Deformaciones del federalismo fiscal argentino y corrupción política

Al recordar que por federalismo se entiende la forma de Estado donde coexiste un poder central con poderes regionales es natural que exista en potencia un conflicto entre ambos tipos o polos de poder, aun en el caso que se hayan definido con precisión las funciones que corresponde a uno. El conflicto puede y suele volverse activo por una inequitativa distribución de los recursos públicos entre ambos niveles en relación a los bienes o servicios públicos prestados por cada uno. Pero esta no es la única mirada que debería tenerse en cuenta para medir el mal desempeño de un sistema federal de gobierno. Aquí nos hemos de ocupar más específicamente de dos distorsiones que tienen lugar dentro del federalismo fiscal argentino y que no son incompatibles. Una es la asimetría en la redistribución geográfica de los ingresos públicos. La otra deformación fiscal del federalismo proviene de la existencia de un sistema de previsión social muy interdependiente de la fiscalidad. Nuestra tesis es que la persistencia de estas distorsiones obedece a la existencia de corrupciones políticas. Por ello nos planteamos las siguientes hipótesis: 1.- La distorsión en el sistema federal argentino responde en parte a a) Una asimetría en la redistribución geográfica de los ingresos públicos recaudados centralmente, cuya desproporción es alta, injustificada y permanente y b) la interdependencia de los recursos gubernamentales destinados al gasto común con el sistema de recursos del sistema de la seguridad social. 2.- Ambas distorsiones son causadas por corrupciones políticas y no coadyuvan a cerrar la brecha en la distribución personal del ingreso en las regiones pobres y favorecidas ni a mejorar los haberes jubilatorios nacionales Estas hipótesis han sido planeadas en pos de alcanzar los objetivos generales de: analizar la deformación del federalismo argentino producida por distorsiones en la redistribución del ingreso público nacional e indagar sobre su relación con corrupciones políticas. Y, específicamente: a.- Determinar con información cuantitativa propia, la magnitud de la asimetría en la redistribución geográfica de la recaudación nacional, período 2000 – 2011; b.- describir la perturbación que ocasiona la interdependencia de los recursos gubernamentales con el sistema de previsión social, desde la década de 1940 a la actualidad y c.- ofrecer un modelo de corrupción política que ayude a comprender las distorsiones anteriores en el federalismo argentino. Esta es una investigación con diseño no experimental que, en términos de los objetivos específicos recién dados, ha de conjugar: La construcción de una serie histórica, para cada año del período 2000 – 2011, de la distribución regional de los flujos fiscales netos que opera el gobierno nacional cuyos detalles metodológicos han sido explicitados en trabajos previos del mismo equipo [Ej.: Ruarte Bazán, R. et al, (2009) Hacia una interpretación del federalismo argentino actual. Edición en CD. 42ª Jornadas Internacionales de Finanzas Públicas. FCE UNC. Córdoba. 16 p], con la recopilación de normas jurídicas y/o información relacionada, referidas a las transferencias monetarias del Sistema de Seguridad Social al Tesoro Nacional y viceversa y la indagación sobre modelos teóricos y datos existentes acerca de corrupción política y federalismo y su adecuación al caso argentino. Como se espera verificar nuestra tesis general y las hipótesis de trabajo mencionadas, el impacto puede ser muy importante ya que introduce y suma la dimensión geográfica o regional como determinante de la corrupción política y consecuentemente proporcionaría una plataforma de ataque a este vicio burocrático, siempre que exista la suficiente decisión política de los gobiernos y residentes perjudicados por su existencia. l

Sôbre uma propriedade da equação utilizada para interpolação da Lei de Mitscherlich

The author proves that equation, Σy n ΣZx | ΣxyZx ΣxZx ΣxZ2x | = 0, Σy ΣZx Σy2x | where Z = 10-cq and q is a numerical constant, used by Pimentel Gomes and Malavolta in several articles for the interpolation of Mitscherlih's equation y = A [ 1 - 10 - c (x + b) ] by the least squares method, always has a zero of order three for Z = 1. Therefore, equation A Zm + A1Zm -1 + ........... + Am = 0 obtained from that determinant can be divided by (Z-1)³. This property provides a good test for the correctness of the computations and facilitates the solution of the equation.

