Fabrication of disposable voltammetric electronic tongues by using Prussian Blue films electrodeposited onto CD-R gold surfaces and recognition of milk adulteration

A new approach to fabricate a disposable electronic tongue is reported. The fabrication of the disposable sensor aimed the integration of all electrodes necessary for measurement in the same device. The disposable device was constructed with gold CD-R and copper sheets substrates and the sensing elements were gold, copper and a gold surface modified with a layer of Prussian Blue. The relative standard deviation for signals obtained from 20 different disposable gold and 10 different disposable copper electrodes was below 3.5%. The performance, electrode materials and the capability of the device to differentiate samples were evaluated for taste substances model, milk with different pasteurization processes (homogenized/pasteurized, ultra high temperature (UHT) pasteurized and UHT pasteurized with low fat content) and adulterated with hydrogen peroxide. In all analysed cases, a good separation between different samples was noticed in the score plots obtained from the principal component analysis (PCA). Crown Copyright (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Use of copper and gold electrodes as sensitive elements for fabrication of an electronic tongue: Discrimination of wines and whiskies

A low-cost method is proposed to classify wine and whisky samples using a disposable voltammetric electronic tongue that was fabricated using gold and copper substrates and a pattern recognition technique (Principal Component Analysis). The proposed device was successfully used to discriminate between expensive and cheap whisky samples and to detect adulteration processes using only a copper electrode. For wines, the electronic tongue was composed of copper and gold working electrodes and was able to classify three different brands of wine and to make distinctions regarding the wine type, i.e., dry red, soft red, dry white and soft white brands. Crown Copyright (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Reactivity of Beer Bitter Acids Toward the 1-Hydroxyethyl Radical as Probed by Spin-Trapping Electron Paramagnetic Resonance (EPR) and Electrospray Ionization-Tandem Mass Spectrometry (ESI-MS/MS)

The iso-alpha-acids or isohumulones are the major contributors to the bitter taste of beer, and it is well-recognized that they are degraded during beer aging. In particular, the trans-isohumulones seem to be less stable than the cis-isohumulones. The major radical identified in beer is the 1-hydroxyethyl radical; however, the reactivity between this radical and the isohumulones has not been reported until now. Therefore, we studied the reactivity of isohumulones toward the 1-hydroxyethyl radical through a competitive kinetic approach. It was observed that both cis- and trans-isohumulones and dihydroisohumulones are decomposed in the presence of 1-hydroxyethyl radicals, while the reactivities are comparable. On the other hand, the tetrahydroisohumulones did not react with 1-hydroxyethyl radicals. The apparent second-order rate constants for the reactions between the 1-hydroxyethyl radical and these compounds were determined by electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) spectroscopy and electrospray ionization-tandem mass spectrometry [ESI(+)-MS/MS]. It follows that degradation of beer bitter acids is highly influenced by the presence of 1-hydroxyethyl radicals. The reaction products were detected by liquid chromatography electrospray ionization-ion trap-tandem mass spectrometry (LC-ESI-IT-MS/MS), and the formation of oxidized derivatives of the isohumulones was confirmed. These data help to understand the mechanism of beer degradation upon aging.

Mode, senmodernitet, identitet

Fashion, late modernity and identity A common discussion in the late modern era is the role that tradition plays concerning individual identity. This forms a background to our article that focuses on consumer culture and one of its characteristics – fashion. To what extent does consumer culture and fashion contribute to the undermining of traditions, and how does this affect individual identity? We discuss two interpretations of consumption in shaping individual identity: the first interpretation maintains that by consumption individuals obtain an increasing freedom of choicemaking them free from the power of tradition, and thereby responsible for their lifestyle choices. According to the second interpretation, the free choice is illusory. This choiceis strongly influenced by factors such as social class and producers’ manipulative skills. Contrasting classical social theorists with contemporary fashion theory we argue that late modern fashion is characterized by quick changes and pluralism that often stand in contrast to tradition. We further discuss the increased importance of taste and new diffusion patterns as signs of a more individualized fashion, and discuss neo-tribalism as a post-traditional kind of community.

Perceptions of Sustainability and Functional Aspects on Liquid Carton Board Packaging Materials versus Competing Materials for Juice Applications in Sweden

This research explores the downstream perceptions of liquid carton board versus competing materials in packaging applications for juice. The methodology used is focus groups. The context is sustainability and functional performance, and related potential implications for the beverage industry value chain. The purpose is to get a deeper insight and understanding of functionality in relation to juice beverage packaging. The results confirm that there is no optimal packaging for every juice product, but a multitude, depending on the distribution channel, retail outlet, customer preferences, and context of consumption. There are some general packaging preferences, but the main deciding criteria for purchase seem to be the product characteristics in terms of quality, taste, brand, price and shelf life. For marketing reasons, packaging has to be adopted to the product and its positioning, liquid carton board packaging seem to have some functional advantages in distribution and is considered as sustainable and functional among many consumers. Major drawbacks seem to be shape limitations, lack of transparency, and lack of a “premium look”. To improve packaging performance and avoid sub-optimization, actors in the beverage industry value chain need to be integrated in development processes.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Avaliando questionários de risco e o comportamento do investidor sobre a ótica de behavioral finance

