A Comparative Analysis of Hedging in a Corpus of Two Written Legal Discourse Genres

Esta tesis doctoral, que es la culminación de mis estudios de doctorado impartidos por el Departamento de Lingüística Aplicada a la Ciencia y a la Tecnología de la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, aborda el análisis del uso de la matización (hedging) en el lenguaje legal inglés siguiendo los postulados y principios de la análisis crítica de género (Bhatia, 2004) y empleando las herramientas de análisis de córpora WordSmith Tools versión 6 (Scott, 2014). Como refleja el título, el estudio se centra en la descripción y en el análisis contrastivo de las variedades léxico-sintácticas de los matizadores del discurso (hedges) y las estrategias discursivas que con ellos se llevan a cabo, además de las funciones que éstas desempeñan en un corpus de sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de EE. UU., y de artículos jurídicos de investigación americanos, relacionando, en la medida posible, éstas con los rasgos determinantes de los dos géneros, desde una perspectiva socio-cognitiva. El elemento innovador que ofrece es que, a pesar de los numerosos estudios que se han podido realizar sobre los matizadores del discurso en el inglés general (Lakoff, 1973; Hübler, 1983; Clemen, 1997; Markkanen and Schröder, 1997; Mauranen, 1997; Fetzer 2010; y Finnegan, 2010 entre otros) académico (Crompton, 1997; Meyer, 1997; Skelton, 1997; Martín Butragueňo, 2003) científico (Hyland, 1996a, 1996c, 1998c, 2007; Grabe and Kaplan, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1997 Varttala, 2001) médico (Prince, 1982; Salager-Meyer, 1994; Skelton, 1997), y, en menor medida el inglés legal (Toska, 2012), no existe ningún tipo de investigación que vincule los distintos usos de la matización a las características genéricas de las comunicaciones profesionales. Dentro del lenguaje legal, la matización confirma su dependencia tanto de las expectativas a macro-nivel de la comunidad de discurso, como de las intenciones a micro-nivel del escritor de la comunicación, variando en función de los propósitos comunicativos del género ya sean éstos educativos, pedagógicos, interpersonales u operativos. El estudio pone de relieve el uso predominante de los verbos modales epistémicos y de los verbos léxicos como matizadores del discurso, estos últimos divididos en cuatro tipos (Hyland 1998c; Palmer 1986, 1990, 2001) especulativos, citativos, deductivos y sensoriales. La realización léxico-sintáctica del matizador puede señalar una de cuatro estrategias discursivas particulares (Namsaraev, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1994), la indeterminación, la despersonalización, la subjectivisación, o la matización camuflada (camouflage hedging), cuya incidencia y función varia según género. La identificación y cuantificación de los distintos matizadores y estrategias empleados en los diferentes géneros del discurso legal puede tener implicaciones pedagógicos para los estudiantes de derecho no nativos que tienen que demostrar una competencia adecuada en su uso y procesamiento. ABSTRACT This doctoral thesis, which represents the culmination of my doctoral studies undertaken in the Department of Linguistics Applied to Science and Technology of the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, focusses on the analysis of hedging in legal English following the principles of Critical Genre Analysis (Bhatia, 2004), and using WordSmith Tools version 6 (Scott, 2014) corpus analysis tools. As the title suggests, this study centers on the description and contrastive analysis of lexico-grammatical realizations of hedges and the discourse strategies which they can indicate, as well as the functions they can carry out, in a corpus of U.S. Supreme Court opinions and American law review articles. The study relates realization, incidence and function of hedging to the predominant generic characteristics of the two genres from a socio-cognitive perspective. While there have been numerous studies on hedging in general English (Lakoff, 1973; Hübler, 1983; Clemen, 1997; Markkanen and Schröder, 1997; Mauranen, 1997; Fetzer 2010; and Finnegan, 2010 among others) academic English (Crompton, 1997; Meyer, 1997; Skelton, 1997; Martín Butragueňo, 2003) scientific English (Hyland, 1996a, 1996c, 1998c, 2007; Grabe and Kaplan, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1997 Varttala, 2001) medical English (Prince, 1982; Salager-Meyer, 1994; Skelton, 1997), and, to a lesser degree, legal English (Toska, 2012), this study is innovative in that it links the different realizations and functions of hedging to the generic characteristics of a particular professional communication. Within legal English, hedging has been found to depend on not only the macro-level expectations of the discourse community for a specific genre, but also on the micro-level intentions of the author of a communication, varying according to the educational, pedagogical, interpersonal or operative purposes the genre may have. The study highlights the predominance of epistemic modal verbs and lexical verbs as hedges, dividing the latter into four types (Hyland, 1998c; Palmer, 1986, 1990, 2001): speculative, quotative, deductive and sensorial. Lexical-grammatical realizations of hedges can signal one of four discourse strategies (Namsaraev, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1994), indetermination, depersonalization, subjectivization and camouflage hedging, as well as fulfill a variety of functions. The identification and quantification of the different hedges and hedging strategies and functions in the two genres may have pedagogical implications for non-native law students who must demonstrate adequate competence in the production and interpretation of hedged discourse.

