Efeito da suplementação prolongada de grão de soja cru e integral no pré-parto sobre o desempenho produtivo, qualidade oocitária e embrionária, e função imune de vacas leiteiras

Objetivou-se avaliar o efeito da suplementação prolongada de grão de soja cru e integral (GSI) como fonte de ácido graxo Ω6 sobre o desempenho produtivo, perfil metabólico, qualidade oocitária e embrionária e função imune de vacas leiteiras no período de transição e início de lactação. Foram selecionadas 44 vacas da raça Holandesa, multíparas e gestantes, com parto previsto para 90 dias após o início da avaliação e fornecimento das dietas experimentais, porém em razão da ocorrência de enfermidades metabólicas ou infecciosas (3 abortos; 3 deslocamentos de abomaso; 3 enfermidades podais; 4 distocias) 13 animais foram retirados do experimento. As vacas foram distribuídas aleatoriamente em quatro grupos experimentais diferindo entre eles o início do fornecimento de grão de soja cru e integral (GSI) durante o pré-parto. A dieta era baseada na inclusão de 12% de GSI %MS, com aproximadamente 5,1% de extrato etéreo (EE) o início de seu fornecimento foi conforme descrito a seguir: Grupo 0: Animais não receberam dieta contendo GSI no pré-parto; Grupo 30: Início do fornecimento de dieta com GSI nos 30 dias finais da gestação; Grupo 60: Início do fornecimento de dieta com GSI nos 60 dias finais da gestação; Grupo 90: Início do fornecimento de dieta com GSI nos 90 dias finais da gestação. Após o parto, todas as vacas receberam dieta única com 5,1% de EE, baseada na inclusão de 12% de GSI %MS até 90 dias de lactação. Os animais foram arraçoados de acordo com o consumo de matéria seca no dia anterior, de forma a ser mantido porcentual de sobras das dietas, diariamente, entre 5 e 10%. As amostras dos alimentos e sobras foram coletadas diariamente e armazenadas a -20ºC. Semanalmente as amostras coletadas diariamente foram misturadas e foi retirada uma amostra composta referente a um período de uma semana, a fim de mensurar o consumo de matéria seca e nutrientes. Amostras de fezes foram coletadas nos dias -56, -21, 21, 56 e 84 dias em relação ao parto, com o propósito de mensurar a digestibilidade da matéria seca e nutrientes. A produção de leite foi mensurada diariamente e para a composição dos teores de gordura, proteína, lactose e perfil de ácidos graxos amostras foram coletadas semanalmente. As amostras de sangue para análise dos metabólitos sanguíneos foram coletadas semanalmente. Amostras de sangue para mensurar a atividade do sistema imune foram coletadas na semanas -8, -4, -2, -1 em relação ao parto, parto, +1, +2, +4 e +8 semanas no período pós-parto. Nos dias 21, 42, 63 e 84 do período pós-parto foram realizadas aspirações foliculares, com posterior fertilização in vitro dos oócitos. Todas as variáveis mensuradas foram analisadas pelo procedimento PROC MIXED do SAS 9.4 através de regressão polinomial, utilizando efeito fixo de tratamento, semana, interação tratamento*semana e efeito de animal dentro de tratamento como aleatório. Utilizou nível de 5% de significância. Foi observado efeito (P<0,05) linear crescente para CEE no pré-parto. Não foi observado diferenças no CMS e nutrientes no pós-parto. Não houve alteração da digestibilidade nos períodos pré e pós-parto. Não houve alteração no balanço de energia e nitrogênio nos periodos pré e pós-parto. Não foi observado diferença na produção, composição e teor dos componentes totais do leite. No perfil de ácidos graxos do leite houve efeito (P<0,05) linear descrescente para as concentrações de C16:1cis, C18:1 cis, total de C:18 insaturado, total de AG monoinsaturados, insaturados e a relação do total de AGS:AGI. Foi observado efeito linear (P<0,05) crescente para o total de AG aturado e efeito (P<0,05) quadrático para C18:2, CLAcis9-trans11, e total de AGPI. Foi observado efeito linear crescente (P<0,05) para colesterol total, LDL no préparto e linear decrescente (P<0,05) para GGT nos períodos pré e pós-parto. Foi observado efeito quadrático (P<0,05) para HDL no pré-parto e AST no pós-parto. Em relação a atividade do sistema imune foi observado efeito linear (P<0,05) crescente para o percentual de CD3+ ativos no pós-parto, para o percentual de monócitos que produziram espécie reativa de oxigênio (ERO) no pós-parto quando foram estimulados por S.aureus e E.coli e para a intensidade de imunofluorescência de ERO para ganulócitos no pós-parto quando estimulados por S.aureus. Foi observado efeito (P<0,05) quadrático para o percentual de granulócitos, mononucleares, CD8+ ativos no pós-parto e para o percentual de granulócitos que produziram ERO no pós-parto quando estimulados por E.coli. A suplementação prolongada com GSI no pré-parto melhora a atividade do sistema imune, não melhora a qualidade oocitária e embrionária bem como não influencia negativamente os parametros produtivos de vacas leiteiras no período de transição e início de lactação

