Measuring conduct and cost parameters in the Spanish air transport market

This paper estimates a model of airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also find evidence that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies

Testing the bivariate distribution of daily equity returns using copulas: an application to the Spanish stock market

In this paper we deal with the identification of dependencies between time series of equity returns. Marginal distribution functions are assumed to be known, and a bivariate chi-square test of fit is applied in a fully parametric copula approach. Several families of copulas are fitted and compared with Spanish stock market data. The results show that the t-copula generally outperforms other dependence structures, and highlight the difficulty in adjusting a significant number of bivariate data series

Chicago to Iowa City Passenger Rail Service, January 12, 2011

Iowa’s investment in the Chicago to Iowa City passenger rail service will produce more ongoing benefits than costs for Iowa residents and taxpayers over the next 30 years. An Iowa investment of $20.6 million will match a federal investment of $86.8 million for the capital costs of the Iowa segment of the Chicago to Iowa City service. Iowa’s share of the expected gap between revenues and operating and maintenance expense is estimated at $3 million annually. The economic analysis included in this document demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of the Iowa investments in the Chicago to Iowa City service and details the benefits that Iowa can expect from Iowa’s expenditures.

2009 Iowa’s Rail System Background Prepared by the Office of Systems Planning December 2010

Iowa’s Rail Environment Iowa’s rail transportation system provides both freight and passenger service. Rail serves a variety of trips, including those within Iowa and those to other states as well as to foreign markets. While rail competes with other modes, it also cooperates with those modes to provide intermodal services to Iowans. In 2009 Iowa’s rail transportation system could be described as follows: Freight Iowa’s 130,000-mile freight transportation system includes an extensive railroad network, a well-developed highway system, two bordering navigable waterways, and a pipeline network as well as air cargo facilities. While rail accounts for only 3 percent of the freight network, it carries 43 percent of Iowa’s freight tonnage. A great variety of commodities ranging from fresh fish to textiles to optical products are moved by rail. However, most of the Iowa rail shipments consist of bulk commodities, including grain, grain products, coal, ethanol, and fertilizers. The railroad network performs an important role in moving bulk commodities produced and consumed in the state to local processors, livestock feeders, river terminals and ports for foreign export. The railroad’s ability to haul large volumes, long distances at low costs will continue to be a major factor in moving freight and improving the economy of Iowa. Key 2008 Facts • 3,945 miles of track • 18 railroads • 49.5 million tons shipped • 39.7 million tons received • 2 Amtrak routes • 6 Amtrak stations • 66,286 rail passenger rides Key Rail Trends • slightly fewer miles being operated; • railroads serving Iowa has remained the same; • more rail freight traffic; • more tons hauled per car; • higher average rail rates per ton-mile since 2002; • more car and tons hauled per locomotive; and • more ton miles per gallon of fuel consumed. Iowa’s rail system and service has been evolving over time relative to its size, financial conditions, and competition from other modes.

Status Report Midwest Regional Rail Passenger Initiative and Passenger Rail Service in Iowa, February 1, 2012

This report fulfills the requirements of the following Code of Iowa Sections: Section 327J.3(1): “The director may expend moneys from the fund to pay the costs associated with the initiation, operation, and maintenance of rail passenger service. The director shall report by February 1 of each year to the legislative services agency concerning the status of the fund including anticipated expenditures for the following fiscal year.” Section 327J.3(5): "The director shall report annually to the general assembly concerning the development and operation of the midwest regional rail system and the state's passenger rail service."

Testing for granger-causality in the Finnish roundwood market

Summary

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Employment risk, unemployment insurance and search strategies: a disaggregated equilibrium approach with application to the Swiss labour market in the 1990-ies

The Organization of the Thesis The remainder of the thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. The next chapter formalizes the envisioned theory into a tractable model. Section 2.2 presents a formal description of the model economy: the individual heterogeneity, the individual objective, the UI setting, the population dynamics and the equilibrium. The welfare and efficiency criteria for qualifying various equilibrium outcomes are proposed in section 2.3. The fourth section shows how the model-generated information can be computed. Chapter 3 transposes the model from chapter 2 in conditions that enable its use in the analysis of individual labor market strategies and their implications for the labor market equilibrium. In section 3.2 the Swiss labor market data sets, stylized facts, and the UI system are presented. The third section outlines and motivates the parameterization method. In section 3.4 the model's replication ability is evaluated and some aspects of the parameter choice are discussed. Numerical solution issues can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of search-strategic behavior in the model economy and its implications for the labor market aggregates. In section 4.2, the unemployment duration distribution is examined and related to search strategies. Section 4.3 shows how the search- strategic behavior is influenced by the UI eligibility and section 4.4 how it is determined by individual heterogeneity. The composition effects generated by search strategies in labor market aggregates are examined in section 4.5. The last section evaluates the model's replication of empirical unemployment escape frequencies reported in Sheldon [67]. Chapter 5 applies the model economy to examine the effects on the labor market equilibrium of shocks to the labor market risk structure, to the deep underlying labor market structure and to the UI setting. Section 5.2 examines the effects of the labor market risk structure on the labor market equilibrium and the labor market strategic behavior. The effects of alterations in the labor market deep economic structural parameters, i.e. individual preferences and production technology, are shown in Section 5.3. Finally, the UI setting impacts on the labor market are studied in Section 5.4. This section also evaluates the role of the UI authority monitoring and the differences in the Way changes in the replacement rate and the UI benefit duration affect the labor market. In chapter 6 the model economy is applied in counterfactual experiments to assess several aspects of the Swiss labor market movements in the nineties. Section 6.2 examines the two equilibria characterizing the Swiss labor market in the nineties, the " growth" equilibrium with a "moderate" UI regime and the "recession" equilibrium with a more "generous" UI. Section 6.3 evaluates the isolated effects of the structural shocks, while the isolated effects of the UI reforms are analyzed in section 6.4. Particular dimensions of the UI reforms, the duration, replacement rate and the tax rate effects, are studied in section 6.5, while labor market equilibria without benefits are evaluated in section 6.6. In section 6.7 the structural and institutional interactions that may act as unemployment amplifiers are discussed in view of the obtained results. A welfare analysis based on individual welfare in different structural and UI settings is presented in the eighth section. Finally, the results are related to more favorable unemployment trends after 1997. The conclusion evaluates the features embodied in the model economy with respect to the resulting model dynamics to derive lessons from the model design." The thesis ends by proposing guidelines for future improvements of the model and directions for further research.