Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Unemployment in an estimated new Keynesian model

We reformulate the Smets-Wouters (2007) framework by embedding the theory of unemployment proposed in Galí (2011a,b). Weestimate the resulting model using postwar U.S. data, while treatingthe unemployment rate as an additional observable variable. Our approach overcomes the lack of identification of wage markup and laborsupply shocks highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) intheir criticism of New Keynesian models, and allows us to estimate a"correct" measure of the output gap. In addition, the estimated modelcan be used to analyze the sources of unemployment fluctuations.

Risk sharing with the monarch: Excusable defaults and contingent debt in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless,there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine thefirst known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip IIof Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended onverifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowedfor effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The data also stronglysuggest that the defaults that occurred were excusable they were simply contingenciesover which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Structural unemployment

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with searchfrictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costsacross segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution ofthese costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as statesor industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, whichare large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structuralunemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, bothin the current and in previous recessions.

Speculation, risk premia and expectations in the yield curve

An affine asset pricing model in which traders have rational but heterogeneous expectations aboutfuture asset prices is developed. We use the framework to analyze the term structure of interestrates and to perform a novel three-way decomposition of bond yields into (i) average expectationsabout short rates (ii) common risk premia and (iii) a speculative component due to heterogeneousexpectations about the resale value of a bond. The speculative term is orthogonal to public informationin real time and therefore statistically distinct from common risk premia. Empirically wefind that the speculative component is quantitatively important accounting for up to a percentagepoint of yields, even in the low yield environment of the last decade. Furthermore, allowing for aspeculative component in bond yields results in estimates of historical risk premia that are morevolatile than suggested by standard Affine Gaussian term structure models which our frameworknests.

The contribution of schooling in development accounting: Results from a nonparametric upper bound

How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were toincrease their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development accounting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on theincrease in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number ofschooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms ofendogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compareour results with the standard development accounting approach, andprovide an update on the results using the standard approach for a largesample of countries.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Do institutions and culture matter for business cycles?

We examine the relationship between institutions, culture and cyclical fluctuations for a sampleof 45 European, Middle Eastern and North African countries. Better governance is associated withshorter and less severe contractions and milder expansions. Certain cultural traits, such as lack ofacceptance of power distance and individualism, are also linked business cycle features. Businesscycle synchronization is tightly related to similarities in the institutional environment. Mediterraneancountries conform to these general tendencies.

Slow recoveries: A structural interpretation

An analysis of the performance of GDP, employment and otherlabor market variables following the troughs in postwar U.S. businesscycles points to much slower recoveries in the three most recentepisodes, but does not reveal any significant change over time in therelation between GDP and employment. This leads us to characterizethe last three episodes as slow recoveries, as opposed to jobless recoveries.We use the estimated New Keynesian model in Galí-Smets-Wouters (2011) to provide a structural interpretation for the slowerrecoveries since the early nineties.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.

How important is the intensive margin of labor adjustment?

Using new quarterly data for hours worked in OECD countries, Ohanian and Raffo (2011) argue that in many OECD countries, particularly in Europe, hours per worker are quantitatively important as an intensive margin of labor adjustment, possibly because labor market frictions are higher than in the US. I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data. Using the same data on hours worked, I find evidence that labor market frictions are higher in Europe than in the US, like Ohanian and Raffo, but also that these frictions seem to affect the intensive margin at least as much as the extensive margin of labor adjustment.