[Taxation research notes, 1794]

One leaf containing a handwritten incomplete text arguing for the creation of tables containing financial data found in government records and account books, as a means of comparing the value of real estate, silver, and salaries, in part to "ascertain how much of the present expense of supporting a family is to be attributed to the present mode of living." The page has the remnants of a red wax seal.

Biennial report of the Vermont State Board of Agriculture, Manufactures and Mining ...

3

Public notice regarding mining,

Public proclamation, signed by Cesareo Sanchez. In Spanish.

Mining Districts, Victoria, Australia, ca. 1868 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Victoria mining districts, mining divisions & the gold fields, engraved by William Slight under the direction of R. Brough Smyth ; colored by Arthur Everett, August 1st, 1868. It was published by Dept of Mines ca. 1868. Scale [ca. 1:1,000,000].The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, administrative boundaries, railroads, gold reefs, mining districts, telegraph lines, shoreline features, and more. Relief shown by hachures. Includes notes.This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.