Formación y determinación del valor del suelo: confrontación y discrepancias entre mecanismos de mercado y regulaciones administrativas

La determinación del valor del suelo implicado en los procesos de urbanización se mueve en una compleja dialéctica en la que algunos fenómenos de naturaleza morfológica como el modelado del espacio social, o el que se deduce de las determinaciones del planeamiento (aprovechamiento especialmente) se enfrentan a instrumentos de regulación que se rigen por normas de carácter administrativo (urbanísticas y expropiatorias, fiscales, financieras-hipotecarias etc.). En ese marco en el que las discrepancias son frecuentes se pretende analizar las posibles actuaciones encaminadas a influir sobre la formación de ese valor en el sentido de limitar las expectativas de aprovechamiento tradicionalmente vinculadas al sistema urbanístico establecido, destacando al respecto la implantación de criterios de sostenibilidad y participación ciudadana, así como que la utilización de normas administrativas de valoración con la finalidad de reducir tales expectativas y tratar de influir sobre el sistema urbanístico en su conjunto, no se considera suficiente para conseguir el logro de tales objetivos. Añadiendo, respecto del conjunto de normas administrativas de determinación del valor del suelo, que si bien las reglas urbanísticas y expropiatorias establecen actualmente reglas objetivas de valoración, a través de la normativa de valoración destinada a entidades financieras, o de carácter fiscal, se introducen criterios subjetivos que tratan de aproximarse al mercado, incluso en el caso del valor catastral, estructuralmente reglado. Esta separación de criterios ha llevado a un enfrentamiento al que ha venido a dar respuesta la reciente sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 30 de mayo de 2014, que impone los criterios urbanísticos de consideración de situaciones básicas de suelo, frente a los fiscalmente regulados en relación con la normativa catastral en cuanto a la consideración de suelo urbanizable sin desarrollar, que pasa a ser considerado como en situación rural, siendo por tanto aplicables sobre el mismo las reglas de valoración que la normativa catastral establece para esta categoría de suelo (rústico) que no considera, incluso con la posterior modificación, de junio de 2015, incorporada para adaptarse a la mencionada sentencia, expectativas de aprovechamiento. Pero como se ha señalado, la exclusiva utilización de la normativa urbanística de valoración no se considera suficiente para evitar los efectos que sobre el valor de suelo produce la asignación de tales aprovechamientos, por lo que acuerdo con la actual legislación de suelo, deben asimismo potenciarse actuaciones encaminadas a un desarrollo sostenible así como a la participación ciudadana, la transparencia y el control, con la finalidad de lograr un mayor rigor en la utilización del suelo que ha de traducirse en su valoración. ABSTRACT Determining the land value involved in the urbanisation process implies a complex dialectic in which certain morphological natural phenomena like the modelling of social space or that deduced from planning determinations (especially land use) face regulatory instruments governed by administrative norms (urban planning and expropriator, tax, financial-mortgage etc.). In this context where discrepancies are common, the purpose is to analyse the possible actions geared to influence the formation of that value in the sense of limiting land use expectations traditionally linked to the established urban planning system, highlighting the implementation of sustainability criteria and citizen participation, as well as to consider that the administrative standards of evaluation for reducing said expectations, and trying to influence the urban system as a whole, are not considered sufficient for achieving these objectives. We might add, with respect to the set of administrative norms for determining the land value, that while urban and expropriations norms currently provide objective rules of valuation, subjective criteria are introduced trying to approach the market, including the structurally regulated cadastral value through valuation rules aimed at financial or fiscal institutions. This separation of criteria has led to a confrontation to which the recent ruling of the Supreme Court of May 30, 2014 responds. The aforementioned judgement imposes the urban core criteria for basic land use situations against those fiscally regulated in relation to cadastral regulations regarding the consideration of undeveloped building land, which is considered to be in a rural situation, making it subject to the same rules that cadastral valuation norms established for this category of land use (rustic) which do not consider, even with the subsequent amendment of June 2015, introduced to fit that judgment, use expectations. But as noted, the exclusive use of valuation planning regulations is not considered sufficient to avoid the effects on the land value produced by the allocation of said uses, so that according to the current land use legislation, actions aimed at sustainable development as well as citizen participation, transparency and control, shall be enhanced in order to achieve greater rigor in the use of land which should be translated in their valuation.

