Making ecological science policy relevant: issues of scale and disciplinary integration

In this paper, we ask why so much ecological scientific research does not have a greater policy impact in the UK. We argue that there are two potentially important and related reasons for this failing. First, much current ecological science is not being conducted at a scale that is readily meaningful to policy-makers. Second, to make much of this research policy-relevant requires collaborative interdisciplinary research between ecologists and social scientists. However, the challenge of undertaking useful interdisciplinary research only re-emphasises the problems of scale: ecologists and social scientists traditionally frame their research questions at different scales and consider different facets of natural resource management, setting different objectives and using different language. We argue that if applied ecological research is to have greater impact in informing environmental policy, much greater attention needs to be given to the scale of the research efforts as well as to the interaction with social scientists. Such an approach requires an adjustment in existing research and funding infrastructures.

Making robust policy decision using global biodiversity indicators

In order to influence global policy effectively, conservation scientists need to be able to provide robust predictions of the impact of alternative policies on biodiversity and measure progress towards goals using reliable indicators. We present a framework for using biodiversity indicators predictively to inform policy choices at a global level. The approach is illustrated with two case studies in which we project forwards the impacts of feasible policies on trends in biodiversity and in relevant indicators. The policies are based on targets agreed at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) meeting in Nagoya in October 2010. The first case study compares protected area policies for African mammals, assessed using the Red List Index; the second example uses the Living Planet Index to assess the impact of a complete halt, versus a reduction, in bottom trawling. In the protected areas example, we find that the indicator can aid in decision-making because it is able to differentiate between the impacts of the different policies. In the bottom trawling example, the indicator exhibits some counter-intuitive behaviour, due to over-representation of some taxonomic and functional groups in the indicator, and contrasting impacts of the policies on different groups caused by trophic interactions. Our results support the need for further research on how to use predictive models and indicators to credibly track trends and inform policy. To be useful and relevant, scientists must make testable predictions about the impact of global policy on biodiversity to ensure that targets such as those set at Nagoya catalyse effective and measurable change.

The making of a negotiating position: the US Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) hearings

Includes bibliography

Making research relevant to policy-makers, development actors, and local communities: NCCR North-South report on effectiveness of research for development

Bridging the gap between research and policy is of growing importance in international development. The National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South has rich experience in collaborating beyond academic boundaries to make their research relevant to various societal actors. This publication is the first to provide an overview of the effectiveness of NCCR North-South researchers’ efforts to interact with policy, practice, and local communities with a view to effecting a change in practices. A systematic assessment of researchers’ interactions with non-academic partners is presented, based on principles of monitoring and evaluation. On this basis, tools for collective learning and widespread adaptation are proposed. The report shows with what types of societal actors NCCR North-South researchers collaborate and analyses examples of how researchers conduct dialogue beyond academic boundaries, leading to specific outcomes. It also explains the frame conditions considered decisive for successful and sustainable policy dialogue and concludes with recommendations about how the NCCR North-South can increase the effectiveness of its research for development. The publication is a valuable source of inspiration for those interested in better understanding how to generate the multiple benefits of making science relevant to society.

Homelessness, Social Work, Social Policy and the Print Media in Australian Cities

Homelessness is a significant social problem worldwide. This paper describes an Australian study that examined print media representations of homelessness and social work, social policy and social work responses to homelessness in three Australian cities. The research included a content analysis of seven Australian newspapers and semi-structured interviews with 39 social workers employed in the field of homelessness in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney. The detailed results of these studies have been published separately elsewhere. This paper reports on how discourses in the print media, social policy and social work practice co-exist in constructing homelessness as a particular social problem, influencing social work responses to homelessness. The research found that individualism is central to many dominant discourses evident in the print media, social policy and social work practice, and that social work is practiced within unequal power relations embedded in organisational contexts.

Structural and Institutional Determinants of Influence Reputation: A Comparison of Collaborative and Adversarial Policy Networks in Decision Making and Implementation

The central assumption in the literature on collaborative networks and policy networks is that political outcomes are affected by a variety of state and nonstate actors. Some of these actors are more powerful than others and can therefore have a considerable effect on decision making. In this article, we seek to provide a structural and institutional explanation for these power differentials in policy networks and support the explanation with empirical evidence. We use a dyadic measure of influence reputation as a proxy for power, and posit that influence reputation over the political outcome is related to vertical integration into the political system by means of formal decision-making authority, and to horizontal integration by means of being well embedded into the policy network. Hence, we argue that actors are perceived as influential because of two complementary factors: (a) their institutional roles and (b) their structural positions in the policy network. Based on temporal and cross-sectional exponential random graph models, we compare five cases about climate, telecommunications, flood prevention, and toxic chemicals politics in Switzerland and Germany. The five networks cover national and local networks at different stages of the policy cycle. The results confirm that institutional and structural drivers seem to have a crucial impact on how an actor is perceived in decision making and implementation and, therefore, their ability to significantly shape outputs and service delivery.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.