DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 6, October 2014. EGYPT. The Return to Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Citizenship Rights

Citizenship and democratic rights have been shrinking in Egypt with the rise of president Abd El Fattah El Sisi, widely popular among Egyptians who fear more violence and unrest in an increasingly volatile region. In this EU Spring Policy Brief, Moataz El Fegiery examines the political landscape in the run-up of parliamentary elections, arguing that the short term is likely to see further curtailment of acquired rights, further crackdown on the opposition and consolidation of military power. In the longer term, however, it is in the interest of Egyptian society and institutions as well as of Europe to reverse the politics of exclusion and ensure that freedoms, pluralism and participation prevent the rise of extremism and political violence.

Hostages to Moscow, clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of the West diminishes. OSW Study 10/2014

The goal of this publication is to attempt to assess the thirteen years (2001- -2014) of the West’s military presence in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, closely associated with the ISAF and OEF-A (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan) missions in Afghanistan. There will also be an analysis of the actual challenges for the region’s stability after 2014. The current and future security architecture in Central Asia will also be looked at closely, as will the actual capabilities to counteract the most serious threats within its framework. The need to separately handle the security system in Central Asia and security as such is dictated by the particularities of political situation in the region, the key mechanism of which is geopolitics understood as global superpower rivalry for influence with a secondary or even instrumental role of the five regional states, while ignoring their internal problems. Such an approach is especially present in Russia’s perception of Central Asia, as it views security issues in geopolitical categories. Because of this, security analysis in the Central Asian region requires a broader geopolitical context, which was taken into account in this publication. The first part investigates the impact of the Western (primarily US) military and political presence on the region’s geopolitical architecture between 2001 and 2014. The second chapter is an attempt to take an objective look at the real challenges to regional security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan, while the third chapter is dedicated to analysing the probable course of events in the security dimension following 2014. The accuracy of predictions time-wise included in the below publication does not exceed three to five years due to the dynamic developments in Central Asia and its immediate vicinity (the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran), and because of the large degree of unpredictability of policies of one of the key regional actors – Russia (both in the terms of its activity on the international arena, and its internal developments).

Who calls the shots in the committees of the new European Parliament? CEPS Special Report No. 97, 21 November 2014

This CEPS Special Report analyses the composition of the 20 committees in the new European Parliament and how representative they are of the 28 member states, identifying which policy areas or committees are of particular interest to MEPs from certain countries. It also examines the allocation of committee chairs and party coordinator positions to assess whether the country of origin matters and if so, why. The study reveals that in general the countries’ share of representatives in the committees is very similar in most of the cases to their representation in Parliament. Still, some policy areas have a special relevance for some countries and attract their MEPs in larger numbers. Due to the procedure used in the allocation of the committee chairs, which favours the largest political groups and the largest national parties within them, MEPs from larger member states tend to hold most of these coveted positions. The internal process followed by the political groups in appointing their coordinators in the respective committees is predisposed towards MEPs with seniority, experience and good connections. All in all, the strategic relevance that national parties attach to these positions makes a difference.

Holes in the skies over NATO's Central European member states. OSW Commentary No. 119, 22.10.2013

Over the past few months, four Central European states have made decisions which will determine the shape of their air forces over the next decade. On 11 October, Romania signed a contract under which it will buy twelve used US F-16A/B multi-role fighter aircraft from Portugal. In August, Slovakia signed contracts with Russia’s MiG for repairs and the limited modernisation of its twelve MiG-29 fighter aircraft currently in service. The Czech Republic entered into a preliminary agreement in July with Sweden on extending the lease of fourteen JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft (the new Czech government will hammer out the details following the parliamentary election). Bulgaria, which has been facing financial problems and political instability, in June postponed the purchase of new (non-Soviet) combat aircraft at least until the end of this year. If Sofia decides to buy any within the next few years, these will be not more than twelve relatively old and worn-out machines (most likely F-16A/B from Portuguese or Dutch army surplus). Given the fact that Hungary in 2012 made the same decision regarding its fourteen Gripen aircraft as the Czech Republic, there are good grounds to claim that the capabilities Central European NATO member states have to take action in airspace are durably limited. The region’s saturation with combat aircraft is the lowest when compared to the entire continent (with the exception of the Baltic states). Furthermore, the machines to be used in the coming decade will be the oldest and the least advanced technologically (all of them belong to the so-called “fourth generation”, the roots of which date back to the 1970s). The problem with gaining full interoperability within NATO has not been resolved in its Central European member states. By modernising its MiG-29 aircraft, Slovakia is to say the least postponing the achievement of interoperability once again. Bulgaria will gain interoperability by buying any Western combat aircraft. However, it is very unlikely to introduce new machines into service earlier than at the end of the present decade. Since the introduction of new fifth generation multi-role combat aircraft or transitional 4+ generation machines in the region’s air forces is unrealistic, the defence of the airspace of NATO member states in Central Europe can be termed an ever more porous sky.

