Belarus-Russia: Whither Integration? OSW Point of View (unspecified), May 2003

Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.

Turbulence ahead: disputes within the Russian ruling elite are gathering force. OSW Commentary No. 91, 2012-09-27

The last month has seen a public confrontation between Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft, and Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime minister, concerning the consolidation of the energy sector. This is the latest in a series of disputes between the Kremlin & businessmen from Putin’s inner circle on one side, and the government & Prime Minister Medvedev on the other. These disputes have been wide-ranging in nature, concerning economic policy, the scope of competency of individual members of the elite, but also the ‘tough line’ adopted by the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. The Kremlin, which is still the main decision-making centre in Russia, has been effectively forcing its opinions through in its short-term disputes with the government. However, a new element in the ongoing conflicts, which is unfavourable to President Putin, is their exceptional strength, their much more public nature, and their wide range (which has included criticism of the president himself) and ever-changing context, especially the worsening socio-economic situation. These conflicts have been overlapping with signs of dissent among Putin’s business supporters, and their declining political willingness to support the leader unconditionally. The Kremlin’s response to the unrest consists of intensifying efforts to discipline the elite and weakening those groups in which Vladimir Putin has limited confidence. The elite’s support is crucial to the stability of his government; to maintain this support, the Kremlin is ready to introduce restrictive and repressive actions against both parliamentarians and government officials. In the short term, such a policy will force the Kremlin’s supporters back into obedience, but fears of a further increase in repression are also starting to be expressed on the sidelines.

The oligarchic democracy: The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics. OSW Study 42/2012

The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during Leonid Kuchma’s second presidency, turned out to be very durable. The nature of close relations between the government and the oligarchs has not undergone any major changes either as a consequence of the Orange Revolution or following Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election of 2010. Although reshuffles have taken place inside the political and business elites, nothing seems to be able to change this system, at least in the medium term. This text is aimed at presenting the network of connections existing between big business and politics in Ukraine and at pointing to the key oligarchic groups and the political forces they support. A definite majority of papers concerning contemporary Ukrainian politics as a rule disregard or deal with this subject very superficially, while it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the political and business elites there.

Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974). ACES Working Papers, 2011

The European Union's powerful legal system has proven to be the vanguard moment in the process of European integration. As early as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice established an effective and powerful supranational legal order, beyond the original wording of the Treaties of Rome through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Whereas scholars have analyzed the evolution of EU case law and its implications, only very recent historical scholarship has examined how the Member States received this process in the context of a number of difficult political and economic crises for the integration process. This paper investigates how the national level dealt with these fundamental transformations in the European legal system. Specifically, it examines one of the Union's most important member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Faced with a huge number of cases dealing with European law, German judges dealt with the supremacy of European law very cautiously, negotiating between increasingly polarized academic, public and ministerial debates on the question throughout the 1960s. By the mid 1970s, the German Constitutional Court famously limited the power of the ECJ in its Solange decision (1974). This was an expression of a broader discourse in Germany from 1968 onwards about the qualitative nature of democracy and participation in public life and was in some aspects a marker, at which the German elites felt comfortable expressing the value of their national constitutional system on the European stage. This paper examines the political, media and academic build up and response to the Constitutional Court's decision in the 1970s, arguing that the national "reception" is central to understanding the dynamics and evolution of European Union legal history.

Lessons for the EU from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/01 • February 2013

Summary. From April until October 2012, China witnessed a series of public protests against the Japanese purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Besides providing further evidence of growing Chinese nationalism, this unrest is interesting for other reasons relevant to EU policy. The Beijing leadership, which is traditionally perceived as the only source of foreign policy decisions in China, faces a changing domestic constellation. Domestic opinion increasingly constrains Chinese foreign policy, and it becomes obvious that foreign policy decision-making in Beijing is not insulated from larger social developments. Even if foreign policy decisions in China are still made without direct input from civil society, the influence of social forces on Chinese foreign policies has to be taken seriously. The EU thus might want to reconsider its approach to China: as long as EU concerns about human rights are met with a rather uncompromising attitude by the Chinese political elites, Brussels should double its efforts to reach Chinese civil society.