Juanita Kidd Stout

When Juanita Kidd was growing up in Wewoka, Oklahoma, she never saw a female lawyer, never mind a black female lawyer. At 16, Stout graduated from high school, but had to leave Oklahoma to find an accredited college, and later a law school that would accept her. Stout made an appearance at Lincoln University from 1935-1937, when she reigned as Queen of the Quill in 1936, but completed her Bachelor’s of Arts degree in Music from the University of Iowa. In 1948, Stout graduated from Indiana University’s School of Law. Juanita Stout paved the way for many aspiring female lawyers. In 1959, Stout was the first black female to be elected to a court of record in the United States. She also became the first black woman in history to serve on a state (Pennsylvania) Supreme Court.

1.3 Charles Hamilton Houston, NAACP Chief Attorney, 1930-54

The NAACP’s legal team, which eventually included Thurgood Marshall, had a strategy in mind for confronting the Plessy v Ferguson “separate but equal” Supreme Court decision of 1896. Walter White, the NAACP President assisted Houston in developing the plan. By concentrating on the “equal” aspect of Plessy, the NAACP would attempt to make “separate but equal” a financial impossibility for states toeing the line of “Jim Crow” laws. In the words of Charles Hamilton Houston, “we are going to bleed them white.”

1.2 NAACP Headquarters, New York City, 1930s

Although Houston had scored a minor victory in the 1935 Murray v Pearson case which allowed African Americans to attend the University of Maryland Law School, the case only affected that state’s jurisdiction due to the decision originating from the Maryland State Supreme Court. It was Houston’s intention to move to the national level. For the NAACP, Lloyd Gaines was the ideal client; well spoken, intelligent and humble; and he was a citizen of the state of Missouri where the laws in question were enforced. Gaines’ case would be the main focus for Houston and the NAACP for the next three years.

3.1 Lloyd Gaines sitting in a chair

While Lloyd Gaines, who was now enrolled at the University of Michigan, worked on a Masters degree in Economics, Houston, Redmond and Espy planned their next step. The decisions in Missouri were not made on a level playing field, so to speak. They needed to take their case to place where justice was blind and unbiased; the Supreme Court of the United States.

1.1 Lloyd Gaines

Lloyd Gaines had won his case. Speaking to reporters, Gaines said he was pleased with the result and looked forward to attending the Missouri School of Law in the fall of 1939. The Gaines v Canada decision was a major triumph and significant steppingstone for the Civil Rights movement. No longer did African-Americans in Missouri have to choose to be educated elsewhere when seeking degrees not offered to them in their home state. This was decided in the Murray v Pearson case three years prior, but the Gaines case had national implications since it was decided by the US Supreme Court.

1.6 School of Law, Lincoln University

Another dilemma also had to be dealt with; Lloyd Gaines was determined to attend law school, not just anywhere but at the University of Missouri. Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, Lloyd Gaines left his civil service job in Michigan and returned home to St. Louis, arriving on New Year’s Eve, 1938. In the meantime, to pay his bills, he took a job as a filling station attendant. On January 9, 1939, Gaines spoke to the St. Louis chapter of the NAACP. He told them he stood “ready, willing, and able to enroll at MU.” Gaines later quit his gas station job. He explained to his family that the station owner substituted inferior gas and that he could not, in good conscience, continue to work there. In the meantime, the state Supreme Court sent the Gaines case back to Boone County to determine whether the new law school at Lincoln would comply with the US Supreme Court’s requirement of “substantial equality.”

Direitos sociais e proporcionalidade: análise da doutrina e da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal

A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar o uso do método da proporcionalidade para decidir questões acerca de direitos sociais. Nesse sentido, antes relacionada somente à proibição do excesso (Übermaßverbot), a proporcionalidade passa a ter reconhecida sua outra face, denominada proibição da proteção insuficiente ou deficiente (Untermaßverbot). O legislador e o administrador passam a ter suas ações balizadas pela proibição do excesso de intervenção e pela imposição da intervenção para proteção de direitos. O termo pouco usual se refere ao controle judicial das omissões do legislador e administrador, na medida em que orienta a atividade deles quando da conformação e implementação dos direitos sociais. Os escassos estudos na doutrina não permitiram o desenvolvimento do método em relação aos direitos sociais no Brasil, em que pese a jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal se utilizar da proporcionalidade como proibição da proteção insuficiente ou deficiente em alguns de seus julgados, especialmente em época recente. Mas se a utilização de tal método na argumentação judicial passa a ser vista de forma recorrente, o Tribunal deve primeiro ter clareza de seus elementos quando pretende invocá-lo em suas decisões e até mesmo firmeza da utilidade de seu uso quanto a esses direitos. Ainda, tem-se que o transplante de métodos de revisão judicial dos direitos de defesa para os direitos sociais merece estudo específico, tanto em relação à concepção desses direitos quanto à possível aplicabilidade da proporcionalidade, pois as diferenças entre eles apontam que nem sempre ambos os direitos comportarão argumentações idênticas para os problemas que enfrentam.