Jihad vs The New Great Game: Paradoxes of militant Islamic threats in Central Asia. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), January 2010

Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations. The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.

Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and the Chinese economic expansion in Eastern Europe. OSW Commentary No. 79, 2012-05-28

The countries of Eastern European and China have been increasingly interested in deepening bilateral contacts over the past few years. In the case of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova this has been caused by the bad economic situation which was in part caused by the consequences of the global economic crisis of 2008 and the desire to establish closer political relations with a country whose significance on the international arena is continually growing. Each of these countries has different expectations regarding the scale and the nature of co-operation with China. Chisinau wishes only to boost trade, whereas in Minsk and Kyiv, Beijing is also presented as a strategic partner whose investments may not only help the indebted economies recover but also strengthen the position of these countries in their dealings with the EU, and especially with Russia. Beijing sees co-operation with these countries in differently, and its offer is much more modest than Belarus and Ukraine are expecting. Eastern Europe is one of the last parts of the world with which China is activating its co-operation. This is not a priority region for Beijing. China wants to derive economic benefits and to diversify the markets on which it invests its financial surplus, and it does not intend to extend its political dialogue with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova beyond the framework which determines its economic interests. The main reason for this is the nature of relations between Russia and China. Beijing sees its partnership with Moscow as more beneficial, and will not offer these countries support in their relations with Russia since in its opinion they belong to Russia’s sphere of influence. Minsk and Kyiv are pinning too much hope on their co-operation with Beijing, while China offers no real counterbalance to the Russian and EU influences in these countries. Nevertheless, it should be expected that China will capitalise on the beneficial political climate in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to reinforce its influence in a region whose location will facilitate its expansion to the EU and the Customs Union markets. In the medium term, Beijing may become a major economic player in Eastern Europe. In a decade’s time this may translate into political influence. Meanwhile, in the short term, China’s financial engagement in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will contribute to increasing the debts and deepening the foreign trade deficits of these countries.

Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election. OSW Commentary No. 89, 2012-07-12

After two and a half years under President Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the state the country’s economy is currently in and the direction it has been developing in. There has also been a significant drop in stability and social security with the general public increasingly feeling that the government has little interest in their problems. Only 16% of Ukrainians believe that the current government has performed better than their predecessors, although overall confidence in both the ruling party and the opposition remains low. Nonetheless, falling support for the president and the Cabinet does not seem to have translated into greater popularity for the country’s opposition parties; these currently enjoy the confidence of only a quarter of the electorate. The clear lack of credibility for politicians on either side of the political spectrum, coupled with an almost universal preoccupation with the bare necessities of life, has shifted the political processes in Ukraine further down the agenda for the majority of Ukrainians. Ukraine’s poor economic performance, which over the last two years has been addressed through a series of highly unpopular economic reforms, has resulted in a growing mood of discontent and increased civil activity, with the Ukrainian people reporting a greater willingness than ever to join protests on social issues. Most of them, however, have shown much less interest in political rallies. This is likely to stem from low levels of trust in the opposition and the general belief that opposition politicians are not a viable alternative to the current government. One may therefore assume that there will be little public scrutiny of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October, and that the likelihood of mass demonstrations during it is low. However, in the event of large-scale vote rigging and a dismissive response from the government, spontaneous unsanctioned rallies cannot be ruled out. What is more likely, however, is a series of protests after the elections, when the already difficult economic situation is further exacerbated by a predicted rise in the price of gas for Ukrainian households and a possible move to devalue the Ukrainian hryvnia.

