Coexistence of GMOs in the EU – A Veritable Choice?

This chapter examines the issue of coexistence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) alongside conventional and organic crops. The central focus is on whether there is a veritable opportunity for coexistence of all three types of crops, which allows for freedom of choice by both farmers and consumers. It commences by considering the nature of the general GM regime, the relationship between the frameworks for cultivation and the use and sale of GM food and feed, and the main elements of the cultivation regime. In light of this, the concept of coexistence is considered, with an evaluation of both the legal and practical elements. Although the general GM regime is controlled at an EU level, coexistence is apparently left to the Member States who may take appropriate coexistence measures. Nonetheless, the Commission has created Recommendations that are to guide the Member States in their choice of measures. To a great extent, what is considered ‘appropriate’ is to be determined by the economic impact upon the farmers and the relationship with the labelling thresholds. The chapter evaluates the future of coexistence, bearing in mind the continued use of the safeguard clauses, the declaration of ‘GM-free’ regions, the potential for national ‘opt-outs’ and the general practical challenges of maintaining coexistence including the ‘domino effect’. Overall, it is arguable that coexistence is a misnomer and that if the term’s meaning is strictly maintained then veritable coexistence that allows for freedom of choice by both farmers and consumers seems unattainable. Although not directly controlled by CAP, there are strong areas of overlap and they share a number of similar objectives; the chapter will conclude by considering whether the approaches in relation to CAP and the cultivation of GMOs are converging or diverging.

Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance of Power in Favour of the Member States?

The question of whether and to what extent sovereignty has been transferred to the European Union (EU) from its Member States remains a central debate within the EU and is interlinked with issues such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, direct effect and primacy. Central to any claim to sovereignty is the principle of primacy, which requires that Member States uphold EU law over national law where there is a conflict. However, limitations to primacy can traditionally be found in national jurisprudence and the Maastricht Treaty introduced a possible EU limitation with the requirement that the EU respect national identities of Member States. The Lisbon Treaty provided only minimal further support to the principle of primacy whilst simultaneously developing the provision on national identities, now found within Article 4(2) TEU. There are indications from the literature, national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU that the provision is gathering strength as a legal tool and is likely to have a wider scope than the text might indicate. In its new role, Article 4(2) TEU bolsters the Member States’ claim to sovereignty and the possibility to uphold aspects crucial to them in conflict with EU law and the principle of primacy. Consequently, it is central to the relationship between the constitutional courts of the Member States and the CJEU, and where the final elements of control remain in ‘hard cases’. However, it does so as part of EU law, thereby facilitating the evasion of direct fundamental conflicts and reflecting the concept of constitutional pluralism.

The legal needs of children and young people in Northern Ireland: the views of young people and adult stakeholders

This research was conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice to explore the following issues: the nature and extent of the legal needs of children and young people; the extent to which these legal needs are being met; barriers to children and young people accessing legal advice, information and representation; potential solutions to these barriers; and potential future mechanisms for meeting identified legal needs of children and young people.

Patient safety and communication: A new assessment for doctors trained in countries where language differs from that of the host country: Results of a pilot using a domain-based assessment

Objective

Global migration of healthcare workers places responsibility on employers to comply with legal employment rights whilst ensuring patient safety remains the central goal. We describe the pilot of a communication assessment designed for doctors who trained and communicated with patients and colleagues in a different language from that of the host country. It is unique in assessing clinical communication without assessing knowledge.

A 14-station OSCE was developed using a domain-based marking scheme, covering professional communication and English language skills (speaking, listening, reading and writing) in routine, acute and emotionally challenging contexts, with patients, carers and healthcare teams. Candidates (n = 43), non-UK trained volunteers applying to the UK Foundation Programme, were provided with relevant station information prior to the exam.

The criteria for passing the test included achieving the pass score and passing 10 or more of the 14 stations. Of the 43 candidates, nine failed on the station criteria. Two failed the pass score and also the station criteria. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient was 0.866.

