SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, COGNITIVE, AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF ELECTRONIC SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

There has been very little research that has studied the capacities that can be fostered to mitigate the risk for involvement in electronic bullying or victimization and almost no research examining positive electronic behavior. The primary goal of this dissertation was to use the General Aggression Model and Anxious Apprehension Model of Trauma to explore the underlying cognitive, emotional, and self-regulation processes that are related to electronic bullying, victimization, and prosocial behavior. In Study 1, we explored several potential interpretations of the General Aggression Model that would accurately describe the relationship that electronic self-conscious appraisal, cognitive reappraisal, and activational control may have with electronic bullying and victimization. In Study 2, we used the Anxious Apprehension Model of Trauma to explore rejection cognitions as the mediator of the relationships among emotionality (emotionality, shame, state emotion responses, and physiological arousal) and electronic bullying and victimization using structural equation modelling. In addition, we explored the role of rejection cognitions in mediating the relationship of moral disengagement with electronic bullying. In Study 3, we examined predictors of electronic prosocial behavior, such as bullying, victimization, time online, electronic proficiency, electronic self-conscious appraisals, emotionality, and self-regulation. All three studies supported the General Aggression Model as a framework to guide the study of electronic behavior, and suggest the importance of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral means of regulation in shaping electronic behavior. In addition, each study has implications for the development of high quality electronic bullying prevention and intervention research.

Bases moléculaires et cellulaires d’un trouble neurodéveloppemental causé par l’haploinsuffisance de SYNGAP1

La déficience intellectuelle est la cause d’handicap la plus fréquente chez l’enfant. De nombreuses évidences convergent vers l’idée selon laquelle des altérations dans les gènes synaptiques puissent expliquer une fraction significative des affections neurodéveloppementales telles que la déficience intellectuelle ou encore l’autisme. Jusqu’à récemment, la majorité des mutations associées à la déficience intellectuelle a été liée au chromosome X ou à la transmission autosomique récessive. D’un autre côté, plusieurs études récentes suggèrent que des mutations de novo dans des gènes à transmission autosomique dominante, requis dans les processus de la plasticité synaptique peuvent être à la source d’une importante fraction des cas de déficience intellectuelle non syndromique. Par des techniques permettant la capture de l’exome et le séquençage de l’ADN génomique, notre laboratoire a précédemment reporté les premières mutations pathogéniques dans le gène à transmission autosomique dominante SYNGAP1. Ces dernières ont été associées à des troubles comportementaux tels que la déficience intellectuelle, l’inattention, des problèmes d’humeur, d’impulsivité et d’agressions physiques. D’autres patients sont diagnostiqués avec des troubles autistiques et/ou des formes particulières d’épilepsie généralisée. Chez la souris, le knock-out constitutif de Syngap1 (souris Syngap1+/-) résulte en des déficits comme l’hyperactivité locomotrice, une réduction du comportement associée à l’anxiété, une augmentation du réflexe de sursaut, une propension à l’isolation, des problèmes dans le conditionnement à la peur, des troubles dans les mémoires de travail, de référence et social. Ainsi, la souris Syngap1+/- représente un modèle approprié pour l’étude des effets délétères causés par l’haploinsuffisance de SYNGAP1 sur le développement de circuits neuronaux. D’autre part, il est de première importance de statuer si les mutations humaines aboutissent à l’haploinsuffisance de la protéine. SYNGAP1 encode pour une protéine à activité GTPase pour Ras. Son haploinsuffisance entraîne l’augmentation des niveaux d’activité de Ras, de phosphorylation de ERK, cause une morphogenèse anormale des épines dendritiques et un excès dans la concentration des récepteurs AMPA à la membrane postsynaptique des neurones excitateurs. Plusieurs études suggèrent que l’augmentation précoce de l’insertion des récepteurs AMPA au sein des synapses glutamatergiques contribue à certains phénotypes observés chez la souris Syngap1+/-. En revanche, les conséquences de l’haploinsuffisance de SYNGAP1 sur les circuits neuronaux GABAergiques restent inconnues. Les enjeux de mon projet de PhD sont: 1) d’identifier l’impact de mutations humaines dans la fonction de SYNGAP1; 2) de déterminer si SYNGAP1 contribue au développement et à la fonction des circuits GABAergiques; 3) de révéler comment l’haploinsuffisance de Syngap1 restreinte aux circuits GABAergiques affecte le comportement et la cognition. Nous avons publié les premières mutations humaines de type faux-sens dans le gène SYNGAP1 (c.1084T>C [p.W362R]; c.1685C>T [p.P562L]) ainsi que deux nouvelles mutations tronquantes (c.2212_2213del [p.S738X]; c.283dupC [p.H95PfsX5]). Ces dernières sont toutes de novo à l’exception de c.283dupC, héritée d’un père mosaïque pour la même mutation. Dans cette étude, nous avons confirmé que les patients pourvus de mutations dans SYNGAP1 présentent, entre autre, des phénotypes associés à des troubles comportementaux relatifs à la déficience intellectuelle. En culture organotypique, la transfection biolistique de l’ADNc de Syngap1 wild-type dans des cellules pyramidales corticales réduit significativement les niveaux de pERK, en fonction de l’activité neuronale. Au contraire les constructions plasmidiques exprimant les mutations W362R, P562L, ou celle précédemment répertoriée R579X, n’engendre aucun effet significatif sur les niveaux de pERK. Ces résultats suggèrent que ces mutations faux-sens et tronquante résultent en la perte de la fonction de SYNGAP1 ayant fort probablement pour conséquences d’affecter la régulation du développement cérébral. Plusieurs études publiées suggèrent que les déficits cognitifs associés à l’haploinsuffisance de SYNGAP1 peuvent émerger d’altérations dans le développement des neurones excitateurs glutamatergiques. Toutefois, si, et auquel cas, de quelle manière ces mutations affectent le développement des interneurones GABAergiques résultant en un déséquilibre entre l’excitation et l’inhibition et aux déficits cognitifs restent sujet de controverses. Par conséquent, nous avons examiné la contribution de Syngap1 dans le développement des circuits GABAergiques. A cette fin, nous avons généré une souris mutante knockout conditionnelle dans laquelle un allèle de Syngap1 est spécifiquement excisé dans les interneurones GABAergiques issus de l’éminence ganglionnaire médiale (souris Tg(Nkx2.1-Cre);Syngap1flox/+). En culture organotypique, nous avons démontré que la réduction de Syngap1 restreinte aux interneurones inhibiteurs résulte en des altérations au niveau de leur arborisation axonale et dans leur densité synaptique. De plus, réalisés sur des coupes de cerveau de souris Tg(Nkx2.1-Cre);Syngap1flox/+, les enregistrements des courants inhibiteurs postsynaptiques miniatures (mIPSC) ou encore de ceux évoqués au moyen de l’optogénétique (oIPSC) dévoilent une réduction significative de la neurotransmission inhibitrice corticale. Enfin, nous avons comparé les performances de souris jeunes adultes Syngap1+/-, Tg(Nkx2.1-Cre);Syngap1flox/+ à celles de leurs congénères contrôles dans une batterie de tests comportementaux. À l’inverse des souris Syngap1+/-, les souris Tg(Nkx2.1-Cre);Syngap1flox/+ ne présentent pas d’hyperactivité locomotrice, ni de comportement associé à l’anxiété. Cependant, elles démontrent des déficits similaires dans la mémoire de travail et de reconnaissance sociale, suggérant que l’haploinsuffisance de Syngap1 restreinte aux interneurones GABAergiques dérivés de l’éminence ganglionnaire médiale récapitule en partie certains des phénotypes cognitifs observés chez la souris Syngap1+/-. Mes travaux de PhD établissent pour la première fois que les mutations humaines dans le gène SYNGAP1 associés à la déficience intellectuelle causent la perte de fonction de la protéine. Mes études dévoilent, également pour la première fois, l’influence significative de ce gène dans la régulation du développement et de la fonction des interneurones. D’admettre l’atteinte des cellules GABAergiques illustre plus réalistement la complexité de la déficience intellectuelle non syndromique causée par l’haploinsuffisance de SYNGAP1. Ainsi, seule une compréhension raffinée de cette condition neurodéveloppementale pourra mener à une approche thérapeutique adéquate.

