Non-conventional provisions in regional trade agreements : do they enhance international trade?

The scope of recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) is becoming much wider in terms of including several provisions such as competition policy or intellectual property. This paper empirically examines how far advanced, non-conventional provisions in RTAs increase trade values among RTA member countries, by estimating the gravity equation with more disaggregated indicators for RTAs. As a result, we find that the provision on competition policy has the largest impacts on trade values, following that on government procurement. Our further analysis reveals that the more significant roles of these two provisions can be also observed in the impacts on the intensive and extensive margins.

Trade policies and trade mis-reporting in Myanmar

While the trade statistics of Myanmar show surpluses for 2007 through 2010, the corresponding statistics of trade partner countries indicate deficits. Such discrepancies in mirror trade statistics are analyzed in connection with the ‘export-first and import-second’ policy provisioning import permissions on permission applicants possessing a sufficient amount of the export-tax-deducted export earnings. Under this policy, the recorded imports and exports of the private sector have been maintaining equilibrium, whereas discrepancies in the mirror statistics have fluctuated. This suggests that traders adjusted mis-reporting in accordance with the supply and demand of the export earnings.

Parameterization of applied general equilibrium models with flexible trade specifications based on the Armington, Krugman, and Melitz models

This paper explains how the Armington-Krugman-Melitz supermodel developed by Dixon and Rimmer can be parameterized, and demonstrates that only two kinds of additional information are required in order to extend a standard trade model to include Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. Further, it is shown how specifying too much additional information leads to violations of the model constraints, necessitating adjustment and reconciliation of the data. Once a Melitz-type model is parameterized, a Krugman-type model can also be parameterized using the calibrated values in the Melitz-type model without any additional data. Sample code for the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) has also been prepared to promote the innovative supermodel in the AGE community.

Simulation analysis of the EU ELV/RoHS directives based on an applied general equilibrium model with Melitz-type trade specification

This paper explores the potential usefulness of an AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic effects of technical regulations, taking the case of the EU ELV/RoHS directives as an example. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings results that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries expand while the domestic trade in the EU shrinks when the importer's preference for variety (PfV) is not strong; (2) if the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring reduction in the number of firms enable survived producers with high productivity to expand production to be large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of scale; and (3) When the strength of the importer's PfV is changed from zero to unity, there is the value that totally changes simulation results and their interpretations.

Approaches Regarding the Competition in Romanian Sugar Market

This paper proposes an economic instrument designed to assess the competitive nature of the sugar industry in Romania. In the first part of the paper is presented the theoretical background underlying index (HHI) and its calculation methodology. Then comes the results of a first application of this index for a total of 10 plants in the sugar industry, the robustness of these results is discussed. We believe HHI is a proactive tool that may prove useful competition authority, in its pursuit of continuous monitoring of various industries in the economy and in the internal decision-making on resource allocation institution (Peacock, and Prisecaru, 2013).The starting point of our research is to free competition in the European market with competitors much stronger than Romanian plants, plants that produce at a price lower than the domestic ones. In our study we will see if it is a concentration of production in factories around the strongest in Romania, concentration accompanied by the collapse of those who could not resist the market.The market concentration, competition policy, we will follow using the HHI index, for evaluation of impact analysis on existing trade, the number and size of competitors, protecting existing sales structures, avoiding disruptions in the competitive environment, etc.

A model of self-thinning through local competition.

Explanations of self-thinning in plant populations have focused on plant shape and packing. A dynamic model based on the structure of local interactions successfully reproduces the pattern and can be approximated to identify key parameters and relationships. The approach generates testable new explanations for differences between species and populations, unifies self-thinning with other patterns in plant population dynamics, and indicates why organisms other than plants can follow the law.

