Invoking a cartesian product structure on social states: new resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems

The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard's and Sen's paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard's paradox and to Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.

Chaotic dynamics in credit constrained emerging economies

This paper analyzes the role of financial development as a source of endogenous instability in small open economies. By assuming that firms face credit constraints, our model displays a complex dynamic behavior for intermediate values of the parameter representing the level of financial development of the economy. The basic implication of our model is that economies experiencing a process of financial development are more unstable than both very underdeveloped and very developed economies. Our instability concept means that small shocks have a persistent effect on the long run behavior of the model and also that economies can exhibit cycles with a very high period or even chaotic dynamic patterns.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Urban spatial structure and suburbanisation. The case of the Barcelona Metropolitan

The metropolitan spatial structure displays various patterns, sometimes monocentricity and sometimes multicentricity, which seems much more complicated than the exponential density function used in classic works such as Clark (1961), Muth (1969) or Mills (1973) among others, can effectively represent. It seems that a more flexible density function,such as cubic spline function (Anderson (1982), Zheng (1991), etc.) to describe the density-accessibility relationship is needed. Also, accessibility, the fundamental determinant of density variations, is only partly captured by the inclusion of distance to the city centre as an explanatory variable. Steen (1986) has proposed to correct that miss-especification by including an additional gradient for distance to the nearest transportation axis. In identifying the determinants of urban spatial structure in the context of inter-urban systems, some of the variables proposed by Muth (1969), Mills (1973) and Alperovich (1983) such as city age or population, make no sense in the case of a single urban system. All three criticism to the exponential density function and its determinants apply for the Barcelona Metropolitan Region, a polycentric conurbation structured on well defined transportation axes.

Airline competition and network structure

This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

Structure-function relationships of the alpha1b-adrenergic receptor.

The alpha1b-adrenergic receptor (AR) is a member of the large superfamily of seven transmembrane domain (TMD) G protein-coupled receptors (GPCR). Combining site-directed mutagenesis of the alpha1b-AR with computational simulations of receptor dynamics, we have explored the conformational changes underlying the process of receptor activation, i.e. the transition between the inactive and active states. Our findings suggest that the structural constraint stabilizing the alpha1b-AR in the inactive form is a network of H-bonding interactions amongst conserved residues forming a polar pocket and R143 of the DRY sequence at the end of TMDIII. We have recently reported that point mutations of D142, of the DRY sequence and of A293 in the distal portion of the third intracellular loop resulted in ligand-independent (constitutive) activation of the alpha1b-AR. These constitutively activating mutations could induce perturbations resulting in the shift of R143 out of the polar pocket. The main role of R143 may be to mediate receptor activation by triggering the exposure of several basic amino acids of the intracellular loops towards the G protein. Our investigation has been extended also to the biochemical events involved in the desensitization process of alpha1b-AR. Our results indicate that immediately following agonist-induced activation, the alpha1b-AR can undergo rapid agonist-induced phosphorylation and desensitization. Different members of the G protein coupled receptor kinase family can play a role in agonist-induced regulation of the alpha1b-AR. In addition, constitutively active alpha1b-AR mutants display different phosphorylation and internalization features. The future goal is to further elucidate the molecular mechanism underlying the complex equilibrium between activation and inactivation of the alpha1b-AR and its regulation by pharmacological substances. These findings can help to elucidate the mechanism of action of various agents displaying properties of agonists or inverse agonists at the adrenergic system.

Structure-function relationships for the interleukin 2 receptor system

Receptors for interleukin 2 (IL-2) esit in at least three forms which differ in their subunit compositio, their affinity for ligand and their ability to mediate a cellular reponse. Type I receptors occur following cellular acitivation and consist of the 55,000 m. w. glycoprotein Tac. These receptors bind IL-2 with a low affinity, do not internalize ligand and have not been definitively associated with any response. Type II receptors, on the other hand, conssit of one or more glycoproteins of 70,000 m. w. which have been termed "beta ([beta]) chains." They bind IL-2 with an intermediate affinity and rapidly internalize the ligand. [Beta] proteins mediate many cellular IL-2-dependent reponses, including the short-term activation of natural killer cells and the induction of Tac protein expression. Type III receptors consist of a ternary complex of the Tac protein, the [beta] chain(s) and IL-2. They are characterized by a paricularly high affinity for ligand association. Type III receptors also internalize ligand and mediate IL-2-dependent responses at low factor concentrations. The identification of two independent IL-2-binding molecules, Tac and [beta], thus provides the elusive molecular explanation for the differences in IL-2 receptor affinity and suggests the potential for selective therapeutic manipulation of IL-2 reponses.