Industry wage survey.

Mode of access: Internet.

A business reborn;

Mode of access: Internet.

Abuses in federal student aid programs : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, second session.

Hearings held Feb. 20, 1990-

Report of the superintendent of banks

1941-<49> also called 91st-<99th> annual report

Report.

"Beginning with rpt. for 1878 (and occasionally in previous years), each rpt. [up to 1910] cont. a compilation of the laws rel. to banks, savings banks, trust and investment cos. and building and loan ass'ns.

Report

None issued 1955

Report

Successively Issued by: Supervisor of Loan Agencies; Bureau of Loan Agencies

Old man Curry, Race track stories.

Levelling with Elisha.- Playing even for Obadiah.- By a hair.- The last chance.- Sanguinary Jeremiah.- Eliphaz, late Fairfax- The redemption handicap.- A morning workout.- Egyptian corn.- The modern judgment of Solomon.

Federal housing enterprises : HUD's mission oversight needs to be strengthened : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives /

"B-278383"--P. 1.

Office of Thrift Supervision journal.

Title from cover.

Hearings relating to Madison Guaranty S & L and the Whitewater Development Corporation, Washington, DC phase : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, second session.

Shipping list no.: 95-0029-P (v. 1), 95-0027-P (v. 2), 95-0194-P (v. 3, 11), 95-0187-P (v. 4, 9, 14), 95-0177-P (v. 5, 8, 13, 17), 95-0205-P (v. 6), 95-0176-P (v. 10, 15-16, 18), 95-0121-P (v. 12), 95-0188-P (v. 19), 95-0185-P (v. 20-21, 23), 95-0199-P (v. 22), 95-0195-P (v. 24).

An Inquiry into the Legal Standing of Rogue REMICs in Foreclosures

The business of privatized mortgage loan securitization (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits or “REMICS”) is so arcane and specialized that few people outside of that realm of investment knowledge understand, or even care to understand how loan securitization functions. However, if the difference between a legitimate REMIC and a Rogue REMIC is adequately explained, one can begin to understand why Rogue REMICs must be exposed as unlawful enterprises whose affiliates are not only able to disregard existing federal securities and tax laws, but are also able to circumvent state and local foreclosure laws at will. These ongoing violations result from the intentional and commonplace shortcutting of the proper mortgage loan securitization processes during the several years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This Inquiry will not focus primarily on how and why Rogue REMICS violate federal tax and securities laws; although those aspects are part of the discussion by necessity. I will argue that all Rogues lack the perquisite legal standing to prosecute both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. I will present compelling evidence that, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, foreclosures by Rogues may have exceeded 10% of all foreclosures. I will further argue that county officials may be violating state laws by recording the documents that impart false legal standing to the Rogues. I will conclude with a suggestion to homeowners on how to proceed if a mortgage assignment to a Rogue turns up in the local County public records

Essays on Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Why do US banks borrow from the Fed? A fresh look at the ‘reluctance’ phenomenon

The role of several theoretical factors in determining the demand of US banks for borrowed reserves from the Fed is empirically investigated. The main objective is to isolate the candidate(s) most likely responsible for the recent observed phenomenon of banks reluctance to borrow from the Fed, particularly since the mid-1980s. The results indicate that the declining number of banks due to mergers and consolidations holds much of the weight for explaining the weakened demand for borrowed reserves since the mid-1980s. Consistent evidence is found suggesting that US banks may have been unlawfully exploiting the discount window service for profit-taking purposes. This finding proves credible and suggests the need for further loan scrutiny at the Federal discount window.