Pesquisas sôbre a análise estatística de experiências de adubação com o auxílio da lei de Mitscherlich

Statistical analyses of an experiment on wheat were carried out with the aid of Mitscherlich's law. The experiment was made in Ponta Grossa, Paraná, by the Ministry of Agriculture of Brasil. Lime, in the form of Ca(OH)2, was applied at the levels of 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 metric tons per hectare. A 5 x 5 Latin square was used. Lime was applied in 1940 and wheat was cultivated in the same plots for several years. The following fertilizers were annually used for all plots: NaNO3 100 kilograms per hectare, Superphosphate 350 kilograms per hectare, K2S04 80 kilograms per hectare. The statistical analysis of the data collected in 1941, 1942, 1943, 1947 and 1948, carried out in accordance with the methods previously introduced by Pimentel Gomes and Malavolta (1949 a, 1949 b) and Pimentel Gomes (1950), proved: I. That Mitscherlich's law could be correctly applied to the data. II. That there was a statistically significant effect of lime on wheat yield. III. That the optimum amount of lime to be applied to the soil lies between 5 and 15 hundred kilograms of Ca(OH)2 per hectare. IV. That there is a migration of calcium from some plots to others, in such a way that the data obtained in 1947 and 1948 are not representative of the amounts of lime applied in 1940. V. That the analysis of variance can be used, as the Bartlett test shows that the variances at the distinct levele of lime application are not statistically different. It must be noted that, with improved variety and fertilization, the yield was rised to about 2500 kilograms per hectare in 1947, and 1600 in 1948, being only of about 100 kilograms per hectare in 1940.

A estimação do efeito residual de fertilizantes por meio da Lei de Mitscherlich

This paper deals with the estimation of the residual effect of fertilizers through the use of Mitscherlich's law. The formulas and reasonings now presented are a further development of those introduced previously by PIMENTEL GOMES (2). The new formulas allow the estimation of the residual effect h in cases where the experiments are carried out in the same plots for two or three subsequent years (or crops). In an experiment analysed as an example, the residual effect of calcium hydroxide was estimated to be h = 0.423, that is, about 42%, so that one should advise the use of frequent application of small amounts of lime instead of heavy quantities used at long intervals.

A lei de Mitscherlich aplicada a experimentos de adubação com vinhaça

The author studies, with the aid of Mitscherlich's law, two experiments of sugar cane fertilization with vinasse. The first one, carried out in Piracicaba, State of S. Paulo, by ARRUDA, gave the following yields. No vinasse 47.0 tons/ha. 76.0 tons/ha. 250 c.m./ha. of vinasse 75.0 do. 112.0 do. 500 do. 90.0 do. 112.0 do. 1000 do. 98.0 do. 107.0 do. Data without NPK were appropriate for the fitting of the law, the equation of which was found to be: y = 100.8 [1 - 10 -0.00132 (x + 206) ], where y is measured in metric tons/hectare, and x in cubic meters/hectare. The optimum amount of vinasse to be used is given by the formula x* = 117.2 + 1 log w u , ______ ____ 0.00132 250 t being u the response to the standard dressing of 250 cubic meters/hectare of vinasse, w the price per ton of sugar cane, and t the price per cubic meter for the transportation of vinasse. In Pernambuco, a 3(4) NPK vinasse experiment gave the following mean yields: No vinasse 41.0 tons/hectare 250 cm./ha. of vinasse 108.3 do. 500 do. 134.3 do. The equation obtained was now y = 150.7 [1 - 10 -000165 (x + 84)], being the most profitable level of vinasse x* = 115.2 + 1 log w u , _______ ____ 0.00165 250 t One should notice the close agreement of the coefficients c (0.00132 in S. Paulo and 0.00165 in Pernambuco). Given the prices of Cr$ 20.00 per cubic meter for the transportation of vinasse (in trucks) and Cr$ 250.00 per ton of sugar cane (uncut, in the fields) the most profitable dressings are: 236 c.m./ha. of vinasse in S. Paulo, and 434 c.m./ha. in Pernambuco.

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

Unemployment, growth and fiscal policy: new insights on the hysteresis hypothesis

We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a complementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection between these diferent equilibrium paths. We use this model to argue that, in contrast to the US, those fiscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the shocks of the 1970’s may have played a central role in generating hysteresis.

Would Fiscal Authorities in the EMU prefer to coordinate?

This article studies whether fiscal authorities would prefer to operate like in the current EMU or to coordinate according to the theoretical literature. The EMU approach will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits, but the SGP deficit target will be breached less often. Keywords: fiscal policy coordination, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0