892 resultados para D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Resumo:
This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.
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Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.
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Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.
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The activities of governments, by their very nature, involve interactions with a broad array of public and private sector entities, from other governments, to business, academia and individual citizens. In the current era, there is a growing expectation that government programs and services will be delivered in a ‘simple, seamless and connected’ manner,1 leading to increased efficiency in government operations and improved service delivery.2 Achieving ‘collaborative, effective and efficient government and the delivery of seamless government services’ requires the implementation of interoperable technologies and procedures.3 Standards, which aim to enable organisations, platforms and systems to work with each other, are fundamental to interoperability.
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In the last 10 years, the third sector has seen an eruption of texts, websites, discussion forums, conferences, new journals, new research centres and sector-specific degrees. This growing abundance of information allows for hitherto impossible networking, collaboration and general awareness of what is happening in the sector. At the same time, however, like staff in many industries, nonprofit professionals can suffer from an increasingly common 21st century malaise known as ‘information anxiety’. It is worth examining the sector through the lens of Information Studies theory, to question what the information technology needs of nonprofits are and how their information management techniques may differ from those in the public and private sectors. There are implications of this both for those within the industry (in terms of governance, training and public relations) and those external to it (who may form relationships with nonprofits on the basis of access to information).
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Objective The main objective of the project was to explore the barriers and obstacles impeding a person-centred approach to planning and private housing for people with disability. Method Methodologically, the project involved explanation building using a multiple case study approach supported by a contextual study. It focussed initially on three organisations and their attempts to integrate innovative and what they regarded as person-centred models of housing into the private housing market for people with disability. It also included a fourth case highlighting the experiences of individuals with disability in accessing suitable and affordable housing. Results Using an ecological framework, the project found that: • Challenges exist within systems (such as the macro cultural, economic, regulatory systems through to local community, family and intra personal systems) as well as with interaction between systems • Reaching across systems is a key role for organisations and individuals but is very challenging with distance from the individual as well as from the policy/funding/service systems being a key aspect of the nature and extent by which they are challenged • In the case of housing for people with disability a ‘disability space’ is assumed and maintained disparately within each system and is separate from the ‘mainstream space’ with the established policy, legal, funding structures making it difficult to move between the two spaces. Conclusions Based on these findings, the project makes recommendations for government, community organisations, the housing industry, people with disability and their families and support networks, as well as for future research. An overarching recommendation is the need to address housing stock availability and suitability by adopting a mainstream approach rather than a disability-first/disability-specific approach.
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Tensions surrounding social media in the employment relationship are increasingly evident in the media, public rhetoric, and courts and employment tribunals. Yet the underlying causes and dimensions of these tensions have remained largely unexplored. This article firstly reviews the available literature addressing social media and employment, outlining three primary sources of contestation: profiling, disparaging posts and blogs, and private use of social media during work time. In each area, the key dynamics and underlying concerns of the central actors involved are identified. The article then seeks to canvas explanations for these forms of contestation associated with social media at work. It is argued that the architecture of social media disrupts traditional relations in organisational life by driving employer and employee actions that (re)shape and (re)constitute the boundaries between public and private spheres. Although employers and employees are using the same social technologies, their respective concerns about and points of entry to these technologies, in contrast to traditional manifestations of conflict and resistance, are asymmetric. The article concludes with a representational summary of the relative legitimacy of concerns for organisational actors and outlines areas for future research.
Resumo:
Preface The 9th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2004) was held in Sydney, 13–15 July, 2004. The conference was sponsored by the Centre for Advanced Computing – Algorithms and Cryptography (ACAC), Information and Networked Security Systems Research (INSS), Macquarie University and the Australian Computer Society. The aims of the conference are to bring together researchers and practitioners working in areas of information security and privacy from universities, industry and government sectors. The conference program covered a range of aspects including cryptography, cryptanalysis, systems and network security. The program committee accepted 41 papers from 195 submissions. The reviewing process took six weeks and each paper was carefully evaluated by at least three members of the program committee. We appreciate the hard work of the members of the program committee and external referees who gave many hours of their valuable time. Of the accepted papers, there were nine from Korea, six from Australia, five each from Japan and the USA, three each from China and Singapore, two each from Canada and Switzerland, and one each from Belgium, France, Germany, Taiwan, The Netherlands and the UK. All the authors, whether or not their papers were accepted, made valued contributions to the conference. In addition to the contributed papers, Dr Arjen Lenstra gave an invited talk, entitled Likely and Unlikely Progress in Factoring. This year the program committee introduced the Best Student Paper Award. The winner of the prize for the Best Student Paper was Yan-Cheng Chang from Harvard University for his paper Single Database Private Information Retrieval with Logarithmic Communication. We would like to thank all the people involved in organizing this conference. In particular we would like to thank members of the organizing committee for their time and efforts, Andrina Brennan, Vijayakrishnan Pasupathinathan, Hartono Kurnio, Cecily Lenton, and members from ACAC and INSS.
