Do agricultural subsidies crowd out or stimulate rural credit institutions? The Case of CAP Payments. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 4, September 2011

In this paper we estimate the impact of subsidies from the EU’s common agricultural policy on farm bank loans. According to the theoretical results, if subsidies are paid at the beginning of the growing season they may reduce bank loans, whereas if they are paid at the end of the season they increase bank loans, but these results are conditional on whether farms are credit constrained and on the relative cost of internal and external financing. In the empirical analysis, we use farm-level panel data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network to test the theoretical predictions for the period 1995–2007. We employ fixed-effects and generalised method of moment models to estimate the impact of subsidies on farm loans. The results suggest that subsidies influence farm loans and the effects tend to be non-linear and indirect. The results also indicate that both coupled and decoupled subsidies stimulate long-term loans, but the long-term loans of large farms increase more than those of small farms, owing to decoupled subsidies. Furthermore, the results imply that short-term loans are affected only by decoupled subsidies, and they are altered by decoupled subsidies more for small farms than for large farms; however, when controlling for endogeneity, only the decoupled payments affect loans and the relationship is non-linear.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

Towards a balanced contribution of household credit to the economy. CEPS-ECRI Task Force Report, May 2015

While policy-makers are creating conditions to strengthen recovery, the debate on the role that retail finance should play in this respect focuses on corporate loans rather than on household credit. The improvement of financing conditions for firms in order to support further investment spending is certainly essential to ensuring sustainable growth. However, a significant part of EU growth will depend on the behaviour of households and on their ability to secure funding for their consumption and investment. It is therefore essential to place further emphasis on the different options available to stimulate household credit, in particular consumer loans. Nevertheless, in order to avoid past mistakes, regulators should continue to develop a framework where consumer loans (and by extension household credit) contributes to the economy in a balanced way. To achieve this, five main issues need to be addressed further.

Where is the credit crunch in Greece? CEPS Commentary, 6 October 2015

Greek policy-makers like to make the point that their economy cannot recover because of a lack of credit and that this affects exports, in particular. Austerity is an easy explanation for the weakness of domestic demand, argues Daniel Gros in this CEPS Commentary, but it is more difficult to see why Greek exports have stagnated in recent years. The author considers the argument that the Greek economy could not recover via export-led growth because of a credit crunch. The overall availability of credit was higher than GDP, and interest rates remained relatively low. There is some indication of a misallocation of bank credit, but the responsibility for any mistakes in this direction must lie squarely with the government and the Troika, given that the Greek banking system has been under government control since 2012.

A Convergence Process in Household Credit in Central and Eastern Europe. ECRI Commentary No. 16, 30 October 2015

The liberalisation of Eastern Europe’s market during the 1990s and the 2004 EU enlargement have had a great impact on the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Indeed, prior to these events, the financial system and household credit markets in CEE were underdeveloped. Nonetheless, it appeared to numerous economists that the development of the CEE financial system and credit markets was following an intensely positive trend, raising the question of sustainability. Many variables impact the level and growth rate of credit; several economists point out that a convergence process might be one of the most important. Using a descriptive statistics approach, it seems likely that a convergence process began during the 1990s, when the CEE countries opened their economies. However, it also seems that the main driver of this household credit convergence process is the GDP per capita convergence process. Indeed, credit to households and GDP per capita have followed broadly similar tendencies over the last 20 years and it has been shown in the literature that they appear to influence each other. The consistency of this potential convergence process is also confirmed by the breakdown of household credit by type and maturity. There is a tendency towards similar household credit markets in Europe. However, it seems that this potential convergence process was slowed down by the financial crisis. Fortunately, the crisis also stabilised the share of loans in foreign currency in CEE countries. This might add more stability to credit markets in Eastern Europe.

Central America aid : status of the Trade Credit Insurance Program : fact sheet for the Honorable Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate /

"B-221422"--1st. prelim. p.

Small farmer credit in Mexico and Central America.

PB 224 025

Credit for marginal groups; a study of the principal private sector credit institutions providing loans to marginal groups in the countries of the Dominican Republic, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, and Guatemala.

"Sponsored by: Pan American Development Foundation, in cooperation with: CUNA International, Inc. [and others]"

Small farmer credit in Colombia.

PB 224 029