Quand la réadaptation blesse? Éducateurs victimes de violence

Cette étude vise à comprendre le phénomène de la violence physique vécue par les éducateurs oeuvrant dans dix Centres Jeunesse (CJ) du Québec. Pour ce faire, un sondage de victimisation a été administré à 586 éducateurs en internat. En premier lieu, la prévalence de cette problématique sera établie. Par la suite, les facteurs individuels et environnementaux prédisposant aux agressions physiques seront identifiés. Des éducateurs sondés, 53,9 % rapportent avoir été victimes de violence physique au cours de la dernière année. Sur le plan individuel, être affecté par les manifestations agressives des clients et la fréquence des violences psychologiques subies augmentent les risques de victimisation physique. Quant au contexte, l’âge de la clientèle et le motif de l’intervention (basé sur la loi justifiant le placement) auprès de l’enfant ou de l’adolescent influencent l’occurrence des actes violents dirigés contre les éducateurs. Nos analyses montrent également que les violences physiques dont sont victimes les éducateurs affectent autant l’individu que l’institution. L’identification de facteurs permettant de prédire les risques de victimisation pourrait notamment servir à orienter les programmes de prévention de la violence dans les CJ, mais aussi à cibler les éducateurs les plus à risque afin de leur fournir un soutien adapté.

