wealthy merchants, confirming that early republican Argentine political struggles were often intra-elite affairs. However, the “classified” individuals and families also represented a variety of socio-economic, ethnic, and racial groups. ^ The second part of this study focuses on families who petitioned Federal authorities for the restitution of rights and property. They proclaimed their loyalty to the “Federal cause,” and often, they had friends and family who could vouch for their claims. These petitions forced Federal authorities to doubt the precision of political identification and re-think how the ideology of Federalism was defined. Authorities granted most requests for repatriation, thereby creating a process of reintegration that included amnesty and restitution. Yet, this system failed to repair the psychological, emotional, materials, and political effects of political purge. Conflicts between society and state led to numerous misunderstandings about what restitution, justice, and reconciliation meant. The new regime's leaders more often denied restitution claims to formerly accused families and individuals, demonstrating that the journey from “savage” to citizen left an indelible imprint on family life in mid-nineteenth century Argentina. ^

Examining the process of regime change in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The divide between rhetoric and reality

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a product of the Cold War through which its members organized their military forces for the purpose of collective defense against the common threat of Soviet-backed aggression. Employing the terminology of regime theory, the creation of NATO can be viewed as the introduction of an international security regime. Throughout the Cold War, NATO member states preserved their commitment to mutual defense while increasingly engaging in activities aimed at overcoming the division of Europe and promoting regional stability. The end of the Cold War has served as the catalyst for a new period of regime change as the Alliance introduced elements of a collective security regime by expanding its mandate to address new security challenges and reorganizing both its political and military organizational structures. ^ This research involves an interpretive analysis of NATO's evolution applying ideal theoretical constructs associated with distinct approaches to regime analysis. The process of regime change is investigated over several periods throughout the history of the Alliance in an effort to understand the Alliance's changing commitment to collective security. This research involves a review of regime theory literature, consisting of an examination of primary source documentation, including official documents and treaties, as well as a review of numerous secondary sources. This review is organized around a typology of power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis. This dissertation argues that the process of regime change within NATO is best understood by examining factors associated with multiple theoretical constructs. Relevant factors provide insights into the practice of collective security among NATO member states within Europe, while accounting for the inability of the NATO allies to build on the experience gained within Europe to play a more central role in operations outside of this region. This research contributes to a greater understanding of the nature of international regimes and the process of regime change, while offering recommendations aimed at increasing NATO's viability as a source of greater security and more meaningful international cooperation.^

State legislative term limits and the law of unintended consequences: An examination of member behavior, power structures, and legislative organization in Florida

The implementation of term limits on state legislators has provided a wealth of data for study. Florida, the second largest state in the Union with term limits, has not been comprehensively studied. This research examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, member composition, legislator career paths, legislative leadership, and intra- and inter-governmental influences on Florida's legislature. This study looks at the Florida legislature from 1992 when term limits were enacted through 2004, three electoral cycles in which term limits have been in effect. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data where appropriate. Electoral data is used to assess electoral and demographic effects, as well as member career trajectories. Interview data with current and former legislators, lobbyists, and executive branch officials is used to analyze both changes in legislative organization and intra- and inter-governmental influences on the legislative process. Term limits has only created greater competition when a legislative seat opens and has actually created a greater advantage for incumbents. Women and minorities have only made minimal gains in winning seats post-term limits. Newly elected legislators are not political novices with a vast majority having previous elective experience. Leadership is more centralized under term limits and the Senate has gained an advantage over the more inexperienced House. Lastly, the influence of staff, lobbyists, and most importantly, the governor has greatly increased under term limits. This research finds that term limits have not produced the consequences that proponents had envisioned.^

Assessing administrative and political factors in implementing a living wage ordinance

Since 2000, the number of living wage ordinances has steadily increased throughout the country. While most of the current research has focused on the beneficial outcomes of living wages, little has been published on their administrative practices. To address this shortcoming, this study focused on the identification of key administrative and political factors involved impacting the implementation of living wage ordinances in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. The study utilized a triangulation of interviews, surveys, and direct observation. The author conducted interviews of administrators and members of the living wage oversight boards in both counties and observed the monthly meetings held by each county's oversight board from January 2006 to June 2007. These findings were buttressed with a national survey of senior staff in other living wage communities. The study utilized descriptive statistics, Chi Square, Cronbach's Alpha, and Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient (Spearman's rho). Interviews indicated that administrators in Dade and Broward are seriously under-staffed and budgeted. Ambiguities in the enabling ordinances have lead to loopholes that undermine implementation and accountability for participating contractors. Survey results showed that policy ambiguity, organizational politics, and a lack of organizational capacity were significant negative factors in the implementation process while an organizational culture emphasizing consistent enforcement was a positive factor. Without the proper inputs, an organization hinders itself from meeting its outputs and outcomes. This study finds that Broward and Miami-Dade Counties do not provide the necessary administrative support to implement a living wage effectively – in stark contrast to the high hopes and strong political support behind their passage. For a living wage to succeed, it first needs an organizational culture committed to providing the necessary resources for implementation as well as transparent, consistent accountability mechanisms.

Trade, justice, and the politics of difference: Small developing states in the World Trade Organization

The purpose of this research project was to investigate two distinct types of research questions – one theoretical, the other empirical: (1) What would justice mean in the context of the international trade regime? (2.Using the small developing states of the Commonwealth Caribbean as a case study, what do Commonwealth Caribbean trade negotiators mean when they appeal to justice? Regarding the first question, Iris Young's framework which focuses on the achievement of social justice in a domestic context by acknowledging social differences such as those based on race and gender, was adopted and its relevance argued in the international context of interstate trade negotiation so as to validate the notion of (size, location, and governance capacity) difference in this latter context. The point of departure is that while states are typically treated as equals in international law – as are individuals in liberal political theory – there are significant differences between states which warrant different treatment in the international arena. The study found that this re-formulation of justice which takes account of such differences between states, allows for more adequate policy responses than those offered by the presumption of equal treatment. Regarding the second question, this theoretical perspective was used to analyze the understandings of justice from which Commonwealth Caribbean trade negotiators proceed. Interpretive and ethnographic methods, including participant observation, interviews, field notes, and textual analysis, were employed to analyze their understandings of justice. The study found that these negotiators perceive such justice as being justice to difference because of the distinct characteristics of small developing states which combine to constrain their participation in the international trading system; based on this perception, they seek rules and outcomes in the multilateral trade regime which are sensitive to such different characteristics; and while these issues were examined in a specific region, its findings are relevant for other regions consisting of small developing states, such as those in the ACP group.

Illicit interest groups: The political impact of the Medellin drug trafficking organizations in Colombia

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.