Comprehensive Validation Of A Measure Of Student School Engagement: A Pilot Study Of Middle School Students

Although it may sound reasonable that American education continues to be more effective at sending high school students to college, in a study conducted in 2009, The Council of the Great City Schools states that "slightly more than half of entering ninth grade students arrive performing below grade level in reading and math, while one in five entering ninth grade students is more than two years behind grade level...[and] 25% received support in the form of remedial literacy instruction or interventions" (Council of the Great City Schools, 2009). Students are distracted with technology (Lei & Zhao, 2005), family (Xu & Corno, 2003), medical illnesses (Nielson, 2009), learning disabilities and perhaps the most detrimental to academic success, the very lack of interest in school (Ruch, 1963). In a Johns Hopkins research study, Building a Graduation Nation - Colorado (Balfanz, 2008), warning signs were apparent years before the student dropped out of high school. The ninth grade was often referenced as a critical point that indicated success or failure to graduate high school. The research conducted by Johns Hopkins illustrates the problem: students who become disengaged from school have a much greater chance of dropping out of high school and not graduating. The first purpose of this study was to compare different measurement models of the Student School Engagement (SSE) using Factor Analysis to verify model fit with student engagement. The second purpose was to determine the extent to which the SSE instrument measures student school engagement by investigating convergent validity (via the SSE and Appleton, Christenson, Kim and Reschly's instrument and Fredricks, Blumenfeld, Friedel and Paris's instrument), discriminant validity (via Huebner's Student Life Satisfaction Survey) and criterion-related validity (via the sub-latent variables of Aspirations, Belonging and Productivity and student outcome measures such as achievement, attendance and discipline). Discriminant validity was established between the SSE and the Appleton, Christenson, Kim and Reschly's model and Fredricks, Blumenfeld, Friedel and Paris's (2005) Student Engagement Instruments (SEI). When confirming discriminant validity, the SSE's correlations were weak and statistically not significant, thus establishing discriminant validity with the SLSS. Criterion-related validity was established through structural equation modeling when the SSE was found to be a significant predictor of student outcome measures when both risk score and CSAP scores were used. The third purpose of this study was to assess the factorial invariance of the SSE instrument across gender to ensure the instrument is measuring the intended construct across different groups. Conclusively, configural, weak and metric invariances were established for the SSE as a non-significant change in chi-square indicating that all parameters including the error variances were invariant across groups of gender. Engagement is not a clearly defined psychological construct; it requires more research in order to fully comprehend its complexity. Hopefully, with parental and teacher involvement and a sense of community, student engagement can be nurtured to result in a meaningful attachment to school and academic success.

New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry

The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?

Symbol for a Community: The Dickens Opera House and Theaters of the American West

This paper reveals the importance of the Dickens Opera House to the local history of Longmont, Colorado. Through an exploration of pioneer history and of architectural patronage and audience accommodation, this paper illustrates how the Dickens Opera House participated in the construction of cultural identity and civic aspirations of the city of Longmont. Using the Tabor Opera House of Leadville and Wright Opera House of Ouray as framing examples to place the Dickens Opera House within its proper architectural and historical context, I approach the building’s inception, construction, and early years as a way to track the early civic identity of a community through a work of architecture. The Dickens Opera House provided a point for the citizens of Longmont to focus their hopes of success and respectability in a newly formed community. An opera house provided a high-class perception of a town that provided a projection of respectability. Such a construction was built from various sources – the architecture of the building, simply calling the building an ‘opera house’, furnishings in the latest fashions and equipment of the latest technology, and extravagant scenery and curtains. In addition to these outward projections, opera houses also provided a place for community events. It was the location in town that brought people together.

