Eficacia de las plataformas electorales en términos de la reforma política del ejecutivo federal del 2012

Los partidos políticos son agrupaciones temporales que median entre los grupos de la sociedad y el Estado y participan en la lucha por el poder político, a través de los procesos electorales. Los partidos tienen la obligación de registrar una plataforma electoral, a través de la cual plantean propuestas preliminares que se someten a consideración de los ciudadanos con el propósito de convocar al diálogo y a la deliberación, las cuales son enriquecidas y profundizadas a lo largo de las campañas, que debieran convertirse posteriormente en la base del programa de gobierno del partido que resulte triunfador en las elecciones. Respecto a la relación que existe entre la Plataforma Electoral y las iniciativas legislativas del Ejecutivo Federal en materia político-electoral, cabe señalar que: El 15 de diciembre de 2009, el Presidente presentó la iniciativa de Reforma Política compuesta por 9 puntos, a saber: Permitir la elección consecutiva de legisladores federales, locales, miembros de los ayuntamientos y jefes delegacionales; reducir el número de integrantes de las cámaras, modificando los principios para la integración de la Cámara de Senadores; adoptar la segunda vuelta electoral para la elección del Presidente; incrementar a 4% el porcentaje mínimo de votación para que un partido político nacional conserve su registro; incorporar las candidaturas independientes; permitir a los ciudadanos y a la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación presentar iniciativas de ley; facultar al Presidente para presentar iniciativas preferentes y para observar, parcial o totalmente, el Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación y la Ley de Ingresos; así como para publicar parcialmente aquellas leyes cuyas observaciones no hayan sido superadas en el Congreso...

Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990-1995

This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country's armed forces to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was widely regarded as negative. The rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security policy with potentially profound implications for international relations. I use social role theory to explain Germany's security policy reorientation. I argue that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a result of a general shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security problems after the Cold War. Germany's resistance to the use of force was viewed as inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role conception of a dependable and reliable ally. Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany's national role conception was pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs'. CDU/CSU politicians initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that the maintenance of the country's role conception necessitated a reorientation in security policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.

Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013

Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.

The Discursive double game of EMU reform: the clash of titans between French White Knight and German Iron Lady. Paper presented at the 9th Biennial Conference European Community Studies Association–Canada (ECSA-C), Ottawa, Ontario, April 27-28, 2012

From the Introduction. In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German “engine” of Europe had come to an end. The political legitimacy of French-German initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult. This is largely due to these countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices....the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken in 2012 before the French Presidential elections. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic corpus of press conferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is complemented by a number of press interviews including some given by their respective Finance Ministers) and important speeches in that same period of time.

New market conditions and "exit strategies" for the German arms industry. OSW Commentary No. 130, 12.03.2014

Due to changing internal and external conditions, the German arms industry is facing serious challenges as are its counterparts across Europe. The arms sales market in Germany is contracting – orders from the Bundeswehr are slowing down and the Federal Ministry of Defence is planning to change the way it cooperates with German arms producers. In addition, member states of NATO and the EU, major customers of German arms manufacturers, are reducing their defence spending, which will spell a fall in their orders for new armament and military equipment. In response to the new circumstances, the German arms industry is beginning to organise itself and increase its lobbying efforts in Berlin and, with the support of the federal government, it has been implementing specific measures in several areas. German companies are interested in securing new markets outside NATO and the EU and are also exploring opportunities for mergers and joint ventures with other German and foreign companies, and are seeking to create more conducive conditions for business on the EU and NATO markets.

The natural resources deficit: the implications for German politics. OSW Commentary No. 46, 2011-02-08

Falling amounts of natural resources and the ‘peak oil’ question, i.e. the point in time when the maximum rate of extraction of easily-accessible oil reserves is reached, have been among the key issues in public debate in Germany on all levels: expert, business and – most crucially – the government level. The alarming assessments of German analysts anticipate a rapid shrinkage of oil reserves and a sharp rise in oil prices, which in the longer term will affect the economic and political systems of importer countries. Concerns about the consequences of the projected resource deficit, especially among representatives of German industry, are also fuelled by the stance of those countries which export raw materials. China, which meets 97% of global demand for minerals crucial for the production of new technologies, cut its exports by 40% in summer 2010 (compared to 2009), arguing that it had to protect its reserves from overexploitation. In 2009 the value of natural resources Germany imported reached €84 billion, of which €62 billion were spent on energy carriers, and €22 billion on metals. For Germany, the shrinkage of resources is a political problem of the utmost importance, since the country is poor in mineral resources and has to acquire petroleum and other necessary raw materials abroad1. In autumn 2010, the German minister of economy initiated the establishment of a Resources Agency designed to support companies in their search for natural resources, and the government prepared and adopted a national Raw Material Strategy. In the next decade the policy of the German government, including foreign policy, will be affected by the consequences of the decreasing availability of natural resources. It can be expected that the mission of the Bundeswehr will be redefined, and the importance of African states and current exporter countries such as Russia and China for German policies will increase. At the same time, Germany will seek to strengthen cooperation among importer countries, which should make pressure on resource-exporting states more effective. In this context, it can be expected that the efforts taken to develop an EU resource strategy or even a ‘comprehensive resource policy’ will be intensified; or at least, the EU’s energy policy will permanently include the issue of sourcing raw materials.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

The Malleable Politics of Welfare-to-Work Reform: Germany's "Hartz" activation compared with Dutch, British and Irish cases. ACES Cases No. 2009.1

We compare the Hartz reforms in Germany with three other major labor market activation reforms carried out by center-left governments. Britain and Germany developed radically neoliberal “mandatory” activation policies, whereas in the Netherlands and Ireland radical activation change took a very different “enabling” form. The Irish and German cases were path deviant, the British and Dutch path dependent. We explain why Germany underwent “mandatory” and path deviant activation by focusing on two features of the policy discourse. First, the elite level discourse was “ensilaged” sealing policy formation off from dissenting actors. This is what the British and German cases had in common and the result was reform that identified long term unemployment as social delinquency rather than market failure. Second, although the German policy-making system lacked the “authoritative” features that facilitated reform in the British case, and the Irish policy-making system lacked the “reflexive” mechanisms that facilitated reform in the Dutch case, in both Germany and Ireland the wider legitimating discourses were reshaped by novel institutional vehicles (the Hartz Commission and FÁS) that served to fundamentally alter system-constitutive perceptions about policy. The findings suggest that major reform of welfare-to-work policy may be much more malleable than previously thought.

One money with several cycles? Evaluation of European business cycles using cluster analysis. ACES Cases No. 2009.3

Optimal currency area theory suggests that business cycle comovement is a sufficient condition for monetary union, particularly if there are low levels of labour mobility between potential members of the monetary union. Previous studies of co-movement of business cycle variables (mainly authored by Artis and Zhang in the late 1990s) found that there was a core of member states in the EU that could be grouped together as having similar business cycle comovements, but these studies always used Germany as the country against which to compare. In this study, the analysis of Artis and Zhang is extended and updated but correlating against both German and euro area macroeconomic aggregates and using more recent techniques in cluster analysis, namely model-based clustering techniques.