Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We showthat under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sectorwith established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a highproduct quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situationwith a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their qualityonly with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature ofthe technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem thatconsumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find thatco-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal itsproduct quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs andconsumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economicsof superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.

A theory of reference-dependent behavior

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.

Externalities and interdependent growth: Theory and evidence

I formulate and estimate a model of externalities within countriesand technological interdependence across countries. I find that externalreturns to scale to physical capital within countries are 8 percent; thata 10 percent increase of total factor productivity of a country's neighborsraises its total factor productivity by 6 percent; and that a 2 percentannual growth rate of labor productivity can be explained as an endogenousresponse to an exogenous 0.2 percent annual growth rate of total factorproductivity in the steady--state.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

A search theory of money and commerce with Neoclassical production

This paper advances a highly tractable model with search theoretic foundations for money and neoclassical growth. In the model, manufacturingand commerce are distinct and separate activities. In manufacturing,goods are efficiently produced combining capital and labor. In commerce,goods are exchanged in bilateral meetings. The model is applied to studythe effects of inßation on capital accumulation and welfare. With realisticparameters, inflation has large negative effects on welfare even though itraises capital and output. In contrast, with cash-in-advance, a deviceinformally motivated with bilateral trading, inflation depresses capitaland output and has a negligible effect on welfare.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

Assédio Moral e Sexual nas Relações de trabalho: Os factores que potenciam o assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho e as atitudes das pessoas perante tal fenómeno. Caso Enapor

Esta pesquisa monográfica, ora apresentada, visa analisar e compreender os factores que os funcionários da ENAPOR percepcionam como estando na origem do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, bem como as atitudes dos mesmos perante o fenómeno. Os aspectos apresentados derivam de interpretações feitas durante a investigação sobre a temática em estudo, assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, tendo como bases as autoras BARRETO (2000) e FREITAS (2001). Estas são as autoras nas quais pretendemos centralizar, mas, outras abordagens teóricas darão suporte a esta nossa investigação. Pretendemos estudar o tema com base na análise documental, Pesquisas na Internet e aplicação das entrevistas aos directores e outros funcionários de outro escalão. A escolha destas duas autoras como suportes teóricos para esta pesquisa tem a ver, sobretudo, com o facto de elas estarem intrinsecamente relacionadas com os objectivos que norteiam a nossa investigação. Utilizaremos também como suporte teórico as contribuições de outros autores em relação à problemática do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalhos. As mesmas razões apresentadas nos parágrafos anteriores em relação às outras contribuições teóricas dos outros autores também se aplicam de forma específica a este autor. Para uma análise aprofundada desta pesquisa, recorreu-se ao método qualitativa para a análise de resultados, utilizando como instrumentos de recolha dos dados a entrevistas. Esta pesquisa monográfica está estruturada em cinco capítulos: no primeiro capítulo, uma reflexão sobre a definição do objecto de estudo e da metodologia; no segundo, assédio moral e sexual; no terceiro, temos as estratégias, motivos que encoraja a pratica do assédio, as atitudes e as politica de prevenção. No quarto, capítulo procede-se à apresentação, análise e interpretação dos resultados obtidos, por último, as principais conclusões a que se chegou nesta pesquisa e as considerações finais do mesmo.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

Indentifying human capital externalities: Theory with an application to US cities

The identification of aggregate human capital externalities is still not fully understood. The existing (Mincerian) approach confounds positive externalities with wage changes due to a downward sloping demand curve for human capital. As a result, it yields positive externalities even when wages equal marginal social products. We propose an approach that identifies human capital externalities whether or not aggregate demand for human capital slopes downward. Another advantage of our approach is that it does not require estimates of the individual return to human capital. Applications to US cities and states between 1970 and 1990 yield no evidence of significant average -schooling externalities.