Foodstuffs and medicines as legal categories in the EU and China. Functional foods as a borderline case

The thesis discusses the regulation of foodstuffs and medicines, and particularly the regulation of functional foods. Legal systems investigated are the EU and China. Both are members of the WTO and Codex Alimentarius, which binds European and Chinese rules together. The study uses three Chinese berries as case examples of how product development faces regulation in practice. The berries have traditional uses as herbal medicines. Europe and China have similar nutrition problems to be resolved, such as obesity, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes. The three berries might be suitable raw materials for functional foods. Consumer products with health-enhancing functions, such as lowering blood pressure, might legally be classifi ed either as foodstuffs or medicines. The classifi cation will depend on functions and presentation of the product. In our opinion, food and medicine regulation should come closer together so the classifi cation issue would no longer be an issue. Safety of both foodstuffs and medicines is strictly regulated. With medicines, safety is a more relative concept, where benefi ts of the product are compared to side-effects in thorough scientifi c tests and trials. Foods, on the other hand, are not allowed to have side-effects. Hygiene rules and rules on the use of chemicals apply. In China, food safety is currently at focus as China has had several severe food scandals. Newly developed foods are called novel foods, and are specifi cally regulated. The current European novel food regulation from 1997 treats traditional third country products as novel. The Chinese regulation of 2007 also defi nes novel foods as something unfamiliar to a Chinese consumer. The concepts of novel food thus serve a protectionist purpose. As regards marketing, foods are allowed to bear health claims, whereas medicines bear medicinal claims. The separation is legally strict: foods are not to be presented as having medicinal functions. European nutrition and health claim regulation exists since 2006. China also has its regulation on health foods, listing the permitted claims and how to substantiate them. Health claims are allowed only on health foods. The European rules on medicines include separate categories for herbal medicines, traditional herbal medicines, and homeopathic medicines, where there are differing requirements for scientifi c substantiation. The scientifi c and political grounds for the separate categories provoke criticism. At surface, the Chinese legal system seems similar to the European one. To facilitate trade, China has enacted modern laws. Laws are needed as the country moves from planned economy to market economy: ‘rule of law’ needs to replace ‘rule of man’. Instead of being citizens, Chinese people long were subordinates to the Emperor. Confucius himself advised to avoid confl ict. Still, Chinese people do not and cannot always trust the legal system, as laws are enforced in an inconsistent manner, and courts are weak. In China, there have been problems with confl icting national and local laws. In Europe, the competence of the EU vs. the competence of the Member States is still not resolved, even though the European Commission often states that free trade requires harmonisation. Food and medicine regulation is created by international organisations, food and medicine control agencies, standards agencies, companies and their organisations. Regulation can be divided in ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’. One might claim that hard law is in crisis, as soft law is gaining importance. If law is out of fashion, regulation certainly isn’t. In the future, ‘law’ might mean a process where rules and incentives are created by states, NGOs, companies, consumers, and other stakeholders. ‘Law’ might thus refer to a constant negotiation between public and private actors. Legal principles such as transparency, equal treatment, and the right to be heard would still be important.

Hälsans grund kan bara hjärtat förstå : ett sökande efter kunskap om hälsa i ljuset av Blaise Pascals tänkande

The aim of this thesis is to gain new understanding of health based on the work Penseés (Thoughts) by Blaise Pascal. The research interest originates from the motive of the heart for the greatness of man in conjunction with his baseness. The study is hermeneutic and the purpose is to describe health formulated as new abductive theses based on the assumption that caring science and caring theology can be conjoined in the same ontology. The work Penseés is, in Gadamer’s sense, alive since the text is constantly being made use of and is in this occurence interpreted through the requirements made by caring science. Pascal’s arguments continue through the historically effected consciousness while the interpretation is confronted with the ontological model of health. In the initial horizon we find the understanding of the motion of health and the extension towards text materials which is undertaken by Pascal’s Penseés. to open up the perspective and be able to project the horizon of the text. In the encounter with the text, the core content will first be discussed in an interpretative part after which the understanding gained will be summarized into new abductive assumptions. On the basis of Gadamer’s emphasis on the applications of the interpretations, the merging of the horizons will identify health as something desired by man, what he is and what he wants to accomplish. The creation of health is the reason of the heart, and on the basis of what man wants to confide in, the rise of health will be established. The totality of greatness and baseness of man is achieved by the accomplishment of health. That man owns spiritual devotedness means health whereas unhealthy means that he is insecure of his character and leads a life with ill-considered amusements. When according to Pascal, man’s desires and thoughts are joined in the heart, a connecting relation will arise. Hence the spiritual edification that man will fail to secure if he puts too much of his confidence in transient reason is included, something that is insufficient when it comes to understand the meaning of health.

