Strong governments, weak banks. CEPS Policy Brief No. 305, 25 November 2013

Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital.

Differentiated Europe needs strong institutions. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

Differentiated Europe can be analysed in terms of the three meta-challenges outlined in this publication – stagnation, fragmentation and legitimacy. My argument is simple: stagnation or the prospect of it has been a catalyst for differentiation, fragmentation poses a risk of differentiation gone too far and legitimacy of differentiation is embedded on institutional cohesion and good results.

Georgian dilemmas. Between a strong state and democracy. Point of View No. 29, July 2012

No abstract.

A Strong Europe in a Globalized World: From the Hungarian to the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union. ACES Working Papers, 2011

On June 17, 2011, the Center for Transatlantic Relations – together with the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, and the Embassies of Hungary and Poland – hosted authors writing on the theme “A Strong Europe in a Globalized World,” and who offered in-depth, substantive reflections about how the United States and Europe can work together more closely in meeting global challenges. Drawing on the agendas of the outgoing and incoming EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union – Hungary and Poland respectively – authors focused on the importance of a strong US-EU partnership in the face of mounting global challenges, from the current financial and economic crisis through the insecurities of energy markets and the promise of the Arab Spring. Authors explored in depth four key areas of shared interests: A Global Perspective (Transatlantic Partnership in a Globalized World); Achievements and Deliverables of Eastern Partnership; Euro-Atlantic Perspectives for the Balkans; and Common Challenges of Energy Security. Senior Hungarian and Polish government officials, subject matter experts, private sector actors, and think tank scholars participated.

Putin: The morally depraved degradation of a strong state leader. CEPS Commentary, 31 March 2015

In a new CEPS Commentary, Michael Emerson calls for an end to diplomatic euphemisms in describing Putin’s tragic degradation of Russia, its political regime and society. The assassination of Boris Nemtsov on February 27th signals one more step down this dreadful path.

Shall Tunisia Succeed in Becoming a Strong Democratic State? EUSpring Arab Citizenship Review No. 13, December 2015

From the Introduction. Arab revolutions have sparked real hopes for democracy, but the situation varies from one state to another and change has taken various directions, with unpredictable outcomes in the future. In light of current events, most of these countries seem to have failed in their democratic transition and also face the dissolution of their state apparatus in bloody civil wars. This leaves the door open to interpretations associating democracy with chaos. In this view, preserving post-colonial states – authoritarian in most cases – is better than having no state at all. This partially justified the coup that took place in Egypt, where the ‘Deep State’ has recovered its capabilities in a dictatorial manner. The Arab world thus faced an impasse: the state is either stable but authoritarian or democratic yet threatened with dissolution. The dilemma results in an impossible choice between stable dictatorship or freedom ending in chaos.

Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong Dispute Settlement Provisions: New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements

To understand why some international institutions have stronger dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) than others, we investigate the dispute settlement provisions of nearly 600 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which possess several desirable case-selection features and are evoked more than is realized. We broaden the study of dispute settlement design beyond “legalization” and instead reorient theorizing around a multi-faceted conceptualization of the strength of DSMs. We posit that strong DSMs are first and foremost a rational response to features of agreements that require stronger dispute settlement, such as depth and large memberships. Multivariate empirical tests using a new data set on PTA design confirm these expectations and reveal that depth – the amount of policy change specified in an agreement – is the most powerful and consistent predictor of DSM strength, providing empirical support to a long-posited but controversial conjecture. Yet power also plays a sizeable role, since agreements among asymmetric members are more likely to have strong DSMs due to their mutual appeal, as are those involving the United States. Important regional differences also emerge, as PTAs across the Americas are designed with strong dispute settlement, as are Asian PTAs, which contradicts the conventional wisdom about Asian values and legalization. Our findings demonstrate that rationalism explains much of international institutional design, yet it can be enhanced by also incorporating power-based and regional explanations.

Ideal physical culture and the truth about the strong man,

Mode of access: Internet.