A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Automatic Stabilizer Feature of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Markets

This paper shows that countries characterized by a financial accelerator mechanism may reverse the usual finding of the literature -- flexible exchange rate regimes do a worse job of insulating open economies from external shocks. I obtain this result with a calibrated small open economy model that endogenizes foreign interest rates by linking them to the banking sector's foreign currency leverage. This relationship renders exchange rate policy more important compared to the usual exogeneity assumption. I find empirical support for this prediction using the Local Projections method. Finally, 2nd order approximation to the model finds larger welfare losses under flexible regimes.

DeMoivre's Theorem

DeMoivre's theorem is of great utility in some parts of physical chemistry and is re-introduced here.

Ehrenfest's Theorem

A one dimensional presentation of Ehrenfest's theorem is presented.

Output processing and automatic reporting with Stata

This talk illustrates how results from various Stata commands can be processed efficiently for inclusion in customized reports. A two-step procedure is proposed in which results are gathered and archived in the first step and then tabulated in the second step. Such an approach disentangles the tasks of computing results (which may take long) and preparing results for inclusion in presentations, papers, and reports (which you may have to do over and over). Examples using results from model estimation commands and various other Stata commands such as tabulate, summarize, or correlate are presented. Users will also be shown how to dynamically link results into word processors or into LaTeX documents.