Kroppen som bärare av hälsa och lidande

The overall aim of this study is to seek new knowledge and deeper understanding of the body as a phenomenon from a caring science point of view. By means of a hermeneutic definition, the body is studied on a contextual as well as an ontological level in order to create a deeper understanding for human beings in relation to health and suffering. The study focuses of the body as a perspective of human beings. It is important for the knowledge growth in caring science to create a deeper understanding for the body, thus making it possible to understand patients in nursing care. The overall methodology is a hermeneutic definition which covers a contextual and an ontological concept definition. In the three empirical studies, Giorgi’s phenomenological method was used. The first empirical study comprises twelve students’ statements about experiences of their body in different situatons in life. The second study is composed of interviews with fifteen patients who had been afflicted by illness and been subjected to surgical treatment. In the third empirical study, ten patients who had been cared for in perioperative nursing care were interviewed. In the data analysis, the essential meaning of the body as a phenomenon is described, along with its variations and nuances. In the ontological determination of the body, an etymologic and semantic analysis is carried out, as well as a qualitative analysis of ideas, where the material is comprised of chosen texts on the body from different perspectives. In the concluding analysis the results were synthesized. The result of the first empirical study shows that a body is expressive and manifests movement in its striving for dignity. The body harbours language and inherent powers to cope with the unexpected, as well as feelings of anxiety, fear and powerlessness. The second study shows that the body is experienced as mysterious when it is afflicted by illness, but it is also found mysterious as an opponent to man and life. A battle is fought between the illness that breaks down the body, and human beings fighting to keep their unity whole. The body appears as a prison and a host for a threatening illness. The body bears a feeling of powerlessness when it is changed by illness and suffering. In a care and treatment context, the body is objectified by the patient and the caregiver. It is the illness that forces the patient to sacrifice parts of the body in order to once again become whole in the unity. The third study shows that the patient in a perioperative nursing context delivers him-/herself over to the hands of the caregiver, who defends and protects body and life. The patient experiences a sense of well-being when the caretaker receives him/her and protects the body from dangers. Suffering is alleviated when the patients are allowed to talk about what has happened in their body. The result of the semantic analysis shows that the body as a concept is described as bending around the human soul and spirit. Linguistically, dimensions like corporeal, shape, totality, unity and mortal clay, are described. Different ideas about the body described it as: a material animate part of man, active and demanding, something that perceives its surrounding world and as a subjective body of senses, thoughts and language. Ideas about the body also describe it as a biological and physiological, living organism, submitted to the laws of nature, a passive apparatus and a socially constructed gender. The results of the different studies were synthesized and reflected against a caring science perspective. The research has created a deeper understanding for the body as a material abode and as an entity of body, soul and spirit.

Miten feministinen teoria kudotaan?

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

Symbioottisesta hallintapakosta suhteelliseen toimintavapauteen : psykohistorian ulottuvuus? 1

Nimekkeen selitys: Klaus Theweleitin psykoanalyyttinen tutkimus Männerphantasien länsimaisesta kulttuurista fasismin (= hallintapakon) alatapauksena.

