Oratio salutatoria et oratio valedictoria, ca. 1763

Undated and unattributed handwritten Latin salutatory and valedictory orations composed for the Harvard College Commencement. A modern note with the materials suggests Nathaniel Sparhawk (Harvard AB 1765) as the author, but the author was more likely Joseph Hooper (Harvard AB 1763), who delivered the orations for the 1763 Harvard Commencement. While the documents are undated, textual clues include mention of the command of George III in recent war against France and Spain, suggesting the speech was written soon after the Treaty of Paris which was signed in February 1763 to end the Seven Years' War. The speech also celebrates Harvard Tutor William Kneeland, who resigned from his position in July 1763, and mentions the illness of Professor Edward Wigglesworth (who died before the 1765 Commencement). The text also mentions Professor John Winthrop and Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard.

Letters from William Tudor to his sister, Emma Tudor Gardiner,

Two letters written from London. In one letter, written in French, Tudor inquires after Emma’s study of the piano and French. In a later letter, he describes to her the cottages he has seen in England, and advises her on the house she is planning to build in Gardiner, Maine, including two architectural sketches. Tudor also offers detailed descriptions of the shops in London, his impressions of Londoners’ rudeness and "blustering air," his impressions of the different classes in England and France, and fashions of the ladies.

Memoire sur la colonie de Quebec, Plaisance, Gaspé et Capbreton : manuscript, 1663

Concerns conditions in New France and the need for French troops.

Fessae, et Marocchi Regna Africae celeberr

describebat Abrah. Ortelius.

The Franco-German Alliance: Can it continue to serve as a motor for Europe? CEPS Commentary, 22 January 2013

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty between Germany and France, CEPS Director Daniel Gros acknowledges the fundamental contribution made by the Franco-German motor but also takes the two countries to task for their refusal abandon the pretence that they still perform individually an independent role at the global level. France and Germany should allow European institutions to formulate and implement common external policies.

Vanishing lines in the sand – Why a new map of the Middle East is necessary. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2013

As the stalemate in Syria drags on, territorial divisions in the country are becoming more entrenched and the civil war is spreading to Syria’s neighbours; aggravating long-standing sectarian divisions in the whole region. In the view of Steven Blockmans, a lasting agreement cannot be reached in the Middle East if world powers stick to infamous 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement in which France and the UK secretly dealt with what came to be called the ‘Syria Question’. Any way out of the quagmire will require a grand bargain – one that establishes a new order in the whole region and draws borders accordingly.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.

Simulation Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on Farm Investment Behaviour. Factor Markets Working Document No. 56, June 2013

This paper completes the comparative analysis of the investment demand behaviour, of a sample of specialised arable crop farms, for farm buildings and machinery and equipment, as a function of the different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support, in selected European Union Member States. This contribution focuses on their quantitative interdependence calculating the relevant elasticity measures. In turn, they constitute the methodological tool to simulate the percentage expected change in average net investment levels associated to the implementation of the, recently proposed and currently under discussion, reductions in the Pillar I Direct Payments disbursed under the Common Agricultural Policy. Evidence suggests a statistically significant elastic and inelastic relationship between both types of subsidies and the investment levels for both asset classes in Germany and Italy, respectively. An elastic dependence of investment in farm buildings on decoupled subsidies exists in Hungary while changes in the level of coupled payments appear to translate into less than proportional changes in the demand for both farm buildings and machinery and equipment in France. Coupled payments appear to influence the UK demand for both asset classes in an elastic manner while decoupled support seems to induce a similar effect on investment in machinery and equipment. Since the currently discussed Common Agricultural Policy reform options imply, almost exclusively, a reduction in the level of support granted through Direct Payments, simulated effects were expected to reveal a worsening of the farm investment prospects for both asset types (i.e., a larger negative investment or a smaller positive one). The actual evidence largely respects this expectation with the sole exception of investment in machinery and equipment in France and Italy reaching smaller negative or larger positive levels irrespectively of the magnitude of the implemented cuts in Direct Payments.

The finance-welfare state nexus. ACES Cases No. 2013.1

At the height of the financial crisis, the Western welfare state prevented a repeat of the Great Depression. But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the crisis, particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of welfare goals. Others claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster. Against this background that motivated our interest, we propose a systematic way of assessing the relationship between financial market and public welfare provisions. We use structural vector auto-regression to establish the causal link and its direction. Two hypotheses about this relationship can be inferred from the literature. First, the notion that welfare states ‘decommodify’ livelihoods or that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff would suggest that welfare states substitute to varying degrees for financial market offers of insurance and savings. By contrast, welfare states may support private interests selectively and/or help markets for households to function better; thus the nexus would be one of complementarity. Our empirical strategy is to spell out the causal mechanisms that can account for a substitutive or complementary relationship and then to see whether advanced econometric techniques find evidence for the existence of either of these mechanisms in six OECD countries. We find complementarity between public welfare (spending and tax subsidies) and life insurance markets for four out of our six countries, notably even for the United States. Substitution between welfare and finance is the more plausible interpretation for France and the Netherlands, which is surprising. Data availability constrains us from testing the implications for the welfare state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings suggest that the welfare state cannot generally be blamed for the financial crisis.