This pilot tested ‘proof of concept’ of a new domain-based communication assessment for non-UK trained doctors.

The test would enable employers and regulators to verify communication competence and safety in clinical contexts, independent of clinical knowledge, for doctors who trained in a language different from that of the host country.

An international comparison of legal frameworks for supported and substitute decision-making in mental health services

There have been important recent developments in law, research, policy and practice relating to supporting people with decision-making impairments, in particular when a person’s wishes and preferences are unclear or inaccessible. A driver in this respect is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the implications of the CRPD for policy and professional practices are currently debated. This article reviews and compares four legal frameworks for supported and substitute decision-making for people whose decision-making ability is impaired. In particular, it explores how these frameworks may apply to people with mental health problems. The four jurisdictions are: Ontario, Canada; Victoria, Australia; England and Wales, United Kingdom (UK); and Northern Ireland, UK. Comparisons and contrasts are made in the key areas of: the legal framework for supported and substitute decision-making; the criteria for intervention; the assessment process; the safeguards; and issues in practice. Thus Ontario has developed a relatively comprehensive, progressive and influential legal framework over the past thirty years but there remain concerns about the standardisation of decision-making ability assessments and how the laws work together. In Australia, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (2012) has recommended that the six different types of substitute decision-making under the three laws in that jurisdiction, need to be simplified, and integrated into a spectrum that includes supported decision-making. In England and Wales the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has a complex interface with mental health law. In Northern Ireland it is proposed to introduce a new Mental Capacity (Health, Welfare and Finance) Bill that will provide a unified structure for all substitute decision-making. The discussion will consider the key strengths and limitations of the approaches in each jurisdiction and identify possible ways that further progress can be made in law, policy and practice.

The Shifting Battleground of Article 4(2) TEU: Evolving National Identities and the corresponding need for EU management?

Article 4(2) TEU requires that the European Union (EU) respect the Member States’ national identities, creating a legal obligation enforceable before the CJEU and valuable in political negotiations. However, the concept of national identities is unclear, leaving open questions about the scope or parameters of the provision and its applicability. The CJEU appears likely to take a relatively flexible approach in light of Article 4(2) TEU’s relationship with national constitutional courts’ reserves. This flexible approach would enable Member States to rely upon a range of aspects as part of their national identity, including ones that were previously unidentified. This is a crucial feature if one considers that national identities may evolve gradually or even dramatically, including where Member States purposefully attempt to develop their national identities further. This possibility of an evolved national identity is exemplified by the French Charte de l’Environnement. It may thereby be possible for Member States to stretch the scope and application of Article 4(2) TEU through reference to these evolving national identities. This potential raises significant challenges for the EU regarding the management of Article 4(2) TEU, which it will need to address if it wishes to ensure harmonisation and uniformity in the relevant areas.

Reva Siegel and the Role of Religion in Constructing the Meaning of ‘Human Dignity

The “religious understanding” of dignity is a topic of considerable complexity and is the subject of extensive scholarship. In this paper, I consider understandings of dignity that are currently under discussion in Roman Catholic circles, not least because Catholic discussions of dignity are often seen as influential in public policy and legal interpretation, directly and indirectly. I shall focus on one relatively neglected issue in legal scholarship: how scholars go about the task of identifying what a particular religion’s understanding of human dignity involves.
To illustrate the methodological problems that such an enterprise raises, I shall take one attempt by a scholar writing in the field of secular legal scholarship to describe Catholic understandings of dignity in the context of abortion and same-sex marriage. The discussion is that of Reva Siegel, an academic lawyer at Yale University; her recent analysis of differing understandings of dignity illustrates some of the issues that arise when the secular scholarly community addresses religious understandings of dignity.

Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance

Americans have been shown to attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the target). However, past research has yet to assess whether this asymmetry persists in cases of extreme causal deviance. Here, we manipulated the level of mild to extreme causal deviance of an immoral versus amoral act. The asymmetry in attributions of intentionality was observed at all but the
most extreme level of causal deviance, and, as we hypothesized, was mediated by attributions of Blame/credit and judgments of action performance. These findings are discussed as they support a multiple-concepts interpretation of the asymmetry, wherein blame renders a naïve concept of intentional action (the outcome matches the intention) more salient than a composite concept (the outcome matches the intention and was brought about by planned means), and in terms of their implications for cross-cultural research on judgments of agency.

Conceptions of subject analysis: a metatheoretical investigation

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2005.

Tutela processual de direitos humanos fundamentais : inflexões no "due process of law"

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Civis), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2014

A aprendizagem da noção de derivada no 11º ano

Relatório da prática de ensino supervisionada, Mestrado em Ensino da Matemática, Universidade de Lisboa, 2014

In-enviroment of law

A linguistic game of prepositions in order to define the following: (1) What is the Environment? What is 'environment' for environmental law? (2) How does the law react to the complexity of its environment? (3) How to take into account the ecological crisis within a rather narrow, anthropocentric legal frame? (4) How to move away from the hackneyed binarism econcentricity/anthropocentricity and venture a different, de-centred conceptualisation? (5) How can utopia be considered in its potential realisation? The paper is a further investigation of the concept of the paradox in the ecological legal crisis.

Spatial justice: law and the geography of withdrawal

While spatial justice could be the most radical offspring of law’s recent spatial turn, it remains instead a geographically informed version of social justice. The majority of the existing literature on the subject has made some politically facile assumptions about space, justice and law, thereby subsuming the potentially radical into the banal. In this article, I suggest that the concept of spatial justice is the most promising platform on which to redefine, not only the connection between law and geography, but more importantly, the conceptual foundations of both law and space. More concretely, the article attempts two things: first, a radical understanding of legal spatiality. Space is not just another parameter for law, a background against which law takes place, or a process that the law needs to take into consideration. Space is intertwined with normative production in ways that law often fails to acknowledge, and part of this article is a re-articulation of the connection. Second, to suggest a conception of spatial justice that derives from a spatial law. Such a conception cannot rely on given concepts of distributive or social justice. Instead, the concept of spatial justice put forth here is informed by post-structural, feminist, post-ecological and other radical understandings of emplacement and justice, as well as arguably the most spatial of philosophical discourses, that of Deleuze–Guattari and the prescribed possibilities of space as manifold.

Law’s spatial turn: geography, justice and a certain fear of space

This is a critical reading of the current literature on law and geography. The article argues that the literature is characterized by an undertheorization of the concept of space. The focus is either on the specific geography of law in the form of jurisdiction, or as a simple terminological innovation. Instead, the article suggests that law’s spatial turn ought to consider space as a singular parameter to the hitherto legal preoccupation with time, history and waiting. This forces law into dealing with a new, peculiarly spatial kind of uncertainty in terms of simultaneity, disorientation, materiality and exclusionary corporeal emplacement. The main area in which this undertheorization forcefully manifests itself is that of spatial justice. Despite its critical potential, the concept has been reduced by the majority of the relevant literature into another version of social, distributive or regional justice. On the contrary, if the peculiar characteristics of space are to be taken into account, a concept of justice will have to be rethought on a much more fundamental level than that.

On the conservatism of post-Jungian criticism: competing concepts of the symbol in Freud, Jung and Walter Benjamin

The renewed interest in analytical psychology by academics working in the humanities has led to the emergence of a post-Jungian field of cultural criticism, at the theoretical core of which stands Jung's theory of symbolism. This article examines the centrality of symbolism to both Freud and Jung's psychology and explains how the differing concepts of the symbol lead to their divergent theories of interpretation in psychology and art criticism. Acknowledging the advantages of Jung's more expansive account of the symbol, it argues that Walter Benjamin's critical engagement with Jung nonetheless provides a useful correction to the problematic conservatism inherent to his concept of the symbol and its contemporary application.