As razões do laissez-faire: uma análise do ataque ao mercantilismo e da defesa da liberdade econômica na Riqueza das Nações

The reasons of the laissez-faire: an analysis of the attack to mercantilism and of the defense of economic liberty in The Wealth of Nations. The main reasons presented in The Wealth of Nations to advocate the system of economic liberty and reject mercantilism are analyzed. These two systems are evaluated considering basically their impact on the annual product, and the degree of liberty and justice they engender. Based on his views of man and of capital hierarchy, Smith defends the superiority of economic liberty in what concerns the growth of the annual product. This system is also considered superior to mercantilism in terms of justice since it does not privilege any sector of society and allows a great level of liberty to the individuals.

Människans liv med sömnbesvär och hur människor med sömnbesvär upplever kognitiv beteendeterapi

Sleep disorders are a common health problem in western countries. Every third working age person suffers from sleep deprivation and that often leads to other health problems as well. One can end up in a vicious circle, which can further decrease mood and ability to function. The aim of this thesis is to illustrate how sleep deprivation affects the lives of working age population and to deepen our understanding of life with sleep deprivation. Study questions are: how does sleep deprivation affect a working age person’s life and what kind of experiences do people have about cognitive-behavioural therapy as a treatment to sleep disorders. Theoretical perspective is based on clinical nursing science theories and the humanist view of man, which sees human as an entity. The methodology used is phenomenological approach and data analysis is conducted by using Ricœur’s hermeneutic phenomenological interpretation method. The empirical part is divided into two different sections. The material of the study consists of interviews and surveys done by people who have experienced sleep deprivation or sleep disorders. Two interviewees talked about their lives with sleep disorders and there are 21 surveys conducted on people’s experiences on cognitive-behavioural therapy. The partakers in the two sections are different people. The results show that people with sleep disorders can end up in a vicious circle of sleep deprivation and in worst cases a sleep disorder can take charge of a person’s whole life. Sleep disorder can cause shame and fear of stigma. Nevertheless, someone suffering from a sleep disorder can find strength and solutions to control the difficult situation. This study proves that both nursing staff and other people have little information about difficulties in sleeping and awareness should be improved in clinical nursing. A health-care provider has an essential role in preventing someone ending up in a vicious circle of sleep deprivation and cognitive-behavioural therapy can contribute to good health. Reflection at the end of cognitive-behavioural sleep therapy course helps patients to continue their learning process. When someone is sleep deprived, it means that they have control over the situation, but when someone has a sleep disorder, that person does not have the strength to control the situation.

Dois métodos ou duas antropologias?

This is a commentary to a well-known paper of Bresser-Pereira: The two methods and the hard core of economics. Therefore, it target a very suggestive article that seeks to examine the conceptions of man of classical political economy and Keynesian economics in contrast to the reductive conception of man found in positive economic theory, especially in neoclassical theory. It shows that both conceptions at large think with abstracts economic men. However, the first one reasons with individuals who are determined by the historical and social structures of the capitalistic economic system. The second one seeks to present them in a formal way, as if they were mere pieces of a large automaton, i.e., the mercantile system as a large and standardized mechanism. In the end, Marx is distinguished because he does not reflect based on a static anthropological foundation. For him, men are subjects that become because they can realize themselves only in the course of history.

Bulgakov's sophiology as philosopheme: non-ontology and ontogenesis

The text examines Sergej Nikolajeviè Bulgakov's description of the philosopheme as thoroughly "immanent" (viz., the immanence of man qua being, such that ontology in Bulgakov becomes a conceptual analogue for immanence) and the corollary that such immanence necessarily excludes the problematic of the "creation of the world." Because of this resolute immanence and the notion that the creation of the world in the form of creatio ex nihilo requires a non-immanent or non-ontological thought and concept, the problematic for Bulgakov is approached only by a theologeme. Appropriating this argument as material for a cursory philosopheme, the text attempts to transform Bulgakov's theologeme into a philosopheme through an elision of God and dogma that overdetermines the theologeme. This philosopheme (nascent within Bulgakov's work itself, in both his hesitation to the overdetermination of immanence and the commitment to the problem of creation) would be a thoroughly non-ontological philosopheme, one that allows for the treatment of the problematic of "creation" or singular ontogenesis, yet with the corollary that this philosopheme must rely on an "ontological zero" Such a philosopheme qua ontologically empty formula nevertheless remains ontologically significant insofar as it is to evince the limit of ontology, in the ontological zero's non-relationality to ontology.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Leaf from a Liturgical Music Manuscript for Good Friday

