The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.

Diplomatic Spin: EU3+3 talks on Iran’s nuclear file. CEPS Commentary, 21 November 2014

The Joint Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran on 24 November 2013 gave negotiators one year to forge a comprehensive agreement that restricts the country’s ability to militarise its nuclear programme. That deadline will lapse in the next few days and diplomats involved in the talks have been trying to rein in expectations that a deal will be struck on time. Satisfying domestic constituencies in Iran and the US is what makes the politics of dealing with the nuclear file so much harder than the physics of slowing down the nuclear programme. Any future deal will have to stand on its own merits, enabling Iran and the EU3+3 to cooperate on the other geopolitical challenges they face. Both parties should therefore balance their demands with what they can realistically offer and make concessions to reach a compromise. The author of this CEPS Commentary argues that if no deal is reached on November 24th, then diplomacy should be allowed to keep on spinning for a few more months.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

Russia in Serbia – soft power and hard interests. OSW COMMENTARY No. 150, 2014-10-29

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on 16 October has demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to secure its interests in the Balkans and use Belgrade in its confrontation with the West. It seems, however, that Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities, which are reluctant to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has already gained a strong position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian natural resources and, in particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian elites and society. The traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result of a series of Russia-inspired, wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so successful that a large part of society has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent with Serbia’s. Russia’s increasingly active policy towards Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the neighbouring countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo – has been part of a larger plan aimed at hampering the integration of the Balkan states with the Euro-Atlantic structures and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in the EU’s near neighbourhood. Russia’s policy is also becoming increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing support for Balkan countries’ European integration.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

Ukraine and Russia: a hindered rapprochement. OSW Commentary No. 44, 2010-12-15

The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numerous top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted from prior agreements. Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the observed deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour. Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they consider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a cooling in bilateral relations.

Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime. OSW Commentary No. 66, 2011-10-28

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.

Moments of Truth – A new neo-Gaullist Germany? EuropEos Commentary No. 3, 1 June 2010

The European process is based on compromises; when it comes to selling them to national electorates, countries behave differently. France feels compelled to declare victory; Germany has more often chosen to stress the concessions that it made, adding that they were painful but necessary for the sake of ‘Europe’. The reality is very different. In this new EuropEos Commentary, Riccardo Perissich, Executive Vice-President of the Council for the United States and Italy, describes that European reality, in unambiguous terms.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

How to deal with Europe’s British problem. EPC Discussion Paper, 11 September 2015

This paper argues that the UK government's renegotiation bid is too feeble to be deserving of concessions by its EU partners, but that the rest of the EU can give the British what they seem to want by pressing on themselves to federal union.

La théorie sociale de la connaissance et la gestion du patrimoine documentaire à l’ère numérique

Les institutions de mémoire et de savoir (par exemple, les bibliothèques, les archives, les musées) font face à des défis importants dans leurs responsabilités d’assurer la pérennité du patrimoine documentaire à l’ère numérique. Citons la surabondance de l’information numérique, la possibilité de production, théoriquement illimitée, offerte aux individus comme aux groupes sociaux, les limites dans les capacités de stockage et de diffusion de l’information numérique qui sont à la disposition des institutions mandataires du patrimoine documentaire. De plus, il est apparu que les approches et les méthodes utilisées pour identifier, gérer, préserver et diffuser le patrimoine documentaire de la société canadienne dans un environnement analogique n’étaient transférables à un environnement numérique. Nous suggérons que la théorie sociale de la connaissance peut servir de base à une réflexion portant sur le développement d’une politique publique qui viserait à encadrer l’identification, la sélection, la gestion et la préservation du patrimoine documentaire d’une société à l'ère numérique. Nous définissons la problématique puis proposons des réponses à travers trois articles scientifiques. Les résultats indiquent que les connaissances et les pratiques professionnelles utilisées demeurent persistantes et limitent la formulation et l'application de nouveaux cadres théoriques, de politiques administratives et de techniques associés à l'identification et la sélection du patrimoine documentaire. Cette recherche propose un cadre conceptuel qui permet de développer des politiques publiques sur le patrimoine documentaire du Canada.

Une ethnographie de la gestion de la population rom en Albanie

Cette thèse propose une ethnographie de la gestion de la population rom en Albanie, saisie sur deux périodes historiques : communisme et postcommunisme. L’analyse porte sur la façon dont divers instruments de gestion des populations en tant que techniques de pouvoir, sont mises en œuvre ; comment une population donnée devient-elle un sujet politique ? Quels sont les effets d’une telle gestion sur les populations en général et sur les populations roms en particulier ? Cette approche, une approche foucaldienne, replace ainsi au centre de l’analyse empirique les politiques, les pratiques et les discours concernant les Roms en Albanie et essaye de saisir les effets qu’ils produisent sur cette population. Cette thèse part de ces éléments pour interroger plus largement les transformations sociétales dans l’Albanie postcommuniste. Ce travail s’inscrit dans le champ de l’anthropologie politique et conjugue à la fois une anthropologie de l’État et une anthropologie de la violence. Il s’articule autour de trois parties. La première porte sur la contextualisation de cette thèse, du point de vue conceptuel, méthodologique et théorique. La deuxième partie propose une analyse des relations que l’État a entretenues avec les Roms pendant la période communiste, phase durant laquelle la population rom a été exposée à diverses mesures administratives visant sa normalisation, à travers une sédentarisation forcée et d’autres mesures coercitives. La troisième partie, précédée par un intermède sur la période de la transition, interroge la relation entre l’État, la violence, la mobilité et la gestion de la population rom en Albanie depuis la chute du communisme. L’analyse se fait à partir d’un cas spécifique, celui des familles roms déplacées et en déplacement aux alentours de Tirana ; une mobilité forcée notamment par peu d’opportunités de sortir de la précarité pour plusieurs familles roms, mais aussi une mobilité induite par les politiques, les pratiques et les discours étatiques, notamment par leur non-action. Au fur et à mesure que l’analyse des pratiques et des discours – complétée par une ethnographie des documents d’archives et dans les quartiers et les campements roms – s’approfondit pendant les deux périodes historiques, elle dévoile de nombreuses – mais différentes – contradictions et controverses au sein du dispositif, lesquelles produisent à leur tour discrimination, exclusion, violence, indifférence et abandon.

2o. [i.e. Segundo] memorandum presentado por la Compañia de los Ferrocarriles Salitreros a la honorable comisión nombrada por S. E. el Presidente de la República para informar sobre las solicitudes referentes a construcción de líneas férreas en Tarapacá.

Mode of access: Internet.

Hints to emigrants : in a series of letters from Upper Canada /

Map: Perth, Lanark & Richmond Settlements, district of Bathurst, Upper Canada with part of the adjacent county; Plans: [1]. Township of Drummond, ten miles square. This sketch shows how a township is divided into concessions & lots; [2]. Perth.