The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness

This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onindividual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewardedaccording to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a realeffort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousaland feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, whilethe treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session.Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided.Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for theaffective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and thefeeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the averageincreases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, June 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

Immigration, family responsibilities and the labor supply of skilled native women

This paper investigates the effects of Spain s large recent immigration wave on thelabor supply of highly skilled native women. We hypothesize that female immigration led to an increase in the supply of affordable household services, such as housekeeping and child or elderly care. As a result, i) native females with high earnings potential were able to increase their labor supply, and ii) the effects were larger on skilled women whose labor supply was heavily constrained by family responsibilities. Our evidence indicates that over the last decade immigration led to an important expansion in the size of the household services sector and to an increase in the labor supply of women in high-earning occupations (of about 2 hours per week). We also find that immigration allowed skilled native women to return to work sooner after childbirth, to stay in the workforce longer when having elderly dependents in the household, and to postpone retirement. Methodologically, we show that the availability of even limited Registry data makes it feasible to conduct the analysis using quarterly household survey data, as opposed to having to rely on the decennial Census.

Family physician involvement in cancer care follow-up: the experience of a cohort of patients with lung cancer.

PURPOSE There has been little research describing the involvement of family physicians in the follow up of patients with cancer especially during the primary treatment phase We undertook a prospective longitudinal study of patients with lung cancer to assess their family physician s involvement in their follow up at the different phases of cancer METHODS In 5 hospitals in the province of Quebec Canada patients with a recent diagnosis of lung cancer were surveyed every 3 to 6 months whether they had metastasis or not, for a maximum of 18 months to assess aspects of their family physician s involvement in cancer care RESULTS Of the 395 participating patients 92% had a regular family physician but only 60% had been referred to a specialist by him/her or a colleague for the diagnosis of their lung cancer A majority of patients identified the oncology team or oncologists as mainly responsible for their cancer care throughout their cancer journey except at the advanced phase where a majority attributed this role to their family physician At baseline only 16% of patients perceived a shared care pattern between their family physician and oncologists but this pro portion increased with cancer progression Most patients would have liked their family physician to be more involved in all aspects of cancer care CONCLUSIONS Although patients perceive that the oncology team is the main party responsible for the follow up of their lung cancer they also wish their family physicians to be involved Better communication and collaboration between family physicians and the oncology team are needed to facilitate shared care in cancer follow up

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, July 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, August 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, September 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Unique and conserved functions of B cell-activating factor of the TNF family (BAFF) in the chicken.

The chicken represents the best-characterized animal model for B cell development in the so-called gut-associated lymphoid tissue (GALT) and the molecular processes leading to B cell receptor diversification in this species are well investigated. However, the mechanisms regulating B cell development and homeostasis in GALT species are largely unknown. Here we investigate the role played by the avian homologue of B cell-activating factor of the tumor necrosis factor family (BAFF). Flow cytometric analysis showed that the receptor for chicken B cell-activating factor of the tumor necrosis factor family (chBAFF) is expressed by mature and immature B cells. Unlike murine and human BAFF, chBAFF is primarily produced by B cells both in peripheral lymphoid organs and in the bursa of Fabricius, the chicken's unique primary lymphoid organ. In vitro and in vivo studies revealed that chBAFF is required for mature B cell survival. In addition, in vivo neutralization with a decoy receptor led to a reduction of the size and number of B cell follicles in the bursa, demonstrating that, in contrast to humans and mice, in chickens BAFF is also required for the development of immature B cells. Collectively, we show that chBAFF has phylogenetically conserved functions in mature B cell homeostasis but displays unique and thus far unknown properties in the regulation of B cell development in birds.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, November 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

The provision on non-audit services by auditors: Let the market evolve and decide

The provision of non-audit services by auditors to their auditclients reduces total costs, increases technical competence and motivates more intense competition. Furthermore, theseservices do not necessarily damage auditor independence nor the quality of non-audit services. This assessment leads to recommending that legislative policy should aim at facilitating the development and use of the safeguardsprovided by the free action of market forces. Regulation should thus aim to enable the parties-audit firms, self-regulatory bodies and audit clients-to discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards, adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility. Particular emphasis is placed on the role played by fee income diversification and the enhancement, through disclosurerules, of market incentives to diversify.

Audit report on the Iowa Federal Family Education Loan Program Division, a Division of the Iowa College Student Aid Commission, for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Iowa Federal Family Education Loan Program Division, a Division of the Iowa College Student Aid Commission, for the year ended June 30, 2008