The urban community in fifteenth-century Scotland : language, law and political practice

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CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

Speaking with different voices: the problems with English law and psychiatric injury

Private law courts in the UK have maintained the de minimis threshold as a condition precedent for a successful claim for the infliction of mental harm. This de minimis threshold necessitates the presence of a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ as opposed to ‘mere emotion’. This standard has also been adopted by the criminal law courts when reading the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to include non-physical injury. In determining the cut-off point between psychiatric injury and mere emotion, the courts have adopted a generally passive acceptance of expert testimony and the guidelines used by mental health professionals to make diagnoses. Yet these guidelines were developed for use in a clinical setting, not a legal one. This article examines the difficulty inherent in utilising the ‘dimensional’ diagnostic criteria used by mental health professionals to answer ‘categorical’ legal questions. This is of particular concern following publication of the new diagnostic manual, DSM-V in 2013, which will further exacerbate concerns about compatibility. It is argued that a new set of diagnostic guidelines, tailored specifically for use in a legal context, is now a necessity.

Default Invariance: Naïve Category of Law and Finance

Default invariance is the idea that default does not change at any scale of law and finance. Default is a conserved quantity in a universe where fundamental principles of law and finance operate. It exists at the micro-level as part of the fundamental structure of every financial transaction, and at the macro- level, as a fixed critical point within the relatively stable phases of the law and finance cycle. A key point is that default is equivalent to maximizing uncertainty at the micro-level and at the macro-level, is equivalent to the phase transition where unbearable fluctuations occur in all forms of risk transformation, including maturity, liquidity and credit. As such, default invariance is the glue that links the micro and macro structures of law and finance. In this essay, we apply naïve category theory (NCT), a type of mapping logic, to these types of phenomena. The purpose of using NCT is to introduce a rigorous (but simple) mathematical methodology to law and finance discourse and to show that these types of structural considerations are of prime practical importance and significance to law and finance practitioners. These mappings imply a number of novel areas of investigation. From the micro- structure, three macro-approximations are implied. These approximations form the core analytical framework which we will use to examine the phenomena and hypothesize rules governing law and finance. Our observations from these approximations are grouped into five findings. While the entirety of the five findings can be encapsulated by the three approximations, since the intended audience of this paper is the non-specialist in law, finance and category theory, for ease of access we will illustrate the use of the mappings with relatively common concepts drawn from law and finance, focusing especially on financial contracts, derivatives, Shadow Banking, credit rating agencies and credit crises.

Law and Original Contract in the Republican Thought of Immanuel Kant

This article discusses the concept of right and its identification with the power to coerce, to show a reciprocity between the original contract and the right, as a manifestation of the reciprocity between moral law and freedom, as Kant states in its Second Critique. The demonstration of this view will allow a republican stance evident in the legal and political thought of Kant, since the right of a people can only exist while the town itself is unified to enact.