The text reads as follows: Narrator: Passio domini nostri iesu christi secundum matheum. In illo tempore dixit iusus discipulis suis. Christ: Scritis quia post biduum pascha fiet, et filius hominis tradetur ut crucifigatur. Narrator: Tumc congregati sunt principes sacerdotum et seniores populi, in atrium principis… Translated: Narrator: The Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ according to Matthew. “And it came to pass when Jesus had finished all of these words that he said to his disciples: Christ: You know that after two days the Passover will be here; and the Son of Man will be delivered up to be crucified. Narrator: Then the chief priests and the elders of the people gathered together in the court of the high priest…

Le développement durable : enfant prodigue ou rejeton matriphage de la protection de la nature ?

article

Développement durable: quelques points litigieux

Ouvrant la réflexion sur les enjeux de la perte massive de la biodiversité, l'article s'appuie sur la question élémentaire de l'importance de la diversité biologique pour l'homme, à la fois sur le plan économique, biologique et éthique. La maîtrise de la nature par l'homme se révèle être une illusion. La réalité étant celle de l'interaction, il est permis de dire que les sociétés humaines agissent sur leurs propres conditions en modifiant les équilibres biologiques pour satisfaire leurs besoins, sans pour autant intégrer cette interaction fondamentale dans l'équation d'un rapport viable entre l'homme et la nature. L'approche récente par le biais des analyses des services écologiques constitue à cet égard un progrès sensible. Il aboutit néanmoins au constat de l'impossibilité pour l'humanité de se substituer aux mécanismes naturels permettant de tirer les services de la nature nécessaires à sa survie. Plutôt que de prétendre contrôler et maîtriser la nature à tout prix, l’homme devrait apprendre à se reconnaître comme une partie consciente de la nature et à vivre avec la vie qui l’entoure. Cet apprentissage soulève des défis scientifiques, humains et de gouvernance. L'article prône la nécessité d'une science de la biodiversité intégrée et non plus éclatée, condition essentielle pour l'élaboration de politiques économiques et sociales qui intègrent la viabilité de l'utilisation des ressources naturelles et des services qu'elles procurent.

Le droit de résistance à l'oppression en droit international

Tantôt nié dans son principe même, tantôt proclamé comme un droit sacré et inaliénable de l'homme, le droit de résistance à l'oppression a, depuis sa proclamation pour la première fois dans la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen du 26 août 1789, continuellement suscité des débats quant à sa nature et la légitimité de son exercice. De façon générale, ce mémoire vise à exposer les origines du droit de résistance à l'oppression, et sa consécration normative au niveau international. Il s'agit de trouver des fondements justifiant et légalisant le recours à la résistance dans toutes ses formes, lorsque confronté à une oppression d'origine étatique. Ces fondements pourront être retracés chez les philosophes du Moyen-âge et de la renaissance qui ont consacré un droit naturel de résistance à l'homme, supérieur au droit positif. En faisant appel aux notions de justice et d'humanité, cette notion de droit naturel a contribué à la légitimation du concept de résistance dans la relation du peuple avec son souverain. Nous retrouvons d'ailleurs cette idée dans le cadre du droit international contemporain à travers la protection accordée à certains droits tels les droit des minorités et le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination. Malgré cela, on constate toutefois l'absence d'une consécration expresse d' «un droit de résistance à l'oppression» au niveau international. Le droit de résistance à l'oppression demeure un droit difficile à positiver dans le cadre d'un droit international qui se présente avant tout comme un droit de consolidation de la souveraineté des États, et dans un système où la mise en œuvre des droits repose sur la bonne volonté de ces derniers.