A specialist root herbivore reduces plant resistance and uses an induced plant volatile to aggregate in a density-dependent manner

1.Leaf-herbivore attack often triggers induced resistance in plants. However, certain specialist herbivores can also take advantage of the induced metabolic changes. In some cases, they even manipulate plant resistance, leading to a phenomenon called induced susceptibility. Compared to above-ground plant-insect interactions, little is known about the prevalence and consequences of induced responses below-ground. 2.A recent study suggested that feeding by the specialist root herbivore Diabrotica virgifera virgifera makes maize roots more susceptible to conspecifics. To better understand this phenomenon, we conducted a series of experiments to study the behavioural responses and elucidate the underlying biochemical mechanisms. 3.We found that D. virgifera benefitted from feeding on a root system in groups of intermediate size (3–9 larvae/plant in the laboratory), whereas its performance was reduced in large groups (12 larvae/plant). Interestingly, the herbivore was able to select host plants with a suitable density of conspecifics by using the induced plant volatile (E)-β-caryophyllene in a dose-dependent manner. Using a split root experiment, we show that the plant-induced susceptibility is systemic and, therefore, plant mediated. Chemical analyses on plant resource reallocation and defences upon herbivory showed that the systemic induced-susceptibility is likely to stem from a combination of (i) increased free amino acid concentrations and (ii) relaxation of defence inducibility. 4.These findings show that herbivores can use induced plant volatiles in a density-dependent manner to aggregate on a host plant and change its metabolism to their own benefit. Our study furthermore helps to explain the remarkable ecological success of D. virgifera in maize fields around the world.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

THE EQUILIBRIUM CONSTANT FOR THE GLYCINE SYNTHASE REACTION (ONE-CARBON, METABOLISM, FOLATE)

The equilibrium constant (K(,c)) under physiological conditions (38(DEGREES)C, 0.25 M ionic strength (I), pH 7.0) for the glycine synthase (GS) reaction (E C 2.1.2.1.0) (Equation 1) has been determined. (UNFORMATTED TABLE FOLLOWS)^ 5,10-CH(,2)-H(,4)Folate NADH NH (,4)+ CO(,2) ^ K(,c) = Eq. 1^ H(,4)Folate NAD('+) GLY ^(TABLE ENDS)^ The enzymatic instability of the GS enzyme complex itself has made it necessary to determine the overall K(,c) from the product of constants for the partial reactions of GS determined separately under the same conditions. The partial reactions are the H(,4)Folate-formaldehyde (CH(,2)(OH)(,2)) condensation reaction (Reaction 1) the K(,c) for which has been reported by this laboratory (3.0 x 10('4)), the lipoate (LipS(,2)) dehydrogenase reaction (LipDH) (Reaction 2) and the Gly-Lip^ decarboxylase reaction (Reaction 3) forming reduced lipoate (Lip(SH)(,2)), NH(,4)('+), CO(,2) and CH(,2)(OH)(,2.) (UNFORMATTED TABLE FOLLOWS)(,)^ H(,4)Fote + CH(,2)(OH)(,2) 5,10-CH(,2)-H(,4)Folate (1)^ Lip(SH)(,2) + NAD('+) LipS(,2) + NADH + H('+) (2)^ H('+) + Gly + LipS(,2) Lip(SH)(,2) + NH(,4)('+) CO(,2) + CH(,2)(OH)(,2) (3)^(TABLE ENDS)^ In this work the K(,c) for Reactions 2 and 3 are reported.^ The K(,c)' for the LipDH reaction described by other authors was reported with unexplainable conclusions regarding the pH depend- ence for the reaction. These conclusions would imply otherwise unexpected acid dissociation constants for reduced and oxidized lipoate. The pK(,a)',s for these compounds have been determined to resolve discrepancy. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The K(,c) for the LipDH reaction is 2.08 x 10('-8); (2) The pK(,a)',s for Lip(SH)(,2) are 4.77(-COOH), 9.91(-SH), 11.59(-SH); for LipS(,2) the carboxyl pK(,a)' is 4.77; (3) Contrary to previous literature, the log K(,c)' for the LipDH reaction is a linear function of the pH, a conclusion supported by the values for the dissociation constants.^ The K(,c) for Reaction 3 is the product of constants for Reactions 4-7. (UNFORMATTED TABLE FOLLOWS)^ LipSHSCH(,2)OH + H(,2)O Lip(SH)(,2) + CH(,2)(OH)(,2) (4)^ H(,2)O + LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,3)('+) LipSHSCH(,2)OH + NH(,4)('+) (5)^ LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,2) + H('+) LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,3)('+) (6)^ Gly + LipS(,2) LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,2) + CO(,2) (7)^(TABLE ENDS)^ Reactions 4-6 are non-enzymatic reactions whose constants were determined spectrophotometrically. Reaction 7 was catalyzed by the partially purified P-protein of GS with equilibrium approached from both directions. The value for K(,c) for this reaction is 8.15 x 10('-3). The combined K(,c) for Reactions 4-7 or Reaction 3 is 2.4 M.^ The overall K(,c) for the GS reaction determined by combination of values for Reactions 1-3 is 1.56 x 10('-3). ^

Isotone Recursive Methods for Overlapping Generation Models with Stochastic Nonclassical Production

Based on an order-theoretic approach, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence, characterization, and computation of Markovian equilibrium decision processes and stationary Markov equilibrium on minimal state spaces for a large class of stochastic overlapping generations models. In contrast to all previous work, we consider reduced-form stochastic production technologies that allow for a broad set of equilibrium distortions such as public policy distortions, social security, monetary equilibrium, and production nonconvexities. Our order-based methods are constructive, and we provide monotone iterative algorithms for computing extremal stationary Markov equilibrium decision processes and equilibrium invariant distributions, while avoiding many of the problems associated with the existence of indeterminacies that have been well-documented in previous work. We provide important results for existence of Markov equilibria for the case where capital income is not increasing in the aggregate stock. Finally, we conclude with examples common in macroeconomics such as models with fiat money and social security. We also show how some of our results extend to settings with unbounded state spaces.