Aggressive incidents inside a Montreal barroom involving patrons, barmaids and bouncers : a micro level examination of routine activity theory

Objectives: This article further examines the phenomenon of aggression inside barrooms by relying on the “bouncer-ethnographer” methodology. The objective is to investigate variations in aggression through time and space according to the role and routine of the target in a Montreal barroom. Thus, it provides an examination of routine activity theory at the micro level: the barroom. Methods: For a period of 258 nights of observation in a Canadian barroom, bouncers completed reports on each intervention and provided specific information regarding what happened, when and where within the venue. In addition, the bouncer-ethnographer compiled field observations and interviews with bar personnel in order to identify aggression hotspots and “rush hours” for three types of actors within barrooms: (a) bouncers, (b) barmaids and (c) patrons. Findings: Three different patterns emerged for shifting hotspots of aggression depending on the target. As the night progresses, aggressive incidents between patrons, towards barmaids and towards bouncers have specific hotspots and rush hours influenced by the specific routine of the target inside the barroom. Implications: The current findings enrich those of previous work by pointing to the relevance of not only examining the environmental characteristics of the barroom, but also the role of the target of aggression. Crime opportunities follow routine activities, even within a specific location on a micro level. Routine activity theory is thus relevant in this context, because as actors in differing roles follow differing routines, as do their patterns of victimization.

Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document No. 400, September 2014

While EU and US sanctions against Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, are much discussed due to their evident political significance, less attention has been given to Russia’s punitive sanctions against the three Eastern European states – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – that have signed with the EU Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provisions. This paper therefore documents these trade policy restrictions and embargoes imposed by Russia, and provides some first indications of their impact. The immediate impact on trade flows, especially for agri-food products, has been substantial, albeit with some leakage through Belarus. The main instrument for the Russian measures has been allegations of non-conformity with Russian technical standards, although the correlation of these allegations with movements in Russia’s geopolitical postures makes it obvious that the Russian technical agencies are following political guidelines dressed up as scientific evidence. These measures also push the three states into diversifying their trade marketing efforts in favour of the EU and other world markets, with Georgia already having taken significant steps in this direction, since in its case the Russian sanctions date back to 2006. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s threat to cancel CIS free trade preferences infiltrated trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia, leading on 12 September to their proposed postponement until the end of 2015 of the ‘provisional’ implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA. This was immediately followed on 16 September by ratification of the AA/DCFTA by both the Rada in Kyiv and the European Parliament, which will lead to its full and definitive entry into force when the 28 EU member states have also ratified it. However Putin followed the day after with a letter to Poroshenko making an abusive interpretation of the 12 September understanding.

The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study. OSW Point of View Number 42, May 2014

The Crimean operation has served as an occasion for Russia to demonstrate to the entire world the capabilities and the potential of information warfare. Its goal is to use difficult to detect methods to subordinate the elites and societies in other countries by making use of various kinds of secret and overt channels (secret services, diplomacy and the media), psychological impact, and ideological and political sabotage. Russian politicians and journalists have argued that information battles are necessary for “the Russian/Eurasian civilisation” to counteract “informational aggression from the Atlantic civilisation led by the USA”. This argument from the arsenal of applied geopolitics has been used for years. This text is an attempt to provide an interpretation of information warfare with the background of Russian geopolitical theory and practice.

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Crimea one year after Russian annexation. EPC Policy Brief, 24 March 2015

On 18 March 2014, the Lower House of the Russian Parliament approved a Treaty to annex the Ukrainian Black Sea Peninsula of Crimea by 443 to 1 votes. This act violated Ukraine's sovereignty, representing a fundamental breach of international law; the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the nuclear arsenal stationed on Ukraine's territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union was relinquished in exchange for security assurances of its sovereign territorial integrity. Russia, the US, France and the UK all signed. The annexation also violated a number of bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia. Russia's actions were immediately condemned by the international community. A 13 March European Parliament Resolution "firmly condemns Russia's act of aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognised as such by the Russian Federation".

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

A challenge for liberal democracy: How to understand the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 16.10.2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine has provoked a deep crisis which will likely last for years, with profound consequences not only for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe, but also for the internal situation in the European Union. The current Russian aggression is frequently seen as a profound violation of international law, breaking the rules that are fundamental for relations in Europe. It is perceived as perhaps a step towards rebuilding imperial Russia or, at the very least, an attempt to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, one very important aspect is virtually neglected, namely, that Russia’s Ukraine venture may have a significant impact on the future of liberal democracy in Europe and beyond.

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?

Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process. CEPS Working Document No. 423 / June 2016

Although the Minsk process brought about a de-escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, not all of its 13 points have been implemented, including a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weaponry. In the absence of a military option, economic sanctions have become the core instrument of the EU and the US, to respond to Russia’s aggression. At the end of June 2016, when EU Heads of State and Government meet to discuss the extension of sanctions against Russia, they should bear in mind that Russia did not implement the commitments it took upon itself in the framework of the Minsk agreements. Given the persistent deadlock in the Ukraine crisis, the leaders of the EU ought to agree to prolong the sanctions against Russia, push for the renegotiation of the Minsk II agreement and widen the ‘Normandy format’ to include the US and bolster reforms in Ukraine.