Design of asymmetrical RF and microwave bandpass filters by computer optimization

This paper presents an optimization-based approach to the design of asymmetrical filter structures having the maximum number of return- or insertion-loss ripples in the passband such as those based upon Chebyshev function prototypes. The proposed approach. has the following advantages over the general purpose optimization techniques adopted previously such as: less frequency sampling is required, optimization is carried out with respect to the Chebyshev (or minimax) criterion, the problem of local minima does not arise, and optimization is usually only required for the passband. When implemented around an accurate circuit simulation, the method can be used to include all the effects of discontinuities, junctions, fringing, etc. to reduce the amount of tuning required in the final filter. The design of asymmetrical ridged-waveguide bandpass filters is considered as an example. Measurements on a fabricated filter confirm the accuracy of the design procedure.

Enhancing the teaching of professional practice and key skills in engineering through the use of computer animation

This paper presents some observations on how computer animation was used in the early years of a degree program in Electrical and Electronic Engineering to enhance the teaching of key skills and professional practice. This paper presents the results from two case studies. First, in a first year course which seeks to teach students how to manage and report on group projects in a professional way. Secondly, in a technical course on virtual reality, where the students are asked to use computer animation in a way that subliminally coerces them to come to terms with the fine detail of the mathematical principles that underlie 3D graphics, geometry, etc. as well as the most significant principles of computer architecture and software engineering. In addition, the findings reveal that by including a significant element of self and peer review processes into the assessment procedure students became more engaged with the course and achieved a deeper level of comprehension of the material in the course.

Costs, outputs and outcomes in school PFI contracts and the significance of project size

This article examines operational Private Finance Initiative (PFI) school projects and reports the experiences of UK headteachers. It considers the impact of project size on value for money (VFM). Headteachers involved in small projects are more satisfied with costs than those involved in large projects, but headteachers involved in larger projects are more satisfied with affordability. Generally, heads are more satisfied with the buildings than with the services. The authors question the government’s recent policy changes to increase the size of PFI projects.

Accountability and Value for Money in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

Within the context of New Public Management (NPM), successive UK governments have claimed that PFI projects provide more accountability, and arguably, more value for money (VFM) than conventional procurement for the public (HM Treasury 1995, 2000, 2003a and 2003b). However, recent empirical research in the UK on PFI has indicated its potential limitations for accountability and VFM (Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin, 2004; Edwards, Shaoul, Stafford and Arblaster, 2004; Shaoul, 2005; and Ismail and Pendlebury, 2006) albeit these are based on either published accounts or a limited number of key stakeholders. This paper attempts to partially redress this gap in the literature by presenting an interesting case of the impact of PFI on accountability and VFM in Northern Ireland's education sector. The findings of this research, based on forty two interviews with a wide range of key stakeholders, suggest that stakeholders have different and often conflicting expectations and the actual PFI accountability and VFM benefits are much more obfuscated than those claimed in Government publications.

Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.