Speaking with different voices: the problems with English law and psychiatric injury

Private law courts in the UK have maintained the de minimis threshold as a condition precedent for a successful claim for the infliction of mental harm. This de minimis threshold necessitates the presence of a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ as opposed to ‘mere emotion’. This standard has also been adopted by the criminal law courts when reading the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to include non-physical injury. In determining the cut-off point between psychiatric injury and mere emotion, the courts have adopted a generally passive acceptance of expert testimony and the guidelines used by mental health professionals to make diagnoses. Yet these guidelines were developed for use in a clinical setting, not a legal one. This article examines the difficulty inherent in utilising the ‘dimensional’ diagnostic criteria used by mental health professionals to answer ‘categorical’ legal questions. This is of particular concern following publication of the new diagnostic manual, DSM-V in 2013, which will further exacerbate concerns about compatibility. It is argued that a new set of diagnostic guidelines, tailored specifically for use in a legal context, is now a necessity.

Paternalism and Competent Patient Choice in the Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People

In 2016 physicians in Ontario will be granted the authority to refer patients with gender dysphoria for sex reassignment surgery. In order to be granted this authority physicians must be trained in the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care, which outlines healthcare procedures for the treatment of gender dysphoria and provides background information concerning transgender health. The Standards of Care require that patients undergo a process of 12 months of continuous living in a gender role that is congruent with their gender identity prior to being given access to sex reassignment surgery. While this requirement can sometimes be helpful it can also cause more harm than benefit. This paper argues that the requirement is strongly paternalistic in its current form and should no longer be mandatory in most cases.

Default Invariance: Naïve Category of Law and Finance

Default invariance is the idea that default does not change at any scale of law and finance. Default is a conserved quantity in a universe where fundamental principles of law and finance operate. It exists at the micro-level as part of the fundamental structure of every financial transaction, and at the macro- level, as a fixed critical point within the relatively stable phases of the law and finance cycle. A key point is that default is equivalent to maximizing uncertainty at the micro-level and at the macro-level, is equivalent to the phase transition where unbearable fluctuations occur in all forms of risk transformation, including maturity, liquidity and credit. As such, default invariance is the glue that links the micro and macro structures of law and finance. In this essay, we apply naïve category theory (NCT), a type of mapping logic, to these types of phenomena. The purpose of using NCT is to introduce a rigorous (but simple) mathematical methodology to law and finance discourse and to show that these types of structural considerations are of prime practical importance and significance to law and finance practitioners. These mappings imply a number of novel areas of investigation. From the micro- structure, three macro-approximations are implied. These approximations form the core analytical framework which we will use to examine the phenomena and hypothesize rules governing law and finance. Our observations from these approximations are grouped into five findings. While the entirety of the five findings can be encapsulated by the three approximations, since the intended audience of this paper is the non-specialist in law, finance and category theory, for ease of access we will illustrate the use of the mappings with relatively common concepts drawn from law and finance, focusing especially on financial contracts, derivatives, Shadow Banking, credit rating agencies and credit crises.

Risk and benefits in lifestyle sports: parkour, law and social value

This paper examines the interrelationship between law and lifestyle sports, viewed through the lens of parkour. We argue that the literature relating to legal approaches to lifestyle sport is currently underdeveloped and so seek to partially fill this lacuna. Hitherto, we argue, the law has been viewed as a largely negative presence, seen particularly in terms of the ways in which counter-cultural activities are policed and regulated, and where such activities are viewed as transgressive or undesirable. We argue that this is a somewhat unsophisticated take on how the law can operate, with law constructed as an outcome of constraints to behaviour (where the law authorises or prohibits), distinct from the legal contexts, environments and spaces in which these relationships occur. We argue that the distinctive settings in which lifestyle sports are practiced needs a more fine-grained analysis as they are settings which bear, and bring to life, laws and regulations that shape how space is to be experienced. We examine specifically the interrelationship between risk and benefit and how the law recognises issues of social utility or value, particularly within the context of lifestyle sport. We seek to move from user-centred constructions of law as an imposition, to a more nuanced position that looks at parkour at the intersections of law, space and lifestyle sport, in order to reveal how law can be used to support and extend claims to space.

Law and Original Contract in the Republican Thought of Immanuel Kant

This article discusses the concept of right and its identification with the power to coerce, to show a reciprocity between the original contract and the right, as a manifestation of the reciprocity between moral law and freedom, as Kant states in its Second Critique. The demonstration of this view will allow a republican stance evident in the legal and political thought of Kant, since the right of a people can only exist while the town itself is unified to enact.