La calle rojinegra. Anarcosindicalismo, rituales de movilización y símbolos en el espacio público (1931-1936)

Este artículo se centra en el análisis de la tipología, características y evolución de algunos de los diversos rituales de movilización y símbolos desplegados en el espacio público por las distintas organizaciones y núcleos de militantes de signo confederal y anarquista en España durante los años de la Segunda República, antes del estallido de la sublevación militar de julio de 1936. Entre ellos: huelgas, insurrecciones revolucionarias, mítines, manifestaciones, excursiones, entierros de militantes, etc. El propósito de estas acciones era claro: tanto la cohesión y reafirmación identitaria internas, como la proyección externa del movimiento. Con estas estrategias de acción colectiva, que suponían una “salida” al espacio público, se trataba de hacer visible allí la fuerza del movimiento y reafirmar la presencia física de este, sus reivindicaciones y aspiraciones. Esta visibilidad se reforzaba mediante el despliegue de los símbolos propios: himnos, canciones, banderas, etc.

Engaging Immigrants in Youth Sport Coaching: Part 2. A Qualitative Analysis of the Barriers, Facilitators and Motivators for Involvement

Although research in the area of immigrants and their physical activity patterns has been steadily growing, there is still much to learn. The purpose of this study was to identify the barriers, facilitators and motivators facing recent Canadian immigrants as they relate to involvement in coaching youth sport. The quantitative information presented in the first article of this series served as a framework for conducting semi-structured qualitative interviews with 28 immigrant youth-sport coaches. Results of these interviews support the notion that there are two distinct groups of immigrant coaches - the ‘leisure-oriented coach’ (those without coaching occupational aspirations) and the ‘career-oriented coach’ (those with coaching occupational pursuits). Despite sharing several of the same barriers, facilitators and motivators, each group showed marked divergence from the other on a number of aspects in each of these three categories.

The Significance of the Disputed Territory in Bechuanaland 1887-1893

British Imperial policy in Southern Africa in the last three decades of the nineteenth century oscillated between two extremes. It began in the early 1870's with Lord Kimberley's attempt to effect confederation as a means of devolving Imperial responsibility and expenditure. It ended in 1899 with Britain's active intervention against the Boers. For most of the remaining years of those decades a middle course was adopted while the British Government struggled to reconcile its diverse political interests. Strategy, supremacy, economy, humanitarianism, and recognition of colonial aspirations were all at one time or another, in varying degrees, motivating forces behind Imperial policy. Many historians have pointed out how incompatible many of these ends were and how the attempt to pursue them all at once almost inevitably ended in at least one of them being sacrificed on the way. This study focusses on a relatively minor problem over a period of about seven years. It attempts to show how the British Government tried to reconcile, in this case, the predominant motives of economy and supremacy. The problem of the Disputed Territory now seems like a small fish in a big ocean because non the great hopes and fears that it raised were ever realized. But the anticlimactic nature of the outcome of events should not be allowed to conceal two important points: first, that the problem loomed large at the time in the eyes of the Imperial Government; and second, that in the case of its policy towards the Disputed Territory, the Government gained a greater degree of success in trying to reconcile seemingly incompatible ends than it did in many other instances.

To Be or Not to Be a Normative Power: The EU’s Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in Russia. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2013

The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

Rosja wobec Unii Europejskiej: kryzys „strategicznego partnerstwa.” Prace OSW 22/2006. = Russia vs. the European Union: a “strategic partnership” crisis. OSW Study 22/2006

Contrary to both parties' declarations on the development of their "strategic partnership", relations between Russia and the European Union have over recent years been in a state which could be called one of crisis. However, this does not mean that there have been no achievements in EU-Russian relations. The key problem is that Russia and the European Union have essentially different perceptions, aspirations and interests, which causes mistrust and disillusionment. This crisis is manifested in mutual criticism by the two sides, regularly recurring tensions and cooling of relations ("minicrises"), and especially by the "virtualisation of co-operation", i.e. concealing a lack of substantive content in many key areas under increasingly rich layers of dialogue and co-operation.

Croatia: accession negotiations with the EU overshadowed by parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 48, 2011-02-29

In 2011 Croatia entered the final stage of its accession negotiations with the EU. The completion of these negotiations will probably coincide with the parliamentary elections which should be held in November or December this year. The elections are likely to bring about a change of government, as public support for Jadranka Kosor's cabinet and her party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) has been declining; the left-wing opposition is likely to take power. Therefore, the government’s main goal is to complete the accession negotiations in the first half of the year, in order to sign the accession treaty and hold the EU membership referendum before the parliamentary elections. The HDZ believes that only the successful completion of the accession negotiations could increase its chances of a good result in the upcoming elections. At the same time, fearing a further fall in support, the government will avoid any decisions and reforms that would be controversial for the public, especially in the sphere of the economy; such decisions could also increase Euroscepticism among the Croatian public, and result in the rejection of EU accession in the referendum. The government in Zagreb hopes that the currently implemented anti-corruption strategy and reform of the judiciary, as well as the advanced process of adaptation to EU conditions, will be enough to complete the negotiations. This strategy has a serious chance of success, considering that there is considerable support for Croatia's membership among the EU countries and institutions. Another reason is that further prolongation of the negotiations could aggravate hostility towards the EU among the Croatian public, and would be a bad sign for other Balkan states with membership aspirations. However, subordinating Croatian policies to the completion of negotiations in the first half of the year could prove to be adverse for Croatia itself in the longer term, as it would put off the necessary structural reforms.