O uso de medidas antidumping como mecanismo de barreira à entrada no mercado brasileiro

As medidas antidumping são uma exceção ao livre comércio e como tal deveriam ser usadas com restrição. No entanto, desde o GATT 1947 há preocupação com o uso abusivo de tais medidas, podendo ser o mecanismo utilizado não apenas para possibilitar a recuperação da indústria doméstica prejudicada pelas importações objeto de dumping, objetivo do Acordo Antidumping (AAD), mas com o fim de proteger a indústria nacional da concorrência estrangeira. Desta forma, o objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar as principais características do AAD firmado ao final da Rodada Uruguai que culminou na constituição da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), incluindo seus antecedentes históricos e a possibilidade de aplicação discricionária, demonstrando como uma norma surgida no plano internacional em decorrência de um acordo multilateral vem sendo utilizada pelo Brasil, com a finalidade de se demonstrar a possibilidade de uso das medidas antidumping como barreira à entrada no mercado brasileiro. Confirmada a possibilidade de uso abusivo desse instrumento de defesa comercial, ainda que no plano teórico, uma vez que não é possível analisar os efeitos reais das medidas aplicadas, serão apresentadas as formas de contrabalanço ao protecionismo atualmente existentes no próprio AAD e sua incorporação e utilização pelo Brasil bem como a possibilidade de questionamento de tais medidas como práticas anticompetitivas com fundamento na legislação antitruste perante as autoridades de defesa da concorrência. Serão ainda analisadas outras possibilidades de contrabalanço ao uso exacerbado das medidas antidumping em debate e viabilidade das mesmas no cenário atual em que se verifica, de um lado, o aumento de uso de tais medidas pelos países Membros da OMC, destacando-se o Brasil e, de outro lado, impasse nas negociações multilaterais, cabendo aos Membros tomarem decisões unilaterais sobre a aplicação de tais medidas, seu grau de intensidade e forma de aplicação a depender da proteção que se pretende garantir à indústria nacional.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

Analysis of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Its Effects on Giant Panda Conservation

The giant panda, Ailuropoda melanoleuca is an endangered species that is protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Numerous factors have led to a decline in giant panda populations in China including habitat loss from human activity, poaching, panda inbreeding and a low reproductive rate. This capstone analyzes the effects of CITES and ESA as policies for the protection of panda populations and their habitat. CITES and ESA provide some protection for panda populations in the United States. However, these policies do not address panda habitat protection in China.

The assignment of credit through bills of exchange and transmission documents in Andalusi Law

The exchange traffic was a practice that suited the modus vivendi of caravanners and traders in the Islamic world. The inclusion of the Iberian.Peninsula into the most important commercial routes of Muslims – such as the silk route through the North Africa – provides a very solid reason to deepen in the study of the sources that have been preserved about the role that certain credit instruments, which represented an alternative to the coin, might have played in trade centres.

Translations of the Ottoman constitutional laws: the Wilayet Administrative Law, the Municipal Law and various other laws

Ottoman constitutional law of the 7th Dhil Hujjah, 1293 AH [December 24, 1876 AD] as amended. -- Regulations of the Chamber of deputies. -- Regulations of the Senate. -- Provisional law of administration of wilayets of the 13th March, 1329 AH [March 26, 1913 AD] as amended. -- Municipal law of the 27th Ramadhan, 1294 AH [October 5, 1877 AD] as amended. -- Law regulating chambers of commerce and industry, dated the 31st May, 1326 AH [June 13, 1910 AD]. -- Provisional law of expropriation on behalf of municipalities dated the 21st Kanun Thani, 1329 AH [February 3, 1914 AD]. -- Regulations of expropriation for public purposes, dated the 24th Tashrin Thani, 1295 AH [December 6, 1879 AD] as amended. -- The Press law of the 16th Tamuz, 1325 AH [July 29, 1910 AD] as amended.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

Der Prozess der europäischen Integration in Belgien Voraussetzung und Rahmen der Föderalisiserung eines ehemaligen = Process of European integration in Belgium; Condition and framework of a former [Föderalisiserung]. Research Papers in Law, 2/2003

No abstract.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.