Potemkin conservatism. An ideological tool of the Kremlin. OSW Point of View 48, February 2015

Since the beginning of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin has consistently invoked conservative ideology. Thus he legitimises the Kremlin’s new political strategy, the aim of which is to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation in Russia around a liberal agenda. This strategy is also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the current model of government, by portraying it as ‘traditional’ for Russia; and to justify the government’s repressive and anti-Western policies. It also includes the policy of reintegrating the post-Soviet space under the auspices of Moscow, as evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and the Novorossiya project. This strategy was devised as a response to the galvanisation of adherents of liberalisation in Russia, namely the new middle class and a part of the business and administrative elites who publicly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the regime in 2011 and 2012. However, the dissonance between the conservative slogans mouthed by the ruling elite and its actual conduct suggest that the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is purely instrumental in nature, which in the longer term will undercut its effectiveness by undermining its credibility in the eyes of Russian society.

The economic and financial crisis in Russia – background, symptoms and prospects for the future. OSW Report 02/2015

The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.

The Politics of Retrospective Justice in Germany & the Czech Republic. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.4, 1994

Ongoing German and Czech efforts to confront legacies of injustice in their recent pasts provides opportunity to examine policies of retrospective justice adopted from where there is no threat of old elites with residual power. Instead of evoking existing explanations of these measures that concentrate on normative issues, the role of former dissidents, or mode of transition, this account focuses on the importance of the character and structure of the political representation in post-Communist regimes in general, and in the German and Czech successor regimes in particular.

Towards Explaining Anti-Foreign Violence in Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.8 (Series 53), 1993

Gennany has recently witnessed a vast increase in anti-foreign violence. Assembling data from a wide variety of recent research, the paper addresses two basic questions: to what extent is the outburst of xenophobic attacks a German peculiarity? and what are the explanations for the mcreasing violence? An analysis of criminal statistics of various European countries and of comparative opinion polls in the European Community shows that Germany has indeed witnessed a growth of anti-foreign sentiment, and a level of violence that is conspicuous from a com­ parative perspective. Four possible determinants of this peculiarity of recent German history are discussed: (1) the growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity due to the vast increase in immigration from non-European countries; (2) the increasing costs of foreigners' claims on the German welfare state; (3) the economic context of immigration; and (4) the transformation of national identity in the context of German unification. It is shown that neither the rate of immigration nor the position of foreigners in the German welfare state yields satisfactory explanations for the recent upsurge in violence, which only occurred after unification. The key for an explanation lies in a particu­lar macro-constellation that is characterized by the concurrence of a massive wave of immigration with an economic crisis, and with the ethnicization of German national identity in the context of unification. Anti-foreign sentiments do not automatically follow increases in immigration, but grow in a specific political climate to which the political elites actively contribute.

Localizing EU Gender Policy: The Diffusion of Gender Mainstreaming across Feminist Movements in Eastern Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.1, June, 2008

Gender mainstreaming emerged in the mid-1990s as an innovative and controversial policy tool for reducing gender inequalities. The European Union seeks to propagate the practice of gender mainstreaming both within EU institutions and among member states. Feminist scholars and policy elites discuss and debate gender main-streaming widely, but have yet to consider how local feminist activists, who could play a central role in diffusing gender mainstreaming, understand, interpret and respond to this agenda. This paper examines whether and why local feminist movements in two cities in eastern Germany adopt gender mainstreaming. Consideration of the characteristics of the contexts in which local feminist movements are embedded clarifies the conditions under which social movements rally round new policy paradigms.

