Game Theoretic Bidding Strategies for Auctions in Green Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs ["bid cost minimization" (BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments ["payment cost minimization" (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in this paper.

Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?

This study compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators (ISOs) in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts as if the auction featured a discriminatory final payment method when, in fact, the markets are uniform price auctions. The proposed alternative explicitly accounts for the market clearing price during the allocation phase. We find that the proposed alternative largely outperforms the current practice on the basis of procurement costs in the context of simple auction markets featuring both day-ahead and real-time auctions and that the procurement cost advantage of the alternative is complete when we simulate the effects of increased competition. We also find that a trade-off between the objectives of procurement cost minimization and productive efficiency emerges in our simple auction markets and persists in the face of increased competition.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Grid-connected roof solar plants in educational institutions for testing and electricity generation: a case in Spain.

The use of photovoltaic experimental plants in engineering educational buildings contributes to an increase in acceptance of this technology by future engineers. There are some photovoltaic (PV) systems in educational buildings in Spain, but they are usually limited to buildings in relation to electrical technologies or research areas. They are not common in other educational or official buildings. This paper presents the project of a grid-connected solar plant with two main objectives. First, different PV module technologies will be compared. Second, an emphasis on agronomical areas in educational settings will be reviewed in an attempt to facilitate student engagement in the use of the power plant. The system is grid-connected in order to pay-back the investment in the plant. In fact the electricity generated by the plant will be used by the installations of the building, as it is the closest consumer. This work intends to approximate photovoltaic technology to university degrees not directly related with it and at the same time research in comparison of systems with different technologies. This is a good example of an solar plant for both optimum production and educational purposes.

The first renewable forward market mechanisms in the Iberian Electricity Market

A description of the first renewable forward market mechanisms in the Iberian Electricity Market is provided. A contract for difference mechanism is available in Spain since March 2011between the last resort suppliers and the special regime (renewables and cogeneration) settling the price differences between the equilibrium price of the forward regulated auctions for the last resort supply and the spot price of the corresponding delivery period. Regulated auctions of baseload futures of the Portuguese zone in which the Portuguese last resort supplier sells the special regime production exist since December 2011. The experience gained from renewables auctions in Latin America could be used in the Iberian Electricity market, complementing these first market mechanisms. Introduction of renewable auctions at least for the most mature technologies (i.e. wind) in Spain and Portugal providing a fair price for the renewable generation will be of utmost importance in the short term to diminish the tariff deficit caused by the massive deployment of the feed-in-tariff scheme. Liquidity in the forward markets will also increase as a result of the entry of renewable generation companies intending to maximize their profits due to gradual suppression of feed in tariff schemes.

Unit Commitment and Electricity Prices Forecasting for Market Strategy Preparation in Interconnected Systems

In this paper we present a solution for building a better strategy to take part in external electricity markets. For an optimal strategy development, both the internal system costs as well as the future values of the series of electricity prices in external markets need to be known. But in practice, the real problems that must be faced are that both future electricity prices and costs are unknown. Thus, the first ones must be modeled and forecasted and the costs must be calculated. Our methodology for building an optimal strategy consists of three steps: The first step is modeling and forecasting market prices in external systems. The second step is the cost calculation on internal system taking into account the expected prices in the first step. The third step is based on the results of the previous steps, and consists of preparing the bids for external markets. The main goal is to reduce consumers' costs unlike many others that are oriented to increase GenCo's profits.

Economic Impacts of Rules-based vs Risk-based Cybersecurity Regulations in Critical Infrastructure Providers (Bulk Electricity Providers)

Economics of Cybersecurity Part 2. SPSI-2015-01-0024.

Geothermal Electricity Generation in Colorado: Actual and Perceived Obstacles to Greater Implementation

The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the potential and obstacles to the development of geothermal energy resources in Colorado. Geothermal energy is the only renewable resource that can provide base-load electricity. While Colorado has significant geothermal energy potential, there are no such power plants. Layers of federal and state laws and regulations represent one barrier to further geothermal development. Transmission constraints represent another major barrier. High exploration and construction costs along with high-risk profiles for geothermal projects form another major barrier. Perceived barriers such as misunderstanding the impacts, risks, and benefits of geothermal energy hinder further development. Recommendations are provided to help overcome these obstacles.