Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden's security policy. OSW Commentary No. 126, 28.01.2014

Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.

Between energy security and energy market integration. Guidelines for the future development of the EU’s external energy policy in Europe’s neighbourhood. OSW Report, June 2011

For many years the European Union has been improving the efficient use of energy resources and yet the demand for energy in the EU continues to increase. When Europe belonged to one of the world’s key energy markets with relatively easy access to energy resources, growing energy needs were not seen as a source of concern. Today, however, as the competition for energy resources is intensifying and the global position of the EU energy market is being challenged by growing economies in the developing countries, above all China and India, the EU needs to adopt bold policies to guarantee the sustainable supply of energy. This report argues the EU needs to develop a fully-fledged external energy policy; i.e. a common, coherent, strategic approach that build bridges between the interests and needs of the EU integrated energy market on the one hand and supplier countries on the other. The EU’s external energy policy has two main objectives. The first one is to ensure a sustainable, stable and cost-effective energy supply. The second is to promote energy market integration and regulatory convergence with neighbouring countries (often but not always this supports the achievement of the first objective). However, in order to improve its effectiveness, the EU’s external energy policy needs to be seen in a broader economic and political context. Any progress in energy cooperation with third countries is contingent upon the EU’s general stance and offer to those countries.

Reforms in Moldova: Moderate progress and an uncertain outlook for the future. OSW Commentary No. 100, 2013-01-22

After coming to power in September 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE)1 coalition began implementing a wide-ranging programme of reforms, with a view to bringing Moldova closer to the European Union, and ultimately to ensure the country’s full membership of the EU. Today, Moldova is considered a clear leader in European integration among the members of the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme. This, however, has less to do with the concrete reforms introduced by the Moldovan government, and more to do with, on the one hand, Chișinău’s excellent public relations with Brussels, achieved through effective diplomacy; and on the other hand, the growing disillusionment with the lack of progress in other Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine. Attempts to evaluate Moldova’s reforms have proven rather problematic. On the one hand, the ruling coalition has managed to make significant progress in the areas of civil liberties, human rights and electoral reform. The government has also successfully implemented regulations which have brought Moldova closer to signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU, and it has made headway in talks on visa liberalisation with Brussels. On the other hand, Chișinău has still not carried out the structural and economic reforms without which real change in the country will be impossible. No reforms have been introduced in the Ministry of the Interior, the Moldovan police force, or the judiciary. The AIE has also failed to decentralise governance and has had no real success in reducing corruption; its attempts to rebuild the country’s financial institutions have proved equally unsuccessful. The main reasons for this poor performance include mutual mistrust and conflicting interests among the coalition members, a shortage of financial resources, strong resistance to change by public administration staff, and significant pressure from those political and business groups whose interests could suffer as a result of the proposed reforms. It should also be noted that since the AIE took power, the international context of the reform efforts has undergone significant changes. On the one hand, the EU has been facing an economic crisis, which has had a negative impact on Moldovan exports and contributed to the worsening of the economic situation in the country; and on the other hand, Moldova has been offered membership of the Customs Union as a viable alternative to EU membership.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

An inexhaustible source of income? The significance of Belarusian refineries and the outlook for the future. OSW Commentary No. 81, 2012-06-20

Belarus generated a surplus at US$1.9 billion in foreign trade in goods and services in the first four months of 2012 as compared to a deficit of US$2.8 billion for the same timeframe a year earlier. Minsk owes this, its highest positive trade balance since 1991, mainly to a significant increase in exports of petroleum products manufactured by the refineries in Navapolatsk and Mazyr. This is a consequence of the favourable contract for supplies of Russian oil until 2015 which Belarus signed in December last year. This contract has resulted in a de facto resumption of Russia subsidising Belarus. The favourable conditions of Russian oil supplies will allow the Belarusian refineries to remain the driving force of the country’s economy, and the Belarusian government will not allow them to be privatised, which Russia has been seeking for years. The two refineries initiated an ambitious modernisation programme, which is aimed at increasing their output and improving the quality of their production. Owing to this, their share in the market of petroleum products in the region, including on the Polish market, may grow within the next few years.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

The menace of a 'brown' Russia: Ethnically motivated xenophobia - symptoms, causes and prospects for the future. OSW Study 29/2008

This paper focuses on the ethnic dimension of xenophobia, as understood as aversion, fear or hostility vis-a-vis members of other nationalities, as well as the related radical nationalist ideas founded on the concept of the dominant (and often discriminatory) role of the Russians in the Russian Federation, with reference to racism or neo-Nazism. This text primarily presents xenophobia as an enormous social problem in today's Russia, which is not being addressed at the moment, but is instead being exploited by both the authorities and radical nationalist groups. This paper attempts to describe and understand the causes of xenophobia and the reasons for the popularity of extremely nationalist views among ethnic Russians. It also seeks to estimate the scale of the problem and the potential threat it may create in the future. The first part describes the different manifestations of xenophobia in present-day Russia. It identifies the groups most exposed to ethnically motivated violence and persecution, as well as the most xenophobic communities, and discusses the scale of the problem and its specific characteristics in the context of Russian reality. The second part looks into the underlying causes of xenophobic sentiments among Russians, while the last chapters delve into the authorities' attitude towards the problem and seek to answer the question of whether radical nationalist ideas may in future come to dominate Russia's political scene.

A "Triple-I" Strategy for the Future of Europe. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 10/2005

The paper lays down a strategy consisting of Innovation, Internalisation of Externalities, and Integration – called Triple I. ‘Innovation’ is seen along value chain management in a systems perspective, driven by competition and participation of stakeholders. ‘Internalisation’ refers to endogenous efforts by industry to assess externalities and to foster knowledge generation that leads to benefits for both business and society. ‘Integration’ highlights the role business and its various forms of cooperation might play in policy integration within Europe and beyond. Looking forward towards measures to be taken, the paper explores some frontiers for a partnership between public and private sector: i) Increasing resource productivity, lowering material cost, ii) Energy integration with Southeast Europe and Northern Africa, iii) Urban mobility services and public transport, iv) Tradable emission permits beyond Europe. Finally, some conclusions from the perspective of the College of Europe are drawn.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.