The great leap. Turkey under Erdogan. OSW Point of View 51, 27 May 2015

Since the AKP took power in 2002, Turkey has seen a replacement of the state’s elites, a real change of the political system and a redefinition of the state identity. All this has been accompanied by economic development and rapid social transformation. The pro-democratic reforms and improved prosperity in the first decade of the AKP’s rule created the opportunity for Turkey to become part of the West in terms of legal and political standards, while maintaining its cultural distinctness. However, from the point of view of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of a new Turkey, the political reforms turned out not to be a goal per se but a means to the end of achieving a monopoly on power. Once this goal was achieved, Erdogan began leading Turkey towards the status of an autocratic state focused on the Middle East and resentful towards the West. This trend is unlikely to be reversed under Erdogan’s rule. However, even if the government were to change, there would be no return to the Turkey from before the AKP era. In turn, the Turkish public will have to answer the questions regarding its civilisational identity and the vision of the political and social order.

Patterns of civil society after authoritarianism: a comparison of Portugal and Spain, 1970s-2000s. CES Papers - Open Forum #17, 2013-2014

In this paper we argue that patterns of civil society in post-authoritarian democracies are the result of divergent pathways to democracy. Through a comparison of contemporary Portugal (social revolution) and Spain (reform), we show that revolutionary pathways to democracy have a positive impact on the self-organizing abilities of popular groups, thus also contributing to a higher quality of democracy. There are three mechanisms in social revolutionary processes that contribute to this. The first stems from the fact that the masses are the key actor in the revolutionary transformation process, with the power to shape (at least partially) the new rules and institutions of the emerging democratic regime. This results in greater legal recognition and institutional embeddedness between civil society organizations and the state, making it easier, in turn, for resources to be transferred to those organizations. Secondly, as a result of changes to the social and economic structure, revolutions engender more egalitarian societies. Likewise, citizens are given more resources and capacities for collective action. Finally, revolutions tend to crystalize a political culture between elites and the masses in which the principles of egalitarian participation and social change through the action of the people are accepted. This all leads to greater opportunities, resources and legitimacy for the civic action of the common people during the subsequent democratic regime.

Greece as an example of “post-politics” in the eurozone. EPIN Commentary No. 28/9 November 2015

The negotiations between Greece and the EU and IMF tested the unity, limits, stamina and financial interdependence of eurozone member states. Greece emerged wounded from the fray, but Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has established beyond doubt his dominance in Greek politics, in defiance of partisan competitors at home and his counterparts’ wishes in the rest of Europe. In this EPIN Commentary the authors argue that – beyond the political significance of SYRIZA’s third electoral victory in seven months – this vote of confidence brings certain characteristics of both Greek and EU politics into sharper relief. The high-risk political activism undertaken by Syriza’s leadership in the first half of 2015 has (re)opened the debate about what kind of EU we live in, and contributed to the creation of another type of discourse in Europe – one that has so far been the preserve of established elites.

Paradoxes of stabilisation. Bosnia and Herzegovina from the perspective of Central Europe. OSW Report, March 2016

On 15 February 2016 Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for membership of the European Union. This was the result of the new policy strategy which the EU introduced in 2014, aimed at unblocking BiH’s integration process and encouraging local elites to accelerate the reform process. Despite a formal application to the EU, the main internal problems of BiH remain the same - local politicians focus more on the power struggle and enhancing ethnic division than on reform and this is hampering the economic development of one of the poorest countries in Europe. For these reasons this report is devoted to analysing the internal challenges to the stability, coherence and unity of the country. Special attention was also placed on examining the interest and strategies of the various international actors since they can hinder or support the reform process.

An essential partner in the background. Europe in China's policy during the rule of Xi Jinping. OSW STUDIES 56 2016

Chinese elites do not treat Europe as an equal partner and are convinced that China holds the upper hand over Europe. They see a growing asymmetry in bilateral relations. China’s sense of its own potential is boosted by internal divisions within the European Union. At the same time, Europe is China’s key economic partner and an ‘economic pillar’ supporting China’s growth on the international stage. Beijing strives to maintain Europe’s open attitude towards the Chinese economy, in particular its exports, technology transfer to China, location of investments and diversification of China’s currency reserves. Cooperation with Europe and support from Europe are necessary to enable China to improve its position in the international economic and financial system, mainly in order to legitimise China’s actions in the area of multilateralism and global governance. Similarly, Beijing attaches great importance to maintaining Europe’s non-involvement in two issues: China’s core interests and Chinese-American relations.