864 resultados para An Act respecting administrative justice
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In the last few years, the introduction of microarrays in the diagnosis of type I allergy is allowing the clinicians to have a much more accurate picture of their allergenic profile. However, the simultaneous measurement of specific IgE to multiple molecules can show unexpected sensitisations, without knowing their clinical relevance. For instance, we have been observing a high prevalence (74%) of sensitisation to Act d 2 (the thaumatin of kiwifruit) in patients sensitised to Alt a 1 (major allergen of Alternaria alternata) with a confirmed allergy to this mould. The aim of the present study was to clarify if there was any clinical relevance in this finding.
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Stimulation of antitumor immune mechanisms is the primary goal of cancer immunotherapy, and accumulating evidence suggests that effective alteration of the host–tumor relationship involves immunomodulating cytokines and also the presence of costimulatory molecules. To examine the antitumor effect of direct in vivo gene transfer of murine interleukin 12 (IL-12) and B7-1 into tumors, we developed an adenovirus (Ad) vector, AdIL12–B7-1, that encodes the two IL-12 subunits in early region 1 (E1) and the B7-1 gene in E3 under control of the murine cytomegalovirus promoter. This vector expressed high levels of IL-12 and B7-1 in infected murine and human cell lines and in primary murine tumor cells. In mice bearing tumors derived from a transgenic mouse mammary adenocarcinoma, a single intratumoral injection with a low dose (2.5 × 107 pfu/mouse) of AdIL12–B7-1 mediated complete regression in 70% of treated animals. By contrast, administration of a similar dose of recombinant virus encoding IL-12 or B7-1 alone resulted in only a delay in tumor growth. Interestingly, coinjection of two different viruses expressing either IL-12 or B7-1 induced complete tumor regression in only 30% of animals treated at this dose. Significantly, cured animals remained tumor free after rechallenge with fresh tumor cells, suggesting that protective immunity had been induced by treatment with AdIL12–B7-1. These results support the use of Ad vectors as a highly efficient delivery system for synergistically acting molecules and show that the combination of IL-12 and B7-1 within a single Ad vector might be a promising approach for in vivo cancer therapy.
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We previously have demonstrated that the colonic P-ATPase α subunit cDNA encodes an H,K-ATPase when expressed in Xenopus laevis oocytes. Besides its high level of amino acid homology (75%) with the Na,K-ATPase, the colonic H,K-ATPase also shares a common pharmacological profile with Na,K-ATPase, because both are ouabain-sensitive and Sch 28080-insensitive. These features raise the possibility that an unrecognized property of the colonic H,K-ATPase would be Na+ translocation. To test this hypothesis, ion-selective microelectrodes were used to measure the intracellular Na+ activity of X. laevis oocytes expressing various combinations of P-ATPase subunits. The results show that expression in oocytes of the colonic H,K-ATPase affects intracellular Na+ homeostasis in a way similar to the expression of the Bufo marinus Na,K-ATPase; intracellular Na+ activity is lower in oocytes expressing the colonic H,K-ATPase or the B. marinus Na,K-ATPase than in oocytes expressing the gastric H,K-ATPase or a β subunit alone. In oocytes expressing the colonic H,K-ATPase, the decrease in intracellular Na+ activity persists when diffusive Na+ influx is enhanced by functional expression of the amiloride-sensitive epithelial Na+ channel, suggesting that the decrease is related to increased active Na+ efflux. The Na+ decrease depends on the presence of K+ in the external medium and is inhibited by 2 mM ouabain, a concentration that inhibits the colonic H,K-ATPase. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that the colonic H,K-ATPase may transport Na+, acting as an (Na,H),K-ATPase. Despite its molecular and functional characterization, the physiological role of the colonic (Na,H),K-ATPase in colonic and renal ion homeostasis remains to be elucidated.
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by Adelaide Mary Anderson ; foreword by the Right Hon. the Viscount Cave.
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Ottoman constitutional law of the 7th Dhil Hujjah, 1293 AH [December 24, 1876 AD] as amended. -- Regulations of the Chamber of deputies. -- Regulations of the Senate. -- Provisional law of administration of wilayets of the 13th March, 1329 AH [March 26, 1913 AD] as amended. -- Municipal law of the 27th Ramadhan, 1294 AH [October 5, 1877 AD] as amended. -- Law regulating chambers of commerce and industry, dated the 31st May, 1326 AH [June 13, 1910 AD]. -- Provisional law of expropriation on behalf of municipalities dated the 21st Kanun Thani, 1329 AH [February 3, 1914 AD]. -- Regulations of expropriation for public purposes, dated the 24th Tashrin Thani, 1295 AH [December 6, 1879 AD] as amended. -- The Press law of the 16th Tamuz, 1325 AH [July 29, 1910 AD] as amended.
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This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.
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Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.
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[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”