The press and freedom of speech in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 90, 2012-09-20

The independence of the mass media has been regularly restricted over the past two years in Ukraine. Following a period of relative freedom in 2005–2010, the scope of direct and indirect government control of the press has increased, cancelling out the achievements of the Orange Revolution in this area. The press in Ukraine is less and less able to perform its role as watchdog on the government and politicians and as a reliable source of information on the situation in the country to the public. This is mainly due to: (1) the concentration of the most important mass media in the hands of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, whose business interests depend on the government; (2) the use of the press as instruments in political and business competition; (3) the ruling class’s subordination of the institutions which supervise the press; (4) repression used against media critical of the government and (5) the lack of an independent public broadcasting corporation. As a consequence, the press has hardly any impact on the political processes taking place ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October. This is also an effect of a passiveness present in the Ukrainian public, who are tired of politics and are focused on social issues. Cases of abuse or corruption scandals revealed by the press do not provoke any response from the public and are rarely investigated by the public prosecution authorities. The more popular a given medium is, the more strongly it is controlled by the government. At present, television has to be recognised as the least reliable of the mass media. In turn, Internet news journals are characterised by the greatest pluralism but also have more limited accessibility. The political conditions in which the mass media operate in Ukraine lead to various forms of pathology. The most serious of them are censorship by the owners and self-censorship performed by journalists, and a great share of political advertorials. As the parliamentary election is approaching, the pathologies of the Ukrainian media market have been showing up with greater intensity.

Empirical Evidence of the Distributional Effects of the CAP in the New EU Member States. Factor Markets Working Document No. 58, August 2013

This study, carried out in the context of the Factor Markets research project, investigates the impact of the SAPS (Single Area Payment Scheme) on farmland rental rates in the new EU member states. Using a unique set of farm level panel data with 20,930 observations for 2004 and 2005 we are able to control for important sources of endogeneity. According to our results, the SAPS has a positive and statistically significant impact on land rents in the EU. However, the estimated incidence is smaller than predicted theoretically. Land rents capture only 19 cents of the marginal SAPS euro, and around 10% of the SAPS benefit non-farming landowners through higher farmland rental prices. As the share of rented land is higher in corporate farms than individual ones, family farms benefit more from the SAPS than corporate farms do.

Direct Payments and Land Rents: Evidence from New Member States. Factor Markets Working Document No. 62, August 2013

This Factor Markets Working Paper analyses the impact of increasing direct payments on land rents in six new EU member states in which agricultural subsidies largely increased as a result of their EU accession. The authors find that up to 25 eurocents per additional euro of direct payments is capitalised in land rents. In addition, the results show that capitalisation of direct payments is higher in more credit constrained markets, while capitalisation of direct payments is lower in countries where more land is used by corporate farms.

An Analysis of the Capitalisation of CAP Payments into Land Rental Rates in Ireland. Factor Markets Working Document No. 68, August 2013

EDITED VERSION SOON TO BE PUBLISHED In this paper the effect of decoupling on the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into agricultural rents in Ireland are analysed using a dynamic rental equations estimated with a two step system GMM estimator that accounts for expectation error and endogenous regressors. The findings illustrate the importance of institutional details in determining the extent to which subsidies are capitalised. In the period prior to decoupling Pillar 1 subsidies were highly capitalised into Irish agricultural rents in both the short and the long run. Depending on the farm system considered between 58 to 80 cents per euro of subsidies were capitalised into agricultural rents. In the post decoupling period the rate at which Pillar 1 subsidies are capitalised into Irish agricultural rents is found to have declined. This change is likely due to short term character of the Irish agricultural land rental market, where 11 month rental periods predominate, and the freedom that the 2003 reform of the CAP offered farmers to consolidate entitlements established on rented land. The generally very short term nature of Irish agricultural rental contracts offered farmers an opportunity to consolidate entitlements that is unlikely to have arisen in other Member States with agricultural land rental markets characterised by long term contracts. The results in both the pre and post decoupling periods highlight the high degree of inertia of agricultural rents in Ireland, and the importance of accounting for dynamics when investigating the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into land rents. The high degree of inertia in rents means that the impact of previously capitalised agricultural policy persists through time.

EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?

Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 156|24.12.2014

On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist movements organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these divisions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusiastically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radical groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict. Since the beginning of the ‘Russian Spring’, the Kremlin has fostered active attitudes among the nationalists and solicited their support, hoping to win a valuable ally. This has boosted hopes in these circles that their political position may be strengthened. The involvement in the fighting in Ukraine has led to a radicalisation of attitudes among the nationalists, and demonstrated that this group is ideologically motivated and has considerable potential for mobilisation. Moreover, the ‘Great Russian’ and anti-Western slogans some of them have propagated are reflected in views displayed by average Russians, who have been influenced by the patriotic enthusiasm which followed the annexation of Crimea. Due to all this, from among all the actors active on the opposition side, it is the nationalists – and not the representatives of the liberal and pro-Western opposition – that have the best prospects for access to the political stage in Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further strengthening of the radical groups might also be boosted by the possible growing social frustration caused by the economic crisis, which additionally increases the risk of political destabilisation.

American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.