Automated tertiary structure prediction with accurate local model quality assessment using the IntFOLD-TS method

The IntFOLD-TS method was developed according to the guiding principle that the model quality assessment would be the most critical stage for our template based modelling pipeline. Thus, the IntFOLD-TS method firstly generates numerous alternative models, using in-house versions of several different sequence-structure alignment methods, which are then ranked in terms of global quality using our top performing quality assessment method – ModFOLDclust2. In addition to the predicted global quality scores, the predictions of local errors are also provided in the resulting coordinate files, using scores that represent the predicted deviation of each residue in the model from the equivalent residue in the native structure. The IntFOLD-TS method was found to generate high quality 3D models for many of the CASP9 targets, whilst also providing highly accurate predictions of their per-residue errors. This important information may help to make the 3D models that are produced by the IntFOLD-TS method more useful for guiding future experimental work

Making the least active pay: a simulation of rewards and penalties under Demand Side Participation programs

The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.