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The South Carolina Coastal Information Network (SCCIN) emerged as a result of a number of coastal outreach institutions working in partnership to enhance coordination of the coastal community outreach efforts in South Carolina. This organized effort, led by the S.C. Sea Grant Consortium and its Extension Program, includes partners from federal and state agencies, regional government agencies, and private organizations seeking to coordinate and/or jointly deliver outreach programs that target coastal community constituents. The Network was officially formed in 2006 with the original intention of fostering intra-and inter- agency communication, coordination, and cooperation. Network partners include the S.C. Sea Grant Consortium, S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control – Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management and Bureau of Water, S.C. Department of Natural Resources – ACE Basin National Estuarine Research Reserve, North Inlet-Winyah Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve, Clemson University Cooperative Extension Service and Carolina Clear, Berkeley-Charleston-Dorchester Council of Governments, Waccamaw Regional Council of Governments, Urban Land Institute of South Carolina, S.C. Department of Archives and History, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – Coastal Services Center and Hollings Marine Laboratory, Michaux Conservancy, Ashley-Cooper Stormwater Education Consortium, the Coastal Waccamaw Stormwater Education Consortium, the S.C. Chapter of the U.S. Green Building Council, and the Lowcountry Council of Governments. (PDF contains 3 pages)
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This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behavior in experimental parimutuel betting markets. In one treatment, groups of eight participants, who possess a private signal about the eventual outcome, play a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observed by eight other participants who submit incentivized beliefs about the winning probabilities of each outcome. In the third treatment, the same individuals make bets and assess the winning probabilities of the outcomes. Market probabilities more accurately reflect objective probabilities in the third than in the other two treatments. Submitting beliefs reduces the favorite-longshot bias and making bets improves the accuracy of elicited beliefs. A level-k framework provides some insights about why belief elicitation improves the capacity of betting markets to aggregate information. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The processes of mobilization of land for infrastructures of public and private domain are developed according to proper legal frameworks and systematically confronted with the impoverished national situation as regards the cadastral identification and regularization, which leads to big inefficiencies, sometimes with very negative impact to the overall effectiveness. This project report describes Ferbritas Cadastre Information System (FBSIC) project and tools, which in conjunction with other applications, allow managing the entire life-cycle of Land Acquisition and Cadastre, including support to field activities with the integration of information collected in the field, the development of multi-criteria analysis information, monitoring all information in the exploration stage, and the automated generation of outputs. The benefits are evident at the level of operational efficiency, including tools that enable process integration and standardization of procedures, facilitate analysis and quality control and maximize performance in the acquisition, maintenance and management of registration information and expropriation (expropriation projects). Therefore, the implemented system achieves levels of robustness, comprehensiveness, openness, scalability and reliability suitable for a structural platform. The resultant solution, FBSIC, is a fit-for-purpose cadastre information system rooted in the field of railway infrastructures. FBSIC integrating nature of allows: to accomplish present needs and scale to meet future services; to collect, maintain, manage and share all information in one common platform, and transform it into knowledge; to relate with other platforms; to increase accuracy and productivity of business processes related with land property management.