Immigration Law by Proxy: The Case of Colorado’s Human Smuggling Crime

Despite the federal government’s well known expansive reach in creating and enforcing immigration law, the states retain substantial authority to play an important role in migrants’ lives. Through their traditional powers to adopt criminal statutes and police their communities, states can indirectly — but intentionally — inject themselves into the incidents of ordinary life as a migrant. Colorado’s human smuggling statute, currently being challenged before the state supreme court, illustrates this type of state regulation of migration. This essay addresses the statute’s reach, its shaky constitutional footing, and places it in a broader context in which states criminalize immigration-related activity.

Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement

The use of solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and jails has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the past few months, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy all but invited constitutional challenges to the use of solitary confinement, while President Obama asked, “Do we really think it makes sense to lock so many people alone in tiny cells for 23 hours a day for months, sometime for years at a time?” Even some of the most notorious prisons and jails, including California’s Pelican Bay State Prison and New York’s Rikers Island, are reforming their use of solitary confinement because of successful litigation and public outcry. Rovner suggests that in light of these developments and “the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on human dignity as a substantive value underlying and animating constitutional rights,” there is a strong case to make that long-term solitary confinement violates the constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation

This Article examines state court cases involving the right to arms, during the first century following ratification of the Amendment in 1791. This is not the first article to survey some of those cases. This Article includes additional cases, and details the procedural postures and facts, not only the holdings. The Article closely examines how the Supreme Court integrated the nineteenth century arms cases into Heller and McDonald to shape modern Second Amendment law. Part I briefly explains two English cases which greatly influenced American legal understandings. Semayne’s Case is the foundation of “castle doctrine” — the right to home security which includes the right of armed self-defense in the home. Sir John Knight’s Case fortified the tradition of the right to bear arms, providing that the person must bear arms in a non-terrifying manner. Part II examines American antebellum cases; these are the cases to which Heller looked for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part III looks at cases from Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow, through 1891. As with the antebellum cases, the large majority of post-war cases are from the Southeast, which during the nineteenth century was the region most ardent for gun control. The heart of gun control country was Tennessee and Arkansas; courts there resisted some infringements of the right to arms, but eventually gave up. Heller and McDonald did not look to the Jim Crow cases as constructive precedents on the Second Amendment.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment

Recently the Supreme Court has placed new limits on both the substance of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary that serves as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In this Article we briefly summarize these limitations and then argue that the curtailment of the exclusionary rule has the potential to ameliorate substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. The limited reach of the modern exclusionary rule provides the Court with license to develop an expansive new substantive framework free of the specter of a correspondingly expansive remedial framework. One point on which nearly all jurists and commentators agree is that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess. We argue that the Court’s exclusionary rule cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited to egregious violations of clear substantive rules. The time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog.

Setting Congress Up to Fail

In Shelby County v. Holder the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on Congress’s failure to justify the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s pre-clearance requirement of submitting all changes to voting procedures to the Justice Department for prior approval. This short essay explores one problematic feature of the Court’s analysis: its refusal to consider the legislative record as adequate because it was created to justify the coverage formula after the fact, rather than to facilitate deliberation on the coverage formula before a decision had been made. This reasoning essentially imports from administrative law a rule called the Chenery principle, and as this essay explains, it does so without justification. The differences between administrative and legislative decision making processes compel different treatment by the courts, and treating legislative records like administrative ones, in essence, asks of Congress something it is institutionally ill-equipped to perform. It sets Congress up to fail.

Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Petitioners in Obergefell v. Hodges

Supreme Court precedent establishes that the government may not punish children for matters beyond their control. Same-sex marriage bans and non-recognition laws (“marriage bans”) do precisely this. The states argue that marriage is good for children, yet marriage bans categorically exclude an entire class of children – children of same-sex couples – from the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage. This amicus brief recounts a powerful body of equal protection jurisprudence that prohibits punishing children to reflect moral disapproval of parental conduct or to incentivize adult behavior. We then explain that marriage bans punish children of same-sex couples because they: 1) foreclose their central legal route to family formation; 2) categorically void their existing legal parent-child relationships incident to out-of-state marriages; 3) deny them economic rights and benefits; and 4) inflict psychological and stigmatic harm. States cannot justify marriage bans as good for children and then exclude children of same-sex couples based on moral disapproval of their same-sex parents’ relationships or to incentivize opposite-sex couples to “procreate” within the bounds of marriage. To do so, severs the connection between legal burdens and individual responsibility and creates a permanent class or caste distinction.