An Equilibrium Model of Lawmaking

This paper embeds a model of lawmaking in an equilibrium framework in which the demand for trials is rationed by court delay. The lawmaking process depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent. The steady state equilibrium of the model determines both the length of delay and the distribution of legal rules. Comparative statics show that an increase in the supply of trials reduces delay but may or may not increase the proportion of efficient rules. An increase in the fraction of judges biased in favor of the efficient rule, however, will likely improve efficiency on both counts.

GMM Based Inference with Standard Stratified Samples when the Aggregate Shares are Known

We show how to do efficient moment based inference using the generalized method of moments (GMM) when data is collected by standard stratified sampling and the maintained assumption is that the aggregate shares are known.

Nitric Oxide Equilibrium

The explicit formulas for following the passage to chemical equilibrium are derived.

The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending

This paper analyzes whether the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) leads to lower aggregate spending than does the piece-meal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis, using spatial models of legislator preferences, is inconclusive. This paper uses a model of interest group lobbying, where a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to subsets of the population that belong to nationwide sector-specific interest groups. In the appropriations process, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget, maximizing the joint welfare of voters and the interest groups, that leads to overspending on subsidies. In the budget process, a Budget Committee proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); the Appropriations Committee then proposes a budget. If the lobby groups are not subject to a binding resource constraint, the two institutional structures lead to identical outcomes. With such a constraint, however, there is a free rider problem among the groups in lobbying the Budget Committee, as each group only obtains a small fraction of the benefits from increasing the aggregate budget. If the number of groups is sufficiently large, each takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies only the Appropriations Committee. The main results are that aggregate spending is lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process; however, provision of the public good is suboptimal. The paper also presents two extensions: the first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution by incorporating the relevant procedural rules into the model. The second analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. In each case,the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to procedural and budget rules.

Stationary Markovian Equilibrium in Overlapping Generation Models with Stochastic Nonclassical Production

This paper provides new sufficient conditions for the existence, computation via successive approximations, and stability of Markovian equilibrium decision processes for a large class of OLG models with stochastic nonclassical production. Our notion of stability is existence of stationary Markovian equilibrium. With a nonclassical production, our economies encompass a large class of OLG models with public policy, valued fiat money, production externalities, and Markov shocks to production. Our approach combines aspects of both topological and order theoretic fixed point theory, and provides the basis of globally stable numerical iteration procedures for computing extremal Markovian equilibrium objects. In addition to new theoretical results on existence and computation, we provide some monotone comparative statics results on the space of economies.

The Aggregate Demand for Private Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S.

This paper estimates the aggregate demand for private health insurance coverage in the U.S. using an error-correction model and by recognizing that people are without private health insurance for voluntary, structural, frictional, and cyclical reasons and because of public alternatives. Insurance coverage is measured both by the percentage of the population enrolled in private health insurance plans and the completeness of the insurance coverage. Annual data for the period 1966-1999 are used and both short and long run price and income elasticities of demand are estimated. The empirical findings indicate that both private insurance enrollment and completeness are relatively inelastic with respect to changes in price and income in the short and long run. Moreover, private health insurance enrollment is found to be inversely related to the poverty rate, particularly in the short-run. Finally, our results suggest that an increase in the number cyclically uninsured generates less of a welfare loss than an increase in the structurally uninsured.

Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from Aggregate European Data

This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by comparing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative inflation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simulation findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in Europe.

On the Existence and Characterization of Markovian Equilibrium in Models with Simple Non-Paternalistic Altruism

This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Markovian equilibrium in models with non-paternalistic altruism extending to one generation ahead. When utility is non-separable, we show that each equilibrium savings policy correspondence is increasing everywhere and single-valued, except perhaps on a countable number of points. It is also upper hemi-continuous where it is single valued. When utility is separable, we show that the equilibrium is unique, increasing, and continuous, and we provide an algorithm converging uniformly to the equilibrium.

Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Nonoptimal Unbounded Infinite Horizon Economies

In applied work in macroeconomics and finance, nonoptimal infinite horizon economies are often studied in the the state space is unbounded. Important examples of such economies are single vector growth models with production externalities, valued fiat money, monopolistic competition, and/or distortionary government taxation. Although sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Markovian equilibrium are well known for the compact state space case, no similar sufficient conditions exist for unbounded growth. This paper provides such a set of sufficient conditions, and also present a computational algorithm that will prove asymptotically consistent when computing Markovian equilibrium.

Advanced Physical Chemistry Problems (VIII), Chemical Equilibrium

This is a set of P. Chem. problems posed at a slightly higher level than the normal textbook level, for students who are continuing in the study of this subject.