Scaling the Costs of 404 Testing to Fit the Needs of Small Public Companies

In July of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress, including section 404 which requires the auditors to test and opine on the company's internal controls. Since that time there has been much debate about whether the intended benefits of increased investor confidence and financial statement transparency trump the unexpectedly high compliance costs, especially for public companies with market-caps less than $75 million. Before these companies begin complying in the upcoming year, interest groups are calling for the requirements to be 'scaled' to better fit the needs of these companies. While auditors already are expected to scale their audit approach to each individual client, more must be done to significantly decrease the costs in order to reverse the trend of small companies foregoing listing on U.S. capital markets. Increased guidance from the PCAOB, SEC, and other related parties could help the small-cap companies and their auditors be aware of best practices. Also, exempting industries that already follow similar guidelines or are significantly injured by the compliance requirements could help. Lastly, the controversial proposal of rotational audits could be put in place if the affected parties cooperate to remove the undue burden on these small-cap companies. Without some form of significant action, the investors could soon lose the ability to buy small-cap companies in U.S. markets.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time

No abstract available.

Varying Injurer Costs of Care, Negligence, and Self-Selection

Standard economic models of negligence set a single standard of care to which all injurers must conform. When injurers differ in their costs of care, this leads to distortions in individual care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a negligence rule that induces optimal care by all injurers by means of self-selection. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard is set at the optimal care of the lowest cost injurer, and (2) liability increases gradually rather than abruptly as care falls below this standard. The results are consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution

The standard economic model of bilateral precaution postulates an interdependency between the care taken by injurers and victims that operates through the effects of each on the expected accident loss. This paper considers situations in which each party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's cost of taking precaution. Generalizing the economic model of tort law in this way allows for a more complete analysis of when standard tort rules can and cannot induce optimal precaution. When this additional externality is introduced into a model of unilateral harm (where all accident losses are borne by the victim), none of the standard tort liability rules induces socially optimal behavior by both parties. Moreover, under a contributory negligence rule, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies; this gives rise to the possibility of litigation in equilibrium. A 'tort-like' liability rule that induces socially optimal behavior by both parties is then characterized; this involves a payment by victims to non-negligent injurers whenever an accident occurs. The model is then extended to consider the case of bilateral harm (where both parties suffer accident losses). It is shown that, as long as both parties can sue to recover their accident losses, all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal behavior by both parties.

Bankruptcy Costs, Liability Dollarization, and Vulnerability to Sudden Stops

Emerging market countries that have improved institutions and attained intermediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises following capital flow reversals. However, there is also evidence that countries with strong institutions and deep capital markets are less affected by external shocks. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors. ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy recovery rates and the output loss following sudden stops. We provide empirical evidence that this non-linear relationship exists.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

The local safety net, health insurance, preventable hospitalizations and costs: Harris County (Houston), Texas

The aim of this study was to examine the association between determinants of access to healthcare and preventable hospitalizations, based on Davidson et al.'s framework for evaluating the effects of individual and community determinants on access to healthcare. The study population consisted of the low income, non-elderly, hospitalized adults residing in Harris County, Texas in 2004. The objectives of this study were to examine the proportion of the variance in preventable hospitalizations at the ZIP-code level, to analyze the association between the proximity to the nearest safety net clinic and preventable hospitalizations, to examine how the safety net capacity relates to preventable hospitalizations, to compare the relative strength of the associations of health insurance and the proximity to the nearest safety net clinic with preventable hospitalizations, and to estimate and compare the costs of preventable hospitalizations in Harris County with the average cost in the literature. The data were collected from Texas Health Care Information Collection (2004), Census 2000, and Project Safety Net (2004). A total of 61,841 eligible individuals were included in the final data analysis. A random-intercept multi-level model was constructed with two different levels of data: the individual level and the ZIP-code level. The results of this study suggest that ZIP-code characteristics explain about two percent of the variance in preventable hospitalizations and safety net capacity was marginally significantly associated with preventable hospitalizations (p= 0.062). Proximity to the nearest safety net clinic was not related to preventable hospitalizations; however, health insurance was significantly associated with a decreased risk of preventable hospitalization. The average direct cost was $6,466 per preventable hospitalization, which is significantly different from reports in the literature. ^

The Emergency Department: Rising wait times, costs, and possible remedies

Emergency Departments (EDs) and Emergency Rooms (ERs) are designed to manage trauma, respond to disasters, and serve as the initial care for those with serious illnesses. However, because of many factors, the ED has become the doorway to the hospital and a “catch-all net” for patients including those with non-urgent needs. This increase in the population in the ED has lead to an increase in wait times for patients. It has been well documented that there has been a constant and consistent rise in the number of patients that frequent the ED (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002); the wait time for patients in the ED has increased (Pitts, Niska, Xu, & Burt, 2008); and the cost of the treatment in the ER has risen (Everett Clinic, 2008). Because the ED was designed to treat patients who need quick diagnoses and may be in potential life-threatening circumstances, management of time can be the ultimate enemy. If a system was implemented to decrease wait times in the ED, decrease the use of ED resources, and decrease costs endured by patients seeking care, better outcomes for patients and patient satisfaction could be achieved. The goal of this research was to explore potential changes and/or alternatives to relieve the burden endured by the ED. In order to explore these options, data was collected by conducting one-on-one interviews with seven physicians closely tied to a Level 1 ED (Emergency Room physicians, Trauma Surgeons and Primary Care physicians). A qualitative analysis was performed on the responses of one-on-one interviews with the aforementioned physicians. The interviews were standardized, open-ended questions that probe what makes an effective ED, possible solutions to improving patient care in the ED, potential remedies for the mounting problems that plague the ED, and the feasibility of bringing Primary Care Physicians to the ED to decrease the wait times experienced by the patient. From the responses, it is clear that there needs to be more research in this area, several areas need to be addressed, and a variety of solutions could be implemented. The most viable option seems to be making the ED its own entity (similar to the clinic or hospital) that includes urgent clinics as a part of the system, in which triage and better staffing would be the most integral part of its success.^

