Basic provisions of European Economic Community grain regulations /

Cover title.

The Turkish Drawbridge: European Integration and the Cultural Economics of National Planning

This article examines the relations between the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Western economic system during the first two decades of national planning in Turkey (1960–1980). It traces how the SPO, established with the guidance and full endorsement of international economic institutions came to vehemently oppose Turkish participation in one of their pillars: the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union. It argues that the shift in the SPO's world-view was founded upon two distinct understandings of the Turkish nation and its development, situates these understandings within the intellectual history of Turkey's past ambivalence towards the West, and, in doing so, provides a historical case-study of the ideological clash between modernisation and dependency theories of development.

The Turkish Drawbridge: European Integration and the Cultural Economics of National Planning

This article examines the relations between the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Western economic system during the first two decades of national planning in Turkey (1960-1980). It traces how the SPO, established with the guidance and full endorsement of international economic institutions came to vehemently oppose Turkish participation in one of their pillars: the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union. It argues that the shift in the SPO's world-view was founded upon two distinct understandings of the Turkish nation and its development, situates these understandings within the intellectual history of Turkey's past ambivalence towards the West, and, in doing so, provides a historical case-study of the ideological clash between modernisation and dependency theories of development.

The nuclear safety framework in the European Union after Fukushima. Egmont Paper No. 73, December 2014

Summary. On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design, insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examination of nuclear reactor security in Europe. It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe. Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether. This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided. The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland. Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress tests’. Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles, and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has established a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines. In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States. Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The intervention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Community method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar mechanism that deserves more attention.

La presse française et l’adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à la CEE : des refus à l’acceptation (1961-1973)

À la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’Europe est affaiblie et divisée. Les horreurs de la guerre amènent les Européens à repenser leur cohabitation et l’idée d’une Europe, unie par des liens économiques et politiques forts, germe dans l’esprit des Européens. Ils créent alors la CECA en 1951 puis, sept ans plus tard, la Communauté économique européenne. Puisque cette dernière aura du succès, certains pays européens, dont la Grande-Bretagne, demandent à la rejoindre. La France d’alors, sous la présidence de Charles de Gaulle, s’oppose à cette demande d’adhésion à deux reprises, en 1963 et en 1967. Il faut attendre l’arrivée de Georges Pompidou à l’Élysée pour que Londres intègre la CEE. L’élargissement de la Communauté est un évènement important; il a un impact direct sur le rôle de la France en Europe et dans le monde. Il a également une incidence certaine sur le rôle de l’Europe dans le monde bipolaire de l’époque, ainsi que sur ses relations avec l’allié américain. La presse des pays concernés suivra ces évènements avec intérêt, telle la presse quotidienne française, qui commente abondamment les décisions prises par son gouvernement. Le présent mémoire, qui étudie certains journaux d’importance à la lumière des ouvrages d’érudition et des sources primaires, analyse thématiquement la position de journaux français de diverses tendances politiques sur la politique française au cours des trois demandes.

Crise da esquerda comunista: políticas do PCI e do PCP sobre a união europeia

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

EU immigration trends and policies: Spain and France as case studies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 10, August 2013

From the Introduction. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht or the Maastricht Treaty, created the European Union (EU) from the existing European Economic Community (EEC.) It was signed by the member states on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993.1 Among its many innovations was the creation of European citizenship, which would be granted to any person who was a citizen of an EU member state. Citizenship, however, is intertwined with immigration, which the Treaty also attempted to address. Policy on visas, immigration and asylum was originally placed under Pillar 3 of the EU, which dealt with Justice and Home Affairs. In 1997, however, the Amsterdam Treaty moved these policies from Pillar 3 to Pillar 1, signaling “a shift toward more supranational decision-making in this area,” as opposed to the intergovernmental method of Pillars 2 and 3.2

The Lisbon Treaty and Spain: Background, Context and Impact. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 1, August 2012

The year 2010 will be remembered in the European Union (EU) circles of governmental Spain as a crucial milestone regarding the role of the country in one of the most important alliances of world history. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain had previously been scheduled to hold the rotating presidency as done since the times of the inception of the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, on June 12, Spain would be ready to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively acceding to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was set to occur, the new Reform Treaty (“of Lisbon”) was set to be implemented as a substitute for the failed constitutional text floated during the first years of the new century. Moreover, these spectacular events unraveled in the middle of one of the worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most especially, Spain. This paper will review the background, context and impact of particular novel aspects of the new treaty governing the EU and several milestones regarding the experience of Spain in the European process.

Spanish monarchy and the Portuguese Republic: two routes to democratization

From 1974 to 1986 the Iberian Peninsula was the arena of major political changes. The process then undertaken was characterized by the transition from two Iberian authoritarian regimes to two democracies, which enabled both countries to join the European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1986. However, the political vicissitudes until full membership of what became the European Union (EU) was achieved were very different and were decisively, although not exclusively, influenced by the fact Portugal was a republic and Spain a monarchy. In Portugal the 1974 revolution took place with consequent shift of the head of state while in Spain the engine of change was precisely the head of state: King Juan Carlos I. It is also true that despite the dangers to democracy (terrorism in Spain and some radicalism in Portugal) both societies supported the political parties committed to the democratic process in elections, which helped avoid tensions that could have defeated the process. Likewise, it is possible to argue that in Spain a plan to achieve democracy within the rule of law (an archetypal transition) was designed by the head of state, while in Portugal there was no pre-established plan – the programme of the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas [MFA]) was a weak and precarious compromise between different visions of the road to follow, enabling an intense political struggle that almost led to civil war and a dangerous state of crisis.