Beware statutory disclosure obligations

Great care is needed to ensure strict compliance with statutory disclosure obligations in conveyancing. The types of issues that may arise are well illustrated by the facts before the court in APM Property 3 Pty Ltd v Blondeau [2009] QSC 326, decision of Mullins J.

Beware the doctrine of election!

The operation of the doctrine of election, as it applies in a conveyancing context, was recently considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P and White and Fryberg JJ) in Barooga Projects (Investments) Pty Ltd v Duncan [2004] QCA 149.

Black v Garnock : implications for Queensland conveyancing practice

What was previously established as a fundamental principle, that a judgment creditor may take no interest beyond what the judgment debtor could give, has now been called into question by the decision of the High Court in Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 31. This article examines the implications of the decision of the High Court for conveyancing practice in Queensland. The relevant facts of Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 31 may be briefly stated: The Garnocks and the Luffs, as purchasers, entered a contract to purchase a rural property from Mrs Smith with settlement due on 24 August 2005. On 23 August 2005, a creditor obtained a writ against Mrs Smith from the District Court of New South Wales. No caveat was lodged on behalf of the purchasers prior to settlement (there being no equivalent, in New South Wales, of the Queensland settlement notice mechanism).

Buyer's waiver of a special condition

A recent decision of the Queensland Supreme Court (McMurdo J) raises matters of interest for practitioners undertaking conveyancing. Woodward v Nagel [2003] QSC 100 was delivered on 11 April 2003.

Do we have a legally binding contract?

Legal advisers are often called upon to advise whether informal correspondence between clients may give rise to a binding contract. The decision of Mullins J in Teviot Downs Estate Pty Ltd v MTAA Superannuation Fund (Flagstone Creek and Spring Mountain Park) Property Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 403 provides general guidance as to matters that may be relevant when faced with this thorny issue.

The meaning of 'material prejudice'

As dictated by s 213 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), the seller of a proposed lot is required to provide the buyer with a disclosure statement before the contract is entered into. Where the seller subsequently becomes aware that information contained in the disclosure statement was inaccurate when the contract was entered into or the disclosure statement would not be accurate if now given as a disclosure statement, the seller must, within 14 days, give the buyer a further statement rectifying the inaccuracies in the disclosure statement. Provided the contract has not been settled, where a further statement varies the disclosure statement to such a degree that the buyer would be materially prejudiced if compelled to complete the contract, the buyer may cancel the contract by written notice given to the seller within 14 days, or a longer period as agreed between the parties, after the seller gives the buyer the further statement. The term ‘material prejudice’ was considered by Wilson J in Wilson v Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd.

Causing economic harm to property developers : damages for starting an incurably bad appeal?

A recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal involved an unusual statement of claim made on behalf of the developer of a proposed resort in Port Douglas. The decision is The Beach Club Port Douglas Pty Ltd v Page [2005] QCA 475. The issue The defendant had objected to a development application of the plaintiff developer and lodged an appeal in the Planning and Environment Court against the council decision granting a development permit. The main issue in the Planning and Environment Court was whether the site coverage of the proposed resort was excessive. In a separate action (the subject matter of the present appeal), the plaintiff developer claimed damages for ‘negligence’ alleging that the defendant had breached a duty of care not to appeal without properly or reasonably assessing whether the development qualified for a permit given that the resort qualified for the maximum allowable site coverage. It was alleged that the appeal lodged by the defendant in the Planning and Environment Court had no reasonable prospects of success and that any reasonable person properly advised would know, or ought reasonably to have known, that to be so. The defendant had been “put on notice” that the plaintiff would incur loss of $10,000 for every day there was a delay in starting construction of the resort. The claim made by the developer required the court to consider those circumstances where a person may lawfully and deliberately cause economic harm to another. Was a duty of care owed by the defendant for negligent conduct of litigation that caused economic loss to the plaintiff?

Compensation for compulsory acquisition of a licensed car parking space

The Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (‘the Act’) deals with the acquisition of land by the State for public purposes and provides for compensation. The issue that arose for determination in Sorrento Medical Service Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Dept of Main Roads [2007] QCA 73 was whether the appellant was entitled to claim compensation under the Act in respect of land resumed by the Main Roads Department over which the appellant had an exclusive contractual licence for car parking spaces for use in association with a medical centre leased by the appellant. At first instance, it was held by the Land Court that the appellant was not entitled to compensation for the resumption of the car parking spaces. The basis for this decision by the Land Court was that a right to compensation only exists where resumption has taken some proprietary interest of the claimant in the land. Following an appeal to the Land Appeal Court being dismissed, the appellant instituted the present appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman J).

Cranes, claims and a statutory right of user

In larger developments there is potential for construction cranes to encroach into the airspace of neighbouring properties. To resolve issues of this nature, a statutory right of user may be sought under s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). Section 180 allows the court to impose a statutory right of user on servient land where it is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any reasonable manner of the dominant land. Such an order will not be made unless the court is satisfied that it is consistent with public interest, the owner of the servient land can be adequately recompensed for any loss or disadvantage which may be suffered from the imposition and the owner of the servient land has refused unreasonably to agree to accept the imposition of that obligation. In applying the statutory provision, a key practical concern for legal advisers will be the basis for assessment of compensation. A recent decision of the Queensland Supreme Court (Douglas J) provides guidance concerning matters relevant to this assessment. The decision is Lang Parade Pty Ltd v Peluso [2005] QSC 112.

Commercial vulnerability of tenant : a special disadvantage?

The Full Federal Court has once again been called upon to explore the limits of s51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in the context of a retail tenancy between commercially experienced parties. The decision is Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 62.

Equitable mortgage by deposit of a Certificate of Title

In Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 45, the High Court considered certain principles governing the creation of an equitable mortgage by the deposit of a title deed as first developed by the English courts of equity with respect to old system conveyancing. The decision will be of interest to Queensland practitioners as it concerned the application of these equitable principles to Torrens land regulated by the provisions of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) and, in particular, the operation of s 75 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) which provides: (i) An equitable mortgage of a lot may be created by leaving a certificate of title with the mortgagee (ii) Subsection (1) does not affect the ways in which an equitable mortgage may be created.