Mental Abnormality And Criminal Responsibility

This is a study in criminal law. The problem probed is the relationship between mental abnormality and criminal responsibility. The subject is yet an unsolved area in criminal jurisprudence. It is of great interest to many jurists lawyers philosophers and psychiatrists. The study lays special emphasis on the Indian law .Comparative assessment wherever found necessary,especially of positions in England ,United states and Germany is made. The thesis is in six parts and sixteen chapters.

A investigação criminal e a vedação ao anonimato no sistema jurídico brasileiro

The thesis, prepared with basis on deductive reasoning (through the utilization of general concepts of the fundamental rights theory) and on inductive logic (by means of the consideration of particular situations in which the theme has been approached) deals with the criminal investigation and the prohibition of anonymity in the Brazilian law system. The state criminal investigation activity presents not only a substantial constitutional basis, due to the objective dimension of fundamental rights (which imposes an obligation to protect these essential values), but also a formal constitutional basis, arising from the administrative principles of rule of law, morality and efficiency, referred to in article 37 of the Constitution. The criminal investigation, however, is not an unlimited pursuit, being restrained by the duty to consider fundamental rights that oppose to its realization. One of the limits of the state investigation activity, in the Brazilian law system, is the prohibition of anonymity, referred to in article 5°, IV, of the Constitution. This prohibition is a direct constitutional restriction to the freedom of expression that aims to ensure the credibility of the diffusion of ideas and prevent the abusive exercise of this fundamental right, which could harm both persons and the state, with no possibility of punishment to the offending party. Generally, based on this prohibition, it is affirmed that a criminal investigation cannot begin and progress founded on anonymous communication of crimes. Informations about crimes to the investigative authorities require the correct identification of the stakeholders. Therefore, it is sustained that the prohibition of anonymity also comprehends the prohibition of utilization of pseudonyms and heteronyms. The main purpose of this essay is to recognize the limits and possibilities in starting and conducting criminal investigations based on communication of crimes made by unidentified persons, behind the veil of anonymity or hidden by pseudonyms or heteronyms. Although the prohibition of article 5°, IV, of the Constitution is not submitted to direct or indirect constitutional restrictions, this impediment can be object of mitigation in certain cases, in attention to the constitutional values that support state investigation. The pertinence analysis of the restrictions to the constitutional anonymity prohibition must consider the proportionality, integrated by the partial elements of adequacy, necessity and strict sense proportionality. The criminal investigation is a means to achieve a purpose, the protection of fundamental rights, because the disclosure of facts, through the investigatory activity, gives rise to the accomplishment of measures in order to prevent or punish the violations eventually verified. So, the start and the development of the state criminal investigation activity, based on a crime communication carried out by an unidentified person, will depend on the demonstration that the setting up and continuity of an investigation procedure, in each case, are an adequate, necessary and (in a strict sense) proportional means to the protection of fundamental rights

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal Justice area? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 74, December 2014

This study examines the legal and political implications of the forthcoming end of the transitional period for the measures in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as set out in Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties. This Protocol limits some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon over EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (until 1 December 2014), and provides the UK with special ‘opt out/opt-in’ possibilities. The study focuses on the meaning of the transitional period for the wider European Criminal Justice area. The most far-reaching change emerging from the end of this transition will be the expansion of the European Commission and Luxembourg Court of Justice scrutiny powers over Member States’ implementation of EU criminal justice law. The possibility offered by Protocol 36 for the UK to opt out and opt back in to pre-Lisbon Treaty instruments poses serious challenges to a common EU area of justice by further institutionalising ‘over-flexible’ participation in criminal justice instruments. The study argues that in light of Article 82 TFEU the rights of the defence are now inextricably linked to the coherency and effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, and calls the European Parliament to request the UK to opt in EU Directives on suspects procedural rights as condition for the UK to ‘opt back in’ measures like the European Arrest Warrant.

Manual de procedimientos en materia criminal para los funcionarios y agentes de policía, guardia civil, jueces y fiscales municipales juzgados de instrucción, con apéndices de distintas leyes y disposiciones vigentes /

Mode of access: Internet.

Corporation procedure : law, finance, accounting /

"Fourth printing."

Cases argued and adjudged in the Court of Appeals of the State of Texas.

Imprint varies.

The third part of the Institutes of the laws of England: concerning high treason, and other pleas of the crown, and criminal causes.

Initials; manuscript marginal notes.

Working papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws relating to the Study draft of the new Federal criminal code.

Includes bibliographical references.

The statute law of Kentucky; with notes, prælections, and observations on the public acts. Comprehending also, the laws of Virginia and acts of Parliament in force in this commonwealth; the charter of Virginia, the federal and state constitutions, and so much of the King of England's proclamation in 1763, as relates to the titles to land in Kentucky. Together with a table of reference to the cases adjudicated in the Court of appeals ...

Imprint varies: v. 2-3, Frankfort, (Ken.) Printed for William Hunter, by Johnston & Pleasants. 1810-1811.--v. 4, Frankfort, (Ken.) Printed for William Hunter, by Robert Johnston. 1814.--v. 5, Frankfort, (Ken.) Printed for Butler & Wood. 1819.

Criminal violence, biological correlates and determinants : a selected bibliography /

Includes indexes.

Crime and the law : a 12th grade social studies course /

WI docs. no.: Ed.3/2:0082