February 2009: Tax Time

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Engaging Faculty in Online Education: Rightsizing Incentives and Optimizing Support

: Colleges and universities of all types are pursuing increasingly ambitious goals for online education for a range of reasons—enhancing learning, increasing access, growing enrollment, managing costs. However, concerns about workload, support resources, autonomy, and course quality leave many faculty skeptical of online instruction, and most institutions expanding online offerings are struggling to get sufficient numbers of faculty both willing and prepared to teach online. This study presents best practices in managing the strategic and operational challenges associated with increasing the number of fully online and hybrid courses

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

MPME- Qual o tratamento mais adequado - regime diferenciado como forma de redução da informalidade?

Este trabalho analisa o papel das micro , pequenas e médias empresas no Brasil, sua importância na geração de rendas e empregos e compara os principais indicadores desse segmento com o de outros países. O trabalho faz uma análise dos principais problemas que dificultam o desenvolvimento das MPME, evidencia o que já foi feito e sugere que as políticas públicas priorizem a melhoria da competitividade das empresas, através da redução dos obstáculos causados pela excessiva regulamentação, dificuldades de acesso a financiamentos de médio e de longo prazos e através de programas e incentivos visando a melhoria da gestão das mesmas. O trabalho evidencia a importância e a evolução dos Distritos Industriais ( APL's) no Brasil, por muitos considerado como uma alternativa de fortalecimento das MPME e de desenvolvimento regional. É feita uma análise dos principais indicadores da economia informal e como algumas medidas de políticas públicas poderiam colaborar para redução dos atuais níveis de informalidade. O trabalho é concluído reenfatizando as principais ações que poderiam ser priorizadas nas diversas áreas - regulamentação, judiciário, tributária, crédito, todas objetivando melhorar a produtividade das MPME.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Yet another reason to tax goods

The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Ideological changes and tax structure: Latin American countries during the nineties

Sabatini (2002) and Roberts and Wibbles (1999) Pointed Out That Voters in Latin American Countries are no Longer Choosing According to Their Ideological Preferences. Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) Showed That the Tax Choice In Oecd Countries Does not Follow the Ideological Pattern of Party Preferences. the Most Robust Result of This Work Shows That the Tax Choice in Latin American Countries Still Depends on This Ideological Preference. We Also Verified That Changes in the Tax Structure Depend on Changes Both in the Tax Burden and the Openness of the Economy

Políticas públicas no setor de turismo: utopia ou realidade?

Este trabalho pretende mostrar que a implementação de políticas públicas no setor de turismo não é utopia, e sim um instrumento essencial à dinamização deste segmento tão promissor e rentável, que no mundo todo vem apresentando resultados surpreendentes, e que pode contribuir de forma significativa para o desenvolvimento de uma região. Para auferir os dividendos da indústria do turismo é primordial que sejam realizados investimentos no setor, de modo a oferecer as condições básicas para que o mesmo possa se expandir. Estas condições vão desde a infra-estrutura básica até a capacitação da mão-de-obra local. Cabe aqui destacar que é fundamental também que se dê incentivos fiscais e monetários para atrair investidores. E, estas, são ações que cabem, fundamentalmente, à iniciativa governamental. Uma análise comparativa entre o desempenho da indústria do turismo no mundo, no Brasil e na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, pretendeu-se provar que nas circunstâncias atuais, a elaboração e a implementação de políticas públicas são essenciais para a expansão do setor de turismo, e que este é certamente um próspero caminho a ser trilhado pelo nosso país e pela nossa cidade, considerando o enorme potencial turístico de ambos, rumo ao desenvolvimento econômico-social.

Patrocínios culturais incentivados: porquês, para quem e como: Oi futuro: um estudo de caso

Este trabalho consiste em um estudo de caso sobre os patrocínios culturais incentivados realizados por uma organização da iniciativa privada que não tem a cultura como seu negócio-fim. Sua proposta é oferecer uma visão do papel desta, dos motivadores para que exerça responsabilidade social utilizando a cultura, o processo de escolha dos projetos patrocinados e os critérios que norteiam a opção por cada um deles. A pesquisa utilizou como base a análise de editais de patrocínio de diversas empresas, dados estatísticos acerca das características dos projetos inscritos e aprovados no processo da instituição escolhida e entrevistas com os protagonistas deste processo. Para contextualizar o estudo, é traçado um panorama histórico da atuação do Estado brasileiro na área cultural, através de suas políticas públicas e, principalmente, das leis de incentivo à cultura. Como fundamentação teórica, conceitos como cultura, política cultural e responsabilidade social são explorados, assim como a importância de indicadores como ferramentas de trabalho e a distinção entre mecenato e patrocínio.

Public investment in basic education and economic growth

The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.

The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgrades

The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

Sacrifice and efficiency of the income tax schedule

We investigate the efficiency of equal sacrifice tax schedules in an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971): a continuum of individuals with identical preferences defined over consumption and leisure who differ with respect to their labor market productivity. Using a separable specification for preferences we derive the minimum equal sacrifice allocation and recover the tax schedule that implements it. The separable specification allows us to use the methodology developed by Werning (2007b) to check whether the schedule is efficient, that is, whether there is no alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. We find that inefficiency does not arise for most parametrizations we use to approximate the US economy. For the few cases for which inefficiency does arise, it does so only for very high levels of income and marginal tax rates.

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.