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Urban mobility is one of the main challenges facing urban areas due to the growing population and to traffic congestion, resulting in environmental pressures. The pathway to urban sustainable mobility involves strengthening of intermodal mobility. The integrated use of different transport modes is getting more and more important and intermodality has been mentioned as a way for public transport compete with private cars. The aim of the current dissertation is to define a set of strategies to improve urban mobility in Lisbon and by consequence reduce the environmental impacts of transports. In order to do that several intermodal practices over Europe were analysed and the transport systems of Brussels and Lisbon were studied and compared, giving special attention to intermodal systems. In the case study was gathered data from both cities in the field, by using and observing the different transport modes, and two surveys were done to the cities users. As concluded by the study, Brussels and Lisbon present significant differences. In Brussels the measures to promote intermodality are evident, while in Lisbon a lot still needs to be done. It also made clear the necessity for improvements in Lisbon’s public transports to a more intermodal passenger transport system, through integration of different transport modes and better information and ticketing system. Some of the points requiring developments are: interchanges’ waiting areas; integration of bicycle in public transport; information about correspondences with other transport modes; real-time information to passengers pre-trip and on-trip, especially in buses and trams. After the identification of the best practices in Brussels and the weaknesses in Lisbon the possibility of applying some of the practices in Brussels to Lisbon was evaluated. Brussels demonstrated to be a good example of intermodality and for that reason some of the recommendations to improve intermodal mobility in Lisbon can follow the practices in place in Brussels.
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This study examined how one university professor negotiated the boundaries between his personal life as a gay man and his professional life as a teacher. Using his sexual orientation as a focal point, the study explored the circumstances and underlying assumptions that influenced this professor's decisions to disclose information of a personal nature. Data collection was solicited from a number of sources: (a) In-depth interviews with the participant, his colleagues, students, and friends; (b) Field observation of the participant teaching over a 3 -day period; and (c) A document review of lesson plans, course outlines, student feedback forms, and the participant's teaching portfolio. The researcher maintained both observation journals and reflective journals during this process. Data analysis using the constant comparative method elicited several themes. The participant engaged in a variety of strategies in disclosing his sexual orientation that included: (a) no disclosure at all, (b) assuming people knew, (c) casually mentioning it in conversation, and (d) deliberately planning to tell someone. The participant also engaged in an ongoing assessment of his environment that included evaluating the level of risk in disclosing his sexual orientation and assessing the listener's ability to receive the information. The participant cited numerous reasons for disclosing his sexual orientation. Further inquiry revealed a number of belief systems that underlined these reasons. These belief systems included beliefs around privacy, authenticity, teaching, manners, professionalism, and homosexuality. The conclusions suggested that the participant utilized a consistent process in both his personal and professional lives to determine what information was kept private and what information was made public. While the process used to determine the degree of disclosure was consistent, the actual disclosures themselves varied widely in nature.
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Market failure can be corrected using different regulatory approaches ranging from high to low intervention. Recently, classic regulations have been criticized as costly and economically irrational and thus policy makers are giving more consideration to soft regulatory techniques such as information remedies. However, despite the plethora of food information conveyed by different media there appears to be a lack of studies exploring how consumers evaluate this information and how trust towards publishers influence their choices for food information. In order to fill such a gap, this study investigates questions related to topics which are more relevant to consumers, who should disseminate trustful food information, and how communication should be conveyed and segmented. Primary data were collected both through qualitative (in depth interviews and focus groups) and quantitative research (web and mail surveys). Attitudes, willingness to pay for food information and trust towards public and private sources conveying information through a new food magazine were assessed using both multivariate statistical methods and econometric analysis. The study shows that consumer attitudes towards food information topics can be summarized along three cognitive-affective dimensions: the agro-food system, enjoyment and wellness. Information related to health risks caused by nutritional disorders and food safety issues caused by bacteria and chemical substances is the most important for about 90% of respondents. Food information related to regulations and traditions is also considered important for more than two thirds of respondents, while information about food production and processing techniques, life style and food fads are considered less important by the majority of respondents. Trust towards food information disseminated by public bodies is higher than that observed for private bodies. This behavior directly affects willingness to pay (WTP) for food information provided by public and private publishers when markets are shocked by a food safety incident. WTP for consumer association (€ 1.80) and the European Food Safety Authority (€ 1.30) are higher than WTP for the independent and food industry publishers which cluster around zero euro. Furthermore, trust towards the type of publisher also plays a key role in food information market segmentation together with socio-demographic and economic variables such as gender, age, presence of children and income. These findings invite policy makers to reflect on the possibility of using information remedies conveyed using trusted sources of information to specific segments of consumers as an interesting soft alternative to the classic way of regulating modern food markets.