Ordnung muss nicht sein. Developments on the German political scene. OSW Commentary No. 55, 2011-06-27

The results of parliamentary elections in seven German federal states, ongoing since early 2011, show the collapse of the existing order on the German political scene, both on a national level and on the level of the individual federal states. So far, the federal states have been governed by one of the catch-all parties1 – i.e. the Christian Democrats or Social Democrats – in coalitions with smaller partners – the FDP and the Greens, respectively2. This year’s elections have fully revealed the extent of social transformation in Germany and its impact on voting preferences and the hitherto stable party system in this country. The largest and most popular parties so far – the CDU and the SPD – are losing the voters’ confidence and support, whereas the parties associated with protest movements (such as the Greens) are gaining prominence. Moreover, the German political scene is undergoing increasing fragmentation, as new small, local groups are appearing who have no political aspirations at the federal level but who are attractive to voters acting as successful groups of common cause. The changes in the existing balance of power on the German political scene are being sped up by the specific features of the federal system. Elections to the parliaments of the federal states are held at regular intervals which increasingly affects policies on the national level. The key decisions that concern domestic and foreign affairs are made under the pressure of constant election campaigns.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine: An attempt to understand the reasons. OSW Study 18/2005

The Ukrainian society in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election was in a state which political science literature characterises as an almost "ideal" condition for an outbreak of social unrest. Growing expectations, both economic and political, seemed vain due to mounting impediments. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by many opinion-makers as a nail in the coffin of such aspirations.

Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implantation. Natolin Research Paper 03/March 2011

While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region has now gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and beyond, not least because of security considerations. The ENP undoubtedly represents a step forward in the EU’s policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, yet its implementation highlights major differences between the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. The Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which is now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS. The paper highlights five main conclusions and recommendations: • Political, economic, social and diplomatic developments in the South Caucasus in the 2000's highlight both diverging trends and the persistence of tensions between the three countries. They also have different aspirations vis-à-vis the EU and different records in ENP implementation. The EU should therefore mainly rely upon an individual approach towards each country. • While bilateral relations should form the basis of the EU's approach, most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not confined to national borders and require regional solutions. This applies primarily, but not exclusively, to the unresolved conflicts. The EU should promote targeted regional cooperation including, inter alia, confidence-building measures to address indirectly the protracted conflicts and measures supporting drivers of change, which play a critical role in the confidence-building process; • Under the ENP, especially since the opening of negotiations for association agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform have become prominent in the EU's relations with all three Caucasus countries. At the same time, the priorities identified when the ENP was launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. The EU should more clearly prioritise good governance and the rule of law as the basis of both the ENP and successful reforms; • In all partner countries (but even more so in the South Caucasus), ENP implementation has been adversely affected by poor administrative capacities and weak institutional coordination. The EU should increasingly focus on institutional reform/capacity building in its support to partner countries and ensure that the link between the ENP and domestic reform processes is strengthened; • In the South Caucasus the EU has recently concentrated on a few assistance tools such as budget support, Twinning and TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly bring an added value, they should be better combined with tools allowing for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors, e.g. EIDHR/NSA.

Georgian drift. The crisis of Georgia's way westwards. OSW POINT OF VIEW 57, 2016-02-22

For several years Georgia has been experiencing processes which may be interpreted as symptoms of a deepening, multidimensional social and political crisis. Reforms have lost momentum, stagnation has set in, and in some areas the situation has begun to revert to the pre-revolution status (including rising crime levels). The Georgian political system has found itself in a serious crisis, while society has become increasingly frustrated and apathetic, mainly because people’s standards of living have been stagnating. This political and social malaise has been breeding Euro-scepticism and disenchantment with the West. A country that had been firmly navigating westwards, Georgia has now started drifting and slipping into malaise. This risks reversing what the country has achieved so far in the internal dimension, increasing instability and triggering a crisis in the pro-Western vector of Tbilisi’s foreign policy. While that may not necessarily mean a turn towards Russia, in the present situation it has been easier for Moscow to pursue its own interests in the region. Should Tbilisi’s pro-Western course become reversed or permanently stagnant, that would entail grave consequences for the country itself and beyond. It would be a defeat for the West and would undermine the European aspirations of countries like Ukraine or Moldova.