Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Baysian Model Averaging, Learning and Model Selection

Agents have two forecasting models, one consistent with the unique rational expectations equilibrium, another that assumes a time-varying parameter structure. When agents use Bayesian updating to choose between models in a self-referential system, we find that learning dynamics lead to selection of one of the two models. However, there are parameter regions for which the non-rational forecasting model is selected in the long-run. A key structural parameter governing outcomes measures the degree of expectations feedback in Muth's model of price determination.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the rm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Extending contingency: the impact of strategy, technology, size and business environment on the organisational form of small Chinese firms

This paper is inspired by articles in the last decade or so that have argued for more attention to theory, and to empirical analysis, within the well-known, and long-lasting, contingency framework for explaining the organisational form of the firm. Its contribution is to extend contingency analysis in three ways: (a) by empirically testing it, using explicit econometric modelling (rather than case study evidence) involving estimation by ordered probit analysis; (b) by extending its scope from large firms to SMEs; (c) by extending its applications from Western economic contexts, to an emerging economy context, using field work evidence from China. It calibrates organizational form in a new way, as an ordinal dependent variable, and also utilises new measures of familiar contingency factors from the literature (i.e. Environment, Strategy, Size and Technology) as the independent variables. An ordered probit model of contingency was constructed, and estimated by maximum likelihood, using a cross section of 83 private Chinese firms. The probit was found to be a good fit to the data, and displayed significant coefficients with plausible interpretations for key variables under all the four categories of contingency analysis, namely Environment, Strategy, Size and Technology. Thus we have generalised the contingency model, in terms of specification, interpretation and applications area.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].

Partner Selection into Policy Relevant Field Experiments

This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the implications of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of interest and (2) does selection matter for the estimates of treatment eff ects. The experimental work consists in testing the e ffects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools through local authorities and randomised schools across two incentive treatments and a control group. We document the selection taking place both at the level of local authorities and at the school level. Overall we nd mild evidence of selection on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We find evidence of selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the school level, but the magnitude is small. Moreover, We do not find signifi cant di erences in the treatment e ffects of the experiment between variables which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated with selection into the experiment. To our knowledge, this is the rst study providing direct evidence on the magnitude of self-selection in fi eld experiments.

Peroxisomal polyhydroxyalkanoate biosynthesis is a promising strategy for bioplastic production in high biomass crops.

Polyhydroxyalkanoates (PHAs) are bacterial carbon storage polymers with diverse plastic-like properties. PHA biosynthesis in transgenic plants is being developed as a way to reduce the cost and increase the sustainability of industrial PHA production. The homopolymer polyhydroxybutyrate (PHB) is the simplest form of these biodegradable polyesters. Plant peroxisomes contain the substrate molecules and necessary reducing power for PHB biosynthesis, but peroxisomal PHB production has not been explored in whole soil-grown transgenic plants to date. We generated transgenic sugarcane (Saccharum sp.) with the three-enzyme Ralstonia eutropha PHA biosynthetic pathway targeted to peroxisomes. We also introduced the pathway into Arabidopsis thaliana, as a model system for studying and manipulating peroxisomal PHB production. PHB, at levels up to 1.6%-1.8% dry weight, accumulated in sugarcane leaves and A. thaliana seedlings, respectively. In sugarcane, PHB accumulated throughout most leaf cell types in both peroxisomes and vacuoles. A small percentage of total polymer was also identified as the copolymer poly (3-hydroxybutyrate-co-3-hydroxyvalerate) in both plant species. No obvious deleterious effect was observed on plant growth because of peroxisomal PHA biosynthesis at these levels. This study highlights how using peroxisomal metabolism for PHA biosynthesis could significantly contribute to reaching commercial production levels of PHAs in crop plants.

Measuring intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain: a selection-bias-free approach

This paper analyses intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain correcting for different selection biases. We address the co-residence selection problem by combining information from two samples and using the two-sample two-stage least square estimator. We find a small decrease in elasticity when we move to younger cohorts. Furthermore, we find a higher correlation in the case of daughters than in the case of sons; however, when we consider the employment selection in the case of daughters, by adopting a Heckman-type correction method, the diference between sons and daughters disappears. By decomposing the sources of earnings elasticity across generations, we find that the correlation between child's and father's occupation is the most important component. Finally, quantile regressions estimates show that the influence of the father's earnings is greater when we move to the lower tail of the offspring's earnings distribution, especially in the case of daughters' earnings.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Prior selection for panel vector autoregressions

There is a vast literature that specifies Bayesian shrinkage priors for vector autoregressions (VARs) of possibly large dimensions. In this paper I argue that many of these priors are not appropriate for multi-country settings, which motivates me to develop priors for panel VARs (PVARs). The parametric and semi-parametric priors I suggest not only perform valuable shrinkage in large dimensions, but also allow for soft clustering of variables or countries which are homogeneous. I discuss the implications of these new priors for modelling interdependencies and heterogeneities among different countries in a panel VAR setting. Monte Carlo evidence and an empirical forecasting exercise show clear and important gains of the new priors compared to existing popular priors for VARs and PVARs.

Selection bias and unobservable heterogeneity applied at the wage equation of European married women

This paper utilizes a panel data sample selection model to correct the selection in the analysis of longitudinal labor market data for married women in European countries. We estimate the female wage equation in a framework of unbalanced panel data models with sample selection. The wage equations of females have several potential sources of.