Crimea one year after Russian annexation. EPC Policy Brief, 24 March 2015

On 18 March 2014, the Lower House of the Russian Parliament approved a Treaty to annex the Ukrainian Black Sea Peninsula of Crimea by 443 to 1 votes. This act violated Ukraine's sovereignty, representing a fundamental breach of international law; the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the nuclear arsenal stationed on Ukraine's territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union was relinquished in exchange for security assurances of its sovereign territorial integrity. Russia, the US, France and the UK all signed. The annexation also violated a number of bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia. Russia's actions were immediately condemned by the international community. A 13 March European Parliament Resolution "firmly condemns Russia's act of aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognised as such by the Russian Federation".

Structure as Process: The Regularized Intergovernmentalism of Franco-German Bilateralism, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No.02.3, 2002

This article systematically scrutinizes the intergovernmental and administrative aspects of Franco- German relations with the 1963 Elysée Treaty at their core. This treaty, together with its various additions and extensions, has defined the basic processes of bilateral interaction between the French and German states. Recurrent tension in Franco-German relations notwithstanding, many observers and participants have viewed France and Germany to be connected particularly closely since the 1960s. This article explores key elements of what it is that links France and Germany. Thereby it clarifies the concept of regularized intergovernmentalism, suggests viewing this specific set of international practices from a social-structural perspective, and evaluates the effects and limits of such regularized procedures. Its findings suggest that bilateral structures have complemented and undergirded a broadly multilateral post-World War II world and are likely to continue to do.

Ties That Bind? The Parapublic Underpinnings of Franco-German Relations as Construction of International Value. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.4, 2002

Beneath the relations among states, and distinct from the exchanges of an autonomous regional or global civil society, there is another set of international practices which is neither public nor private but parapublic. The Franco-German parapublic underpinnings consist of publicly funded youth and educational exchanges, some two thousand city and regional partnerships, a host of institutes and associations concerned with Franco-German matters, and various other parapublic elements. This institutional reality provides resources, socializes the participants of its programs, and generates social meaning. Simultaneously, parapublic activity faces severe limits. In this paper I clarify the concept of “parapublic underpinnings” of international relations and flesh out their characteristics for the relationship between France and Germany. I then evaluate the effects and limits of this type of activity, and relate this paper’s findings and arguments to recent research on transnationalism, Europeanization, and denationalization.

Europe's exports superstar - it's the organisation! Bruegel Working Paper 2015/05, 15 July 2015

What explains Germany’s superb export performance? Is Germany’s export behaviour very distinct compared to other European countries? The authors explore the organisational responses to competition of 14,000 exporting firms in seven European countries. The paper examines the export business model of the median exporter and of the top one percent exporters in each country, accounting for 20 percent to 55 percent of total exports. What do these firms do to become superstars? The authors find, first, that the export market share of the median exporter in each of the countries to the world more than tripled (in some cases the export market share increases tenfold) for firms that combine decentralised management with offshoring of production to low-wage countries. Exporters which abstain from any organisational adjustment do very badly. Decentralised management provides incentives for workers for product improvements allowing exporters to compete on quality. Offshoring production to low-wage countries reduces costs allowing exporters to compete on price. Second, we find that Germany is the leading quality exporter in Europe followed by Austria and Spain. Among the top 10 percent of exporters there is no single firm with low quality in Germany and Austria, which suggest that decentralised management has provided incentives for quality in these countries. Third, Germany’s exports are less vulnerable to price increases, while exports from France and Italy respond strongly to price changes, and thus costs reductions via offshoring benefits these countries most.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Awkward partner once again? Repercussions for Europe of Poland’s elections. EPIN Commentary No. 27, 3 November 2015

A clear majority of Poles voted to end eight years of Civic Platform (PO) government on October 25th when they brought the national-conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) back to power. This outcome might be difficult to understand for Poland’s West European partners and may also confuse some EU officials who have observed developments in Poland since it joined the EU in 2004. The implications of these elections for relations with Germany and France, and for Poland’s own EU policy, are a source of concern. Do the results herald a return to the country Poland was during its early years as EU member? In this EPIN commentary the author attempts to throw light on the reasons behind the return to power of Law and Justice Party and considers the wider implications for the EU and European cohesion.