Factors associated with home health care costs

Characteristics of Medicare-certified home health agencies in Texas and the contributions of selected agency characteristics on home health care costs were examined. Cost models were developed and estimated for both nursing and total visit costs using multiple regression procedures. The models included home health agency size, profit status, control, hospital-based affiliation, contract-cost ratio, service provision, competition, urban-rural input-price differences, and selected measures of patient case-mix. The study population comprised 314 home health agencies in Texas that had been certified at least one year on July, 1, 1986. Data for the analysis were obtained from Medicare Cost Reports for fiscal year ending between July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986.^ Home health agency size, as measured by the logs of nursing and total visits, has a statistically significant negative linear relationship with nursing visit and total visit costs. Nursing and total visit costs decrease at a declining rate as size increases. The size-cost relationship is not altered when controlling for any other agency characteristic. The number of visits per patient per year, a measure of patient case-mix, is also negatively related to costs, suggesting that costs decline with care of chronic patients. Hospital-based affiliation and urban location are positively associated with costs. Together, the four characteristics explain 19 percent of the variance in nursing visit costs and 24 percent of the variance in total visit costs.^ Profit status and control, although correlated with other agency characteristics, exhibit no observable effect on costs. Although no relationship was found between costs and competition, contract cost ratio, or the provision on non-reimburseable services, no conclusions can be made due to problems with measurement of these variables. ^

Comparison of medical care costs, utilization, and satisfaction of AIDS patients with and without home care

A sample of 157 AIDS patients 17 years of age or over were followed for six months from the date of hospital discharge to derive average total cost of medical care, utilization and satisfaction with care. Those referred for home care follow-up after discharge from the hospital were compared with those who did not receive home care.^ The average total cost of medical care for all patients was $34,984. Home care patient costs averaged \$29,614 while patients with no home care averaged $37,091. Private hospital patients had average costs of \$50,650 compared with $25,494 for public hospital patients. Hospital days for the six months period averaged 23.9 per patient for the no home care group and 18.5 days for home care group. Patient satisfaction with care was higher in the home care group than no home care group, with a mean score of 68.2 compared with 61.1.^ Other health services information indicated that 98% of the private hospital patients had insurance while only 2% of public hospital patients had coverage. The time between the initial date of diagnosis with AIDS and admission to the study was longer for private hospital patients, survival time over the study period was shorter, and the number of hospitalizations prior to entering the study was higher for private hospital patients. These results suggest that patients treated in the private hospital were sicker than public hospital patients, which may explain their higher average total cost. Statistical analyses showed that cost and utilization have no significant relationship with home care or no home care when controlling for indicators of the severity of illness and treatment in public or private hospital.^ In future studies, selecting a matched group of patients from the same hospital and following them for nine months to one year would be helpful in making a more realistic comparison of the cost effectiveness of home care. ^

THE RECOVERY OF ENTEROPATHOGENS FROM CONTAMINATED COOKED FOODS AT HOLDING TEMPERATURES

Hot foods served in foodservice establishments, institutions and homes, have always been regarded as safe, since cooking temperatures are more likely to kill the bacterial agents that may cause foodborne diseases. However, foods that are otherwise served hot have been epidemiologically incriminated for causing foodborne diseases. This situation arises due to the possible post-cooking food contamination. Post-cooking contamination of hot-held food is most threatening for it gives the contaminating agents the possibility of proliferation. On one hand, post-cooking contamination is least understood and on the other, hot-holding of food gives the consumer a false sense of freedom from foodborne diseases. In this study, the dynamics of food contamination before or after cooking and during hot-holding are discussed and a food contamination dynamics model is presented.^ The literature on foodborne cholera, cholera-like diarrhea, shigellosis and E. coli gastroenteritis together with the literature on the occurrence and growth of the causative enteropathogens; 01 V. cholerae, non-01 V. cholerae, S. sonnei, S. flexneri and E. coli were reviewed. The literature on the infective doses of these organisms were also cited.^ In the study, four cooked food types held hot at 40-60(DEGREES)C were deliberately contaminated with 01 V. cholerae, non-01 V. cholerae, S. sonnei, S. flexneri and E. coli, one at a time at each of the hot-holding temperatures. Tested food samples for the recovery of these enteropathogens were withdrawn at various time intervals of hot holding.^ The results showed bacterial recovery to decline with increasing temperature and with increasing hot-holding time within each holding temperature. All the bacterial types except V. cholerae were recovered even after holding the food at 60(DEGREES)C for one hour. V. cholerae was not recovered after hot-holding the food at 50-60(DEGREES)C at certain holding periods. After 48 hrs incubation, V. cholerae was recovered on TCBS agar plates that read negative after the initial 24 hrs of incubation. Effective hot-holding temperatures were determined for each of the food types contaminated by each of the bacterial types.^ Statistical analysis of the collected data showed temperature, bacterial type and their interaction to be significant in enteropathogen recovery. Food type and its interactions with temperature and bacterial type were found not significant. ^