Tolerância ao risco é fundamental quando se tomam decisões financeiras. No entanto, a avaliação da tolerância ao risco tem se baseado ao longo dos anos em diferentes metodologias, tais como julgamentos heurísticos e a teoria da utilidade esperada que tem como base a hipótese dos mercados eficientes. Foi dentro desta ótica que este trabalho se desenvolveu. O objetivo é analisar três diferentes questionários de avaliação ao risco que são na prática amplamente utilizados por consultores financeiros. Foi assumido para isso que os investidores são considerados racionais, conhecem e ordenam de forma lógica suas preferências, buscam maximizar a "utilidade" de suas escolhas, e conseguem atribuir com precisão probabilidades aos eventos futuros, quando submetidos a escolhas que envolvam incertezas. No entanto, em uma análise preliminar dos questionários, estes poderiam estar utilizando conceitos de behavioral finance para avaliarem a tolerância ao risco, ao invés de utilizarem somente a metodologia tradicional da teoria da utilidade esperada. Dessa forma tornou-se necessário o estudo dos conceitos de behavioral finance. O primeiro capítulo então trata dos aspectos psicológicos do investidor, procurando entender como este se comporta e como este forma suas preferências. Apesar do estudo assumir racionalidade nas decisões, se a teoria de behavioral estiver correta e os investidores apresentarem desvios a racionalidade, como a teoria prospectiva afirma, o questionário poderia ser o veículo ideal para identificar tais desvios, sendo possível então educar e orientar o indivíduo em suas escolhas financeiras, afim de maximizá-las. O capitulo dois coloca a análise dos questionários inserida no contexto da teoria moderna de finanças, falando das escolhas de portfólio para investidores de longo prazo. O capítulo mostra de forma bem resumida e simplificada como o investidor maximiza a sua utilidade da riqueza. A idéia desse capítulo é entender como alguns julgamentos heurísticos assumidos na prática por consultores financeiros afetam as escolhas de portfólio e em quais condições esses julgamentos heurísticos são verdadeiros. Isso se torna importante pois os questionários mesclam medidas de risco com horizonte de investimentos do investidor. Estes questionários são utilizados para traçar uma política de investimentos completa para o investidor. Para cada perfil de risco encontrado a instituição traça um modelo de alocação de portfólio. O capítulo três trata da avaliação dos questionários em si tendo como base a teoria da utilidade esperada, os conceitos de behaviral finance e as lições tiradas das escolhas de portfólio para investidores de longo prazo.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Estimating the stochastic discount factor without a utility function

Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the serial-correlation ìcommon featureîin every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns, does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences, is suitable for testing di§erent preference speciÖcations or investigating intertemporal substitution puzzles, and can be a basis to construct an estimator of the risk-free rate. For post-war data, our estimator is close to unity most of the time, yielding an average annual real discount rate of 2.46%. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference speciÖcations used in the literature and estimates of the relative risk-aversion coe¢ cient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. Using our SDF estimator, we found little signs of the equity-premium puzzle for the U.S.

Estimando a aversão ao risco, a taxa de desconto intertemporal, e a substutibilidade intertemporal do consumo no Brasil usando três tipos de função utilidade

Nesse trabalho estima-se, usando o método generalizado dos momentos e dados brasileiros, os parâmetros estruturais do modelo CCAPM (consumption capital asset pricing model) a partir de três classes de funções utilidade distintas: função utilidade potência (CRRA), utilidade com hábito externo, e aversão ao desapontamento (Kreps-Porteus). Estes parâmetros estruturais estão associados à aversão ao risco, à elasticidade de substituição intertemporal no consumo e à taxa de desconto intertemporal da utilidade futura. Os resultados aqui obtidos são analisados e comparados com resultados anteriores para dados brasileiros e americanos. Adicionalmente, testa-se econometricamente todos os modelos estruturais estimados a partir do teste de restrições de sobre-identificação, para investigar, da forma mais abrangente possível, se há ou não equity premium puzzle para o Brasil. Os resultados surpreendem, dado que, em raríssimas ocasiões, se rejeita as restrições implícitas nesses modelos. Logo, conclui-se que não há equity premium puzzle para o Brasil.

Laws of large numbers for non-additive probabilities

We apply the concept of exchangeable random variables to the case of non-additive robability distributions exhibiting ncertainty aversion, and in the lass generated bya convex core convex non-additive probabilities, ith a convex core). We are able to rove two versions of the law of arge numbers (de Finetti's heorems). By making use of two efinitions. of independence we rove two versions of the strong law f large numbers. It turns out that e cannot assure the convergence of he sample averages to a constant. e then modal the case there is a true" probability distribution ehind the successive realizations of the uncertain random variable. In this case convergence occurs. This result is important because it renders true the intuition that it is possible "to learn" the "true" additive distribution behind an uncertain event if one repeatedly observes it (a sufficiently large number of times). We also provide a conjecture regarding the "Iearning" (or updating) process above, and prove a partia I result for the case of Dempster-Shafer updating rule and binomial trials.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Essays on asymmetric information problems without the single